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From the editors
Our belief in the need for and the efficacy of humanitarian action is partly based on its actual effectiveness over the years in addressing the needs 
of, among others, forced migrants. But this belief is tempered by the obvious 
and manifold failures of such action. The existence of people in very protracted 
displacement, the inadequacy of the solutions proposed for them and the 
inevitability that many people now becoming displaced will face the same fate  
all point to the pressing need for improvement that cannot reasonably be achieved 
through humanitarian action alone. Far more could be achieved if development 
and peace-building actors were also involved in responses to displacement.
This is not a new idea in itself, as shown by the statement made in 1967 by 
Sadruddin Aga Khan, then High Commissioner for Refugees, which we publish 
on the back cover. This issue of FMR continues to explore the more recent ideas 
and practices that are being tried out in order to engage development and  
humanitarian work in support of ‘transitions’ for displaced people and a variety  
of ‘solutions’. 
FMR 52 also includes a range of ‘general’ articles on other aspects of forced 
migration. 
We would like to thank Alyoscia D’Onofrio (International Rescue Committee) and 
Kathrine Starup (Danish Refugee Council) for their assistance as advisors on the 
feature theme of this issue. We are grateful to the Government of Denmark which 
has provided financial support for this issue on behalf of the Solutions Alliance of 
which it is vice-chair.  
The full issue and all the individual articles in this issue are online in html, pdf and 
audio formats at www.fmreview.org/solutions. Please help disseminate this issue 
by circulating it through your networks, mentioning it on Twitter and Facebook and 
adding it to resources lists. 
This issue will be available online in English, Arabic, French and Spanish. Also 
available is the FMR digest – formerly called ‘Listing’, now in a new format –  
to help you gain easy online access to all the articles published in FMR 52.  
If you would like printed copies of either, please email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk. 
For details of Forthcoming issues see www.fmreview.org/forthcoming. 
•  FMR 53, Local communities: first and last providers of protection  
(due out October 2016) www.fmreview.org/community-protection
•  FMR 54, Resettlement (due out February 2017).  
Submission deadline: 10th October 2016.
Join us on Facebook or Twitter or sign up for our occasional email alerts at  
www.fmreview.org/request/alerts. 
Our thanks to the many people who responded to our Readers Survey. We are 
collating the results and will report back in the coming months. We also hope  
to be able to take up some of the suggestions you had for us as to how to improve 
on what FMR can offer.
Marion Couldrey and Maurice Herson 
Editors, Forced Migration Review
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Forced displacement: a development issue with 
humanitarian elements
Niels Harild 
Work on conflict-induced forced displacement is at a crucial moment, at a tipping point. 
Now is the time to consolidate the shift towards full global recognition that the challenge of 
forced displacement is an integral part of the development agenda too. 
There are currently an estimated 60 million 
refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in the world. The related social, 
economic and fiscal challenges are further 
amplified if one also takes affected host and 
return populations into account. In addition, 
the average length of time that people are 
displaced has been growing and is likely to 
increase even further as there is still no peace 
in sight for many of the ongoing conflicts. 
Only a few of the displaced people are 
currently able to avail themselves of any of 
the three ‘durable solutions’. Resettlement 
in third countries is limited in numbers 
and very expensive; voluntary return is 
hampered by lack of stability and peace, and 
full local integration and naturalisation are 
often blocked by policy restrictions. Most 
displaced are therefore living in ‘protracted 
displacement’. An increasing proportion 
of displaced people live in urban areas, 
intermingled with the local communities, 
but often do not benefit from basic services 
on a par with the local population and 
are also excluded from the formal job 
market and from business opportunities. 
In large displacement situations the socio-
economic and macro-economic impact on 
host communities and countries can be 
substantial. In such situations, the needs of 
the displaced and affected host populations 
are predominantly developmental.
Challenges, obstacles, opportunities
While there clearly is a continuing need for 
more humanitarian assistance, there is simply 
no way that present-day displacement needs 
can be covered by humanitarian financing 
and approaches, let alone solved. Given the 
lack of success by national and international 
stakeholders in addressing the roots of today’s 
conflicts, they tend to linger on without 
any resolution in sight. Yet policymakers, 
planners and other actors see displacement 
as a largely humanitarian issue. They ignore 
its inevitable longevity, and the typical 
response therefore stays in a short-term 
mode. However, there is growing recognition 
that the present system is not working. 
Humanitarian agencies are not equipped 
to address the long-term developmental 
needs of those in protracted displacement, 
and yet this has been the default for many 
years. If the policy framework stays in a short-
term humanitarian mode during protracted 
displacement, there is every potential for 
this to breed exclusion, poverty, degradation, 
possible radicalisation, and new conflict 
Third-generation refugee children walking to school in Ban Mai Nai Soi 
refugee camp on the Thai-Myanmar border. June 2014.
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and violence as well as significant economic 
and fiscal pressure on host countries. 
The problems in an inherently 
humanitarian approach are compounded 
by policymakers who focus on the negative 
impacts of the arrival of displaced people 
and ignore the positives. They often blame 
displaced people for other pre-existing 
ailments, and they put in place shortsighted 
and restrictive policies rather than addressing 
the problem more jointly and holistically. 
This reflects a lack of understanding of 
short- and long-term social, economic, fiscal 
and security implications of protracted 
displacement. There is sometimes a deliberate 
wish not to want to understand these 
implications out of fear that this would run 
counter to short-term political views or trends, 
leading to loss of electoral votes. Thereby 
displaced people fall victim to local politics. 
This negative spiral needs to be reversed. 
In practical terms this would require 
recognition of displaced people’s right to 
work and to move freely. Displaced people 
need to be seen as potential assets for local 
growth and development rather than always 
being viewed as a burden. For this to happen, 
there is a need 
for affected 
governments 
and their 
development 
partners to 
understand 
that forced 
displacement 
is a core 
development 
issue and 
that, as such, 
it belongs 
in national 
development 
plans, even 
if substantial 
ongoing 
humanitarian 
needs mean that 
humanitarian 
actors must 
stay engaged. 
There is growing analytical and 
operational evidence of the benefits of 
innovative, development-led approaches to 
displacement. A few countries are beginning 
to include displacement challenges in their 
development plans and are thus setting the 
stage for development actors to support 
national efforts through loans or grants. The 
World Bank is getting seriously involved 
in addressing forced displacement in 
terms of analytical work, policy dialogue, 
operations and new financing options, and its 
partnership with UNHCR, the UN Refugee 
Agency, is expanding. An increasing number 
of bilateral donors are beginning to think 
more in this way about the issue as well.
The issue is attracting attention in 2016 
through a number of high-level events; this 
increased engagement at the policy level is 
welcome but also essential if we are to achieve 
the fundamental change that is needed. It is 
an opportunity that should not be missed. The 
challenge will be to find a holistic approach 
that deals with these crises at the source, for 
neighbouring countries and for countries 
further afield, under one comprehensive 
long-term framework where the legitimate 
concerns of all parties are addressed.
What is to be done?
The first step towards fundamental change 
would be for all actors to accept that 
conflict-induced forced displacement is 
predominantly a development issue with 
humanitarian elements – and not the other 
way around. This change in mindset requires 
an understanding that, while protracted 
forced displacement often requires short-term 
humanitarian action, it is fundamentally 
about responding to the social, economic 
and fiscal implications for the displaced 
people and for hosting countries to the 
benefit of all affected. Often this may require 
area-based, targeted investments to boost 
economic activity, particularly in host 
areas with high unemployment. Real and 
substantial improvements for those living 
in protracted displacement and the affected 
host populations can only come about by 
addressing housing, livelihoods and jobs, 
access to services, inclusion and governance in 
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ways that benefit both the displaced and their 
host communities, ensuring that displaced 
people end up being self-reliant rather than 
needing continued humanitarian aid. 
It is important for governments of affected 
countries to understand that most, if not 
all, new forced displacement situations may 
become protracted, and that they need to 
muster sufficient political courage to make 
the necessary long-term policy decisions early 
in the crisis. This is not easy. International 
development actors and donors should 
work closely with these governments to 
help them weigh up the different policy 
options; they can do this by providing 
country-specific context assessments (that 
include joint stakeholder analysis of the 
policy environment and the institutional 
frameworks and capacity), demographic 
profiling and an analysis of the prospects 
for durable solutions. Hence it is important 
to map the direct and indirect economic, 
environmental, social, macro-economic 
and political impact of the displacement 
situation on both the displaced and the host 
communities. This evidence can then be used 
as an entry point for policy discussions with 
the host government and local authorities. 
These analyses should of course include 
meaningful beneficiary consultation.
Governments need to have such 
assessments and policy options available to 
make the needed policy choices. Multilateral 
and bilateral development actors should work 
with governments to shift from short- to long-
term policies to forced displacement from 
the beginning. They should also continue 
to strengthen the design of multilateral and 
bilateral sectoral programmes and operations 
so they include a response to the specific 
needs of the displaced and affected host 
and return communities within the wider 
programme. This will include embracing a 
new policy concept of ‘temporary longer-
term economic integration’, with return or 
other lasting solutions being the long-term 
goal. This is a difficult and slow process 
but it must be done and there is growing 
evidence that it can work. If displaced people 
are allowed to be more self-reliant, thereby 
enabling them to contribute to the economy 
and to pay taxes, it can reduce the need for 
humanitarian assistance and lessen macro-
economic and service-delivery stress. In this 
way the displaced will also be better prepared 
for return as they are able to build and retain 
skills and accumulate savings essential for 
eventual successful return and reintegration.
For a comprehensive approach to work 
effectively, governments need to exercise 
strong leadership and provide the required 
legal and policy frameworks that set the 
parameters for development interventions 
and the timing and space for humanitarian 
interventions. Hence host countries should 
play a leading role in policy dialogue from 
the beginning in order to develop long-term 
comprehensive planning for all sectors, 
taking into account country-specific needs 
and political challenges. All government 
actors should be clear about the short- 
and long-term economic, social and fiscal 
implications. A key host country concern 
would often be a reluctance to entertain the 
full durable solution of local integration. 
An approach of longer-term temporary 
integration until a lasting solution is found 
would be more applicable to most situations.
Development actors should also 
continue to deepen their collaboration with 
humanitarian actors. First and foremost, this 
should involve developing a situation-specific, 
multi-year common programme framework 
with well-defined lead roles and overall 
objectives and based on joint assessment and 
analysis. For this to work, all international 
and local actors need to work together. 
Donors need more comprehensive, synergetic 
approaches to funding, UN development 
agencies need to establish their roles through 
a more inclusive and open approach towards 
larger common programme frameworks, 
and the international financial institutions 
need to engage in broad partnerships 
that also include bilateral donors. 
By adopting such approaches, it should 
be possible for development actors to engage 
from the beginning of crises and to focus 
on the long-term development needs of 
the displaced and their host countries or 
return communities. In this collaborative 
approach, it is important that they draw 
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on their comparative advantages and resist 
the temptation to get directly involved in 
humanitarian work. Humanitarian actors on 
the other hand need a clear exit strategy built 
in early, taking into account host country 
capacity and also the continued need for 
protection of and support to marginalised 
groups that are not benefitting from wider 
programmes. 
A key part of this is the importance of a 
joint context assessment which can provide 
a joint platform for all actors to work from. 
The World Bank-led joint assessments of 
displacement in the Great Lakes and the 
Horn of Africa are good examples of how 
this can be done differently from in the 
past.1 Once the needed policies are in place 
and operations are designed, all relevant 
financing sources – including new lending 
tools and grants – must be activated along 
with inputs from the private sector and the 
security sector, in order to project a real sense 
of responsibility sharing supporting a single 
policy framework. International development 
partners can assist affected countries in 
formulating such policy frameworks.
All this serves to show that 
development actors have a key role to 
play in mainstreaming the issue of forced 
displacement, and they must make the best 
of current opportunities and platforms 
to ensure that they meet this challenge. 
These opportunities include consensus 
around the need to operationalise the 
Sustainable Development Goals, the World 
Humanitarian Summit and global and 
country-specific efforts, among which the 
Solutions Alliance stands out as particularly 
promising. In short, it is time for development 
actors to work comprehensively on their 
tools and instruments, to scale up their 
efforts on forced displacement impacts 
in fragile and conflict-affected countries 
and to advocate with governments.
Dialogue on all of these issues is most 
effective if it addresses the concerns of host 
countries, if it includes a focus on improving 
conditions of host communities and thereby 
of the displaced as well, and if it proves that 
allowing refugees to use the capacity they 
have is beneficial to the host country. Above 
all we should not forget that this is about 
respect for other human beings; our objective 
is to help them secure a dignified, meaningful 
and safe life while in displacement and to 
support them in finding a lasting solution. 
Niels Harild nharild@gmail.com  
Formerly Manager of the Global Program on 
Forced Displacement, The World Bank Group 
www.worldbank.org; now independent policy 
expert on forced displacement and development
This article draws on work on the displacement 
challenge with UNHCR, NGOs and the World 
Bank Group. It reflects the views of the author 
and not necessarily the views of UNHCR, the 
World Bank or any of the other organisations.
1. World Bank/UNHCR (2015) Forced Displacement in the Great 
Lakes Region: A Development Response  
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21708; World Bank/UNHCR (2015) 
Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa  
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22286
The 67 families of IDPs living in this collective centre in Georgia fled 
Tskhinvali in 1991. (photo taken 2008)
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The reality of transitions
Silvio Cordova
Attempts to address the drivers of forced displacement and to provide sustainable solutions 
for refugees, IDPs and returnees need a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of 
violence and of war-to-peace transitions. 
There is a well-known litany of reasons 
for obstacles to the engagement of 
development stakeholders in forced 
displacement and protracted situations. 
While factors such as differing mandates, 
institutional arrangements, funding 
instruments and programming cycles 
between the humanitarian and development 
communities have played a role in creating 
and perpetuating the ‘humanitarian-
development divide’, little attention has been 
drawn to the weak conceptual foundations 
of ‘bridges’ or ‘links’ between humanitarian 
and development assistance and their 
lack of empirical evidence. Barriers to 
engaging development and political actors in 
preventing and responding to displacement, 
and to the design and implementation of 
joint humanitarian-development strategies, 
have primarily been conceptual. 
Despite growing recognition that 
transitions from emergency response to 
development assistance should not be 
linear, the idea and practice of humanitarian 
actors ‘handing over’ to development 
actors persist. This is primarily due to a 
lack of understanding of drivers of violence 
and of how transitions from war to peace 
unfold. Indeed, analysts and practitioners 
have rarely questioned the phenomenon at 
the core of concepts such as ‘linking relief 
to development’: namely the transition 
from war to peace. The idea of ‘links’ and 
‘bridges’ is based on flawed assumptions 
about such transitions, assumptions that 
are not grounded in the complex reality 
of countries emerging from conflicts and 
crisis. As a result, interventions based 
on such an approach cannot provide a 
response to and address the unpredictability 
and multiple variables of transitions. 
In order to understand why a 
linear sequencing of humanitarian and 
development assistance is unhelpful and 
counter-productive, it is of paramount 
importance to look into the drivers of 
violence and displacement in the first 
place. This will also allow us to understand 
why violence often continues into so 
called ‘post-conflict’ settings and hence 
will provide us with a more nuanced 
interpretation of war-to-peace transitions. 
Continuities and cycles
In many conflicts, the aim of armed groups 
and other actors is the prolongation of 
violence in order to achieve economic (and 
political) gains, rather than outright victory. 
Economic agendas, though, are not enough 
to explain why violence may continue 
into ‘peacetime’. Greater attention should 
be given to communities’ socio-economic 
grievances that are often overlooked and 
that play a critical role in triggering and 
fuelling violence. The end of a conflict does 
not necessarily entail a clean break from past 
patterns of violence: high levels of violence 
are a recurrent feature of most countries 
emerging from conflict. Indeed, legacies of 
war together with new forms of violence 
explain why transitions are characterised 
by repeated setbacks and reversals. 
Given the reality of the prolongation 
of violence into ‘peacetime’ and repeated 
cycles of violence and displacement, 
the debate on the relationship between 
humanitarian and development assistance 
should therefore move from a focus on 
‘gaps’, ‘bridges’ and ‘links’ between the two 
communities towards a better understanding 
of transitions from war to peace. 
As transitions are not a one-way process 
neither should transitions from humanitarian 
assistance to development be. It would be 
unrealistic to assume that the international 
community can address such a fluid, 
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complex and unpredictable phenomenon 
as transition by providing humanitarian 
and development assistance in sequential 
ways, and to plan the timing of when 
humanitarian assistance should ‘hand over’ 
to development cooperation. As transitions 
are particularly susceptible to repeated 
cycles of violence and displacement, even 
in situations of relative peace and stability, 
it is no surprise that the implementation of 
early recovery initiatives, the ‘handing-over’ 
model and other variations of ‘linking relief 
to development’ have proven problematic. 
There may be a need for humanitarian aid, 
for instance, in ‘post-conflict’ environments 
during relapses into violence and new cycles 
of displacement, as the conflicts in Colombia 
and DRC have shown, or there may be room 
for development in emergency settings 
and on-going violence as in South Sudan. 
Changing the discourse 
It is important to point out that most 
drivers of violence – and resulting cycles 
of displacement and protracted situations 
– are structural developmental, economic 
and political factors. In addition, most 
issues limiting sustainable solutions for 
refugees, IDPs and returnees – such as land 
rights, establishment of livelihoods and 
employment opportunities, rule of law, and 
freedom of movement – are developmental 
and political in nature rather than 
humanitarian. As a consequence, a linear 
implementation of humanitarian assistance 
followed by development would not only 
postpone – rather than address – these 
underlying issues but also might contribute 
to the prolongation of crises and conflicts. 
Therefore, keeping in mind the drivers 
of violence and the multi-faceted nature 
of transitions, forced displacement and, 
in particular, protracted refugee and IDP 
situations should be reframed within 
broader development, peace-building, 
economic and political discourses. Indeed, 
preventing and addressing these issues 
need societal and economic transformation 
that go beyond the scope and mandate of 
humanitarian organisations. The strategies 
that follow on from this should be broader, 
multi-sectoral and multi-year interventions 
that envisage the simultaneous engagement 
of development, humanitarian and 
political stakeholders from the onset of and 
throughout a conflict and a displacement 
crisis. This will be likely to contribute to 
enhancing the human development of 
displaced populations, their contribution 
to the economy of hosting countries and 
communities and, as a result, the quality of 
their protection during displacement.
Reframing the debate on the 
‘humanitarian-development divide’ around 
the issue of transitions can result in more 
informed and evidence-based policy 
and programming and more sustainable 
solutions for displaced populations. It has 
also the potential to open up space for a 
greater involvement of development and 
political stakeholders in mitigating drivers 
and impacts of displacement on host 
communities and countries. In addition, 
their engagement from the onset of a 
displacement crisis would be instrumental 
in conducting advocacy and political 
dialogue with countries of origin and 
asylum for addressing the development 
needs of refugees, IDPs and returnees. 
It may be that the narrow way in 
which the humanitarian community has 
contributed to depicting displacement 
and protracted situations for decades has 
been in part the cause of lack of interest 
by development actors, who have not 
seen these issues as being their concern. 
It is now crucial to address the tendency 
– within donor and government circles 
as well as international organisations – to 
underestimate the implications of labels 
and rigid categories for policymaking 
and for developing innovative and more 
sustainable approaches to preventing 
and addressing forced displacement 
and protracted situations.
Silvio Cordova silvio.cordova@eeas.europa.eu 
Programme Manager, European Union Delegation 
to South Sudan 
The views expressed in this article are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect those  
of the European Union. 
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Forgotten people: former Liberian refugees in Ghana
Naohiko Omata 
More than three years after the cessation of refugee status for Liberian refugees, the viability 
of the ECOWAS integration scheme implemented as a solution for those Liberians who 
continued to stay in Ghana is seen to be limited. 
Although exile can be interminably 
protracted, refugee status is not granted 
permanently. According to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, when the circumstances under 
which people were recognised as refugees 
no longer exist (the premise of ‘ceased 
circumstances’), the Cessation Clause may  
be invoked while they are still in a country  
of asylum. Through this process thousands 
of Liberian refugees in Ghana saw the end 
of their refugee status in 2012, after which 
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, brought in 
an integration scheme through the freedom 
of movement protocol of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
as a ‘sub-regional solution’ for Liberians who 
remained in exile. 
Prolonged displacement for Liberian 
refugees 
After the beginning of the Liberian civil 
war in 1989, the Ghanaian government 
established the Buduburam refugee camp in 
1990 in response to the arrival of displaced 
Liberians in the country. After the final 
ceasefire agreement of the war in 2003, 
UNHCR repeatedly urged the repatriation of 
refugees to Liberia. The pace of repatriation, 
however, was sluggish among the remaining 
Liberians in Ghana due to the precarious 
political and economic environment in 
Liberia. Many Liberian refugees in Ghana had 
been hoping for third-country resettlement 
but, with peace restored in Liberia, most no 
longer met the criteria for resettlement. 
The other remaining ‘traditional’ durable 
solution – local integration – failed to gain 
support from either the host government 
or the Liberian refugees themselves. 
The Ghanaian administration viewed 
local integration as an imposition on the 
country and did not offer integration as 
an option to refugees who remained. 
Local integration was also unpopular with 
refugees, mainly because of the lack of socio-
economic prospects for them in Ghana. 
Not only did these refugees remain 
without a durable solution but their living 
conditions had also become increasingly 
challenging. After the 2003 ceasefire, the 
amount of humanitarian aid was continuously 
reduced and almost entirely terminated 
by 2010. In addition, refugees continued to 
face a number of barriers to engaging in 
economic activities outside the camp, such 
as local xenophobia and their own lack of 
knowledge of local languages. Thus, with the 
exception of a few recipients of remittances, 
many Liberians were reduced to bare 
subsistence inside and around the camp. 
ECOWAS-based integration as a ‘solution’ 
In January 2012, UNHCR announced the 
cessation of refugee status for Liberian 
refugees worldwide as from the end of 
June 2012. As nearly a decade had passed 
since the 2003 ceasefire agreement, the 
international community deemed that the 
situation in Liberia had greatly improved 
and that the causes of the displacement no 
longer existed. At the beginning of 2012, 
the Liberian refugees living in Ghana were 
left with two options: either to repatriate by 
the end of June 2012 before the invocation 
of the Cessation Clause or to remain in 
Ghana through an agreement that existed 
among the member countries of ECOWAS. 
ECOWAS is not a refugee-protecting 
body but a regional confederation of fifteen 
West African states – including both Ghana 
and Liberia – which was founded in 1975 
to promote trade and economic integration 
across the region. The sub-regional 
integration scheme was based on the 1979 
Protocol on Free Movement adopted by 
ECOWAS which confers on community 
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citizens the right 
to enter, reside 
in and establish 
economic activities 
in the territory of any 
ECOWAS member 
state.1 Since the late 
2000s, UNHCR had 
been focusing on 
this scheme as an 
‘innovative solution’ 
for protracted 
refugees in West 
Africa. Staff members 
of UNHCR Ghana 
believed that 
increasing refugees’ 
mobility offered a 
means of ensuring 
their enduring access 
to sustainable livelihoods and meaningful 
employment opportunities by providing 
legal residency and better access to labour 
markets across ECOWAS countries. 
At the end of June 2012, approximately 
7,000 Liberians remained in Ghana and 
continued living in exile under the new 
label of ECOWAS migrants. Even though 
the Ghanaian administration officially 
announced the closure of Buduburam 
camp in 2012, most of these Liberian former 
refugees continued living inside the camp 
area and in February 2014, almost two years 
after the cessation of their refugee status, 
Liberians remaining in Ghana were finally 
issued ECOWAS passports, which included 
a two-year work and residence permit. 
The provision of this migrant status, 
however, has not brought meaningful 
changes in their daily lives. 
Dearth of economic opportunities
Stephanie, a single mother with a school-age 
daughter, had been living hand-to-mouth by 
combining various means of subsistence, such 
as doing household jobs for other refugee 
families and receiving charitable assistance 
from other refugees and her church inside 
the camp. When asked how her life had 
changed since the provision of ECOWAS 
work and residence permit, she responded: 
 
“No change. We are living on help from other 
Liberians [inside the camp]. I wash their clothing 
and clean their house for a little cash or a portion 
of food. This is how we have survived for a long 
time… I do not have any special skills. We cannot 
manage outside the camp.” 
Some Liberians unsuccessfully attempted 
to explore employment opportunities outside 
the camp area. Marshall, owner of a small 
shop in the camp, expressed his despair 
during this job search: 
“I applied for two jobs at local supermarkets but 
I did not get either of them. I don’t speak local 
[Ghanaian] languages. Discrimination from locals 
remains strong. Even if I have a work permit, I 
don’t think I can get a job in Ghana.” 
Adam, a Ghanaian programme officer 
who had worked for NGOs in the camp 
for over a decade, questioned the viability 
of the sub-regional integration scheme: 
“I was always sceptical about the feasibility of this 
ECOWAS option. UNHCR said that the work 
permit enables refugees to move to a place where 
they can find good jobs. But where can they find 
good jobs? Ghana does not have many employment 
opportunities and many locals are unemployed… 
The ECOWAS status might be useful for those 
with special qualifications such as doctors, nurses 
One of the main business streets inside Buduburam refugee camp, Ghana, now relatively quiet since 
the departure of many refugees due to the invocation of the cessation clause. With the reduced camp 
population, refugees with businesses experienced a steep decline in sales and found it hard to survive.
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or computer experts. But how many Liberians have 
such technical skills?” 
Former refugees who were interviewed 
in 2015 were in unanimous agreement that 
the camp economy had been weakening 
for the last several years. This is in part 
due to the changing demographics in 
the camp. In refugee populations, it is 
common for those who are wealthier or 
more resourceful to be the first to repatriate 
or leave. In response to earlier pressure to 
repatriate and the cessation of their refugee 
status, Liberian refugees followed a similar 
pattern. Kevin, a former refugee who lived 
in Ghana from the mid-1990s, observed: 
“The camp economy is dying. Many small 
enterprises closed down due to the reduced number 
of customers. Most of the richer ones left Ghana 
before the cessation. They used to help poor ones 
but they [richer ones] are all gone. Remaining 
Liberians are all very poor.” 
In Ghana, after better-off refugees 
departed, vulnerable people with few 
marketable livelihood skills and economic 
resources were left behind, increasing the 
proportion of impoverished refugees in the 
remaining camp population. Put differently, 
former refugees who were least well-suited 
to be able to take advantage of the ECOWAS 
integration scheme were the ones left in 
exile to survive as ‘economic migrants’. 
‘Solving’ the problem or concealing failure? 
Given these findings, the feasibility of the 
ECOWAS-based integration scheme as a 
‘solution’ deserves careful scrutiny. First, the 
provision of work and residence permits alone 
has done little to facilitate integration of the 
remaining Liberians in Ghana. Most of them 
engage in means of subsistence built on the 
camp economy and do not require extensive 
mobility in their livelihoods. In addition, 
few could afford the cost of transportation 
to venture out to external markets. 
Second, fundamental impediments 
to integration such as language barriers 
and xenophobic attitudes among locals 
remain untouched. Due to the persistent 
reluctance of the host government to 
integrate refugees, the Ghanaian government 
and UNHCR made little effort to set up a 
conducive environment for the successful 
integration of remaining Liberians. 
Third, the limited absorptive capacities 
of the West African region should not 
be overlooked. Most ECOWAS member 
countries, including Ghana, have stagnant 
economies and high unemployment rates. 
Even if the former Liberian refugees could 
move freely to markets in neighbouring states, 
it is difficult to imagine that many of them 
would be able to secure gainful employment.
The introduction of this sub-regional 
integration scheme risks disguising the 
failure of the international community to 
provide a durable solution for these refugees. 
Although the Liberians’ refugee status 
ceased, their exile and plight continued. 
Substituting the label of ‘economic migrant’ 
for that of ‘refugee’ is not a real alternative 
to a durable solution. It is a ‘quasi-solution’ 
that serves to conceal the failure of the global 
refugee regime to deal with the challenges 
of former refugees who have been left with 
ambiguous migrant status and little attention 
from the international community.2 
It is imperative that the international 
refugee regime closely monitors the situations 
of former refugees in West Africa to find 
out whether the ECOWAS integration 
scheme can really constitute a solution for 
Liberians who continue in exile. Otherwise, 
such refugee populations who are not able 
to attain a durable solution will eventually 
‘disappear’, removed from official statistics 
by being stripped of refugee status. Given 
the ubiquity of protracted refugee cases 
worldwide, we may witness more of these 
‘forgotten’ former refugees in the near future. 
Naohiko Omata naohiko.omata@qeh.ox.ac.uk  
Senior Research Officer, Humanitarian Innovation 
Project, Refugee Studies Centre, University of 
Oxford www.rsc.ox.ac.uk 
1. Adepoju A, Boulton A and Levin M (2007) ‘Promoting 
integration through mobility: free movement and the ECOWAS 
Protocol’, Working Paper No.150, New Issues in Refugee Research, 
UNHCR www.unhcr.org/476650ae2.pdf
2. Long K (2014) ‘Rethinking Durable Solutions’ in Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh E, Loescher G, Long K and Sigona N (Eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford University 
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Reflecting on Liberia and Sierra Leone
J O Moses Okello
In post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone, partnerships that were mutually supportive and that 
included the displaced themselves facilitated rapid and enduring results. 
Not too long ago, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
experienced extreme violence with both of 
them teetering on the brink of being failed 
states. Today they are on the mend, albeit 
struggling. What happened in their case and 
how were their fortunes turned around? 
Governments and their international 
partners tend to prioritise resources aiming 
at buttressing peace agreements and related 
political processes such as elections, but 
in isolation and at the expense of other 
equally critical needs such as revitalising 
the economy and restoring basic social 
services and infrastructure. In both Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, a deliberate effort was 
made to tackle these concurrently. Security 
and a return to law and order were other 
basic areas that required attention. Restoring 
governmental authority (such as police and 
other institutions of governance) and putting 
in place minimal mechanisms for the delivery 
of services were priorities. This was also the 
period when early foundations for the return 
to rule of law were created, including the 
rehabilitation of courts and courthouses. 
Long years of exile tend to rob people of 
the opportunity to learn or develop traditional 
coping mechanisms. People who go through 
this experience face monumental challenges 
when faced with re-establishing themselves 
upon return. In Liberia and Sierra Leone 
support had to be provided to returnees in the 
form of cash grants, food, shelter materials 
and other relief items in the initial stages 
of the return process. This enabled a ‘soft 
landing’ for the returnees but they were, 
nevertheless, faced with other problems. 
It was also important that reintegration 
programmes avoided unhelpful distinctions 
between groups of beneficiaries or return 
areas. It was critical, for example, to ensure 
that ex-combatants were given special attention 
so as not to be tempted to sell their only skill 
– warfare – but counter-productive to treat 
them as entirely distinct from returnees. There 
had, therefore, to be a point of convergence, 
mostly at the community reintegration level, 
where assistance saw no distinctions but gave 
equal recognition and treatment to everyone. 
Likewise, no distinction was made in respect 
of internally displaced persons and former 
refugees returning to the same locations. 
It was similarly unreasonable to ignore 
the needs of displaced persons and former 
refugees returning to urban areas in favour 
of the rural areas. Attention had to be given 
also to individuals who were not displaced 
– ‘stayees’ – who were equally in need.
Apart from the social provisioning, a 
very important matter in the post-conflict 
recovery process was ensuring food security. 
The wars had debilitated the countries’ 
productive capacity and displaced most of 
the agriculturally productive segment of the 
population. Improving food security thus 
required substantial attention, including 
extending humanitarian food assistance 
alongside improving agricultural productivity 
and supporting small-scale subsistence 
farming. It had to be recognised that the 
transition from relief to development was 
not a linear experience and that relief and 
development assistance were required 
concurrently for a number of years. 
Partnership between a renewed state 
apparatus, civil society and the private sector is 
indispensable for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Responding to the needs of the forcibly 
displaced is a complex undertaking that needs 
broad partnerships to be forged involving 
all relevant actors – traditional development 
partners, financial institutions, bilateral 
donors, agencies with relevant mandates, 
international and national NGOs with their 
specialised knowledge, the private sector and, 
not least, the broader local civil society. 
J O Moses Okello jomokello@gmail.com  
Formerly UNHCR Representative in Liberia
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Peace in Colombia and solutions for its displaced 
people
Martin Gottwald
With the prospect of peace comes the need to find solutions for those displaced during  
50 years of fighting. Solutions will not come without comprehensive attention to the factors 
affecting IDPs and refugees.
Since 2012, the Colombian government has 
been engaged in peace talks with the 
country’s largest guerrilla group, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), amidst an armed conflict that 
has dragged on for over 50 years and has 
displaced more than six million people.  
The negotiating parties have reached 
agreements on rural development, drug 
substitution, political participation, 
transitional justice and reparations for 
victims. The remaining points on the 
agenda are a deal on how the guerrillas 
will demobilise and disarm, and how to 
implement the peace accords. 
The peace agreement will be just the 
beginning of a transition period that will 
encompass a range of measures aimed at 
reducing the country’s risk of relapsing 
into conflict. Finding comprehensive 
durable solutions for the country’s 
displaced populations is a key aspect of 
that process because, among other reasons, 
the reintegration of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and refugee returnees will 
validate the post-agreement political order 
and contribute to the recovery of licit local 
economies and to participatory development.
The concept of comprehensive solutions is 
premised on the belief that both the purpose 
of solutions and the systemic nature of the 
problem of IDPs and refugees require that 
the approach taken to achieve a lasting 
restoration of human rights must build on 
a full understanding of the interconnected 
factors around displacement, and must tackle 
them in an inclusive manner.1 This contrasts 
with non-comprehensive approaches to 
solutions which address displacement 
factors, population groups of concern and 
solutions in isolation from each other, or 
which expect solutions automatically to result 
from generic peace-building interventions.
In substantive terms, the concept of 
comprehensive solutions requires an 
integrated and multi-sectoral approach to 
protection and durable solutions that focuses 
on self-reliance, with displaced populations 
meaningfully involved in decision-making 
processes. Mutually reinforcing synergies 
need to be created between proposed 
solutions – whether voluntary return, 
local integration or resettlement – for IDPs, 
returnees and refugees. The final purpose 
and outcome must be the full restoration 
of human rights in line with the IASC 
Framework on Durable Solutions for 
Internally Displaced People2 and standards 
defined by Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
in its landmark ruling T-025 from 2004. 
In terms of processes and structures, the 
concept requires that the government and 
the UN draw up a comprehensive solutions 
strategy in the framework of coordinated 
multi-stakeholder partnerships.
Still displaced
Since 1985, 6.9 million people have been 
internally displaced, of whom some 60% 
have fled to the shantytowns of Colombia’s 
25 largest cities. In addition, there are 
around 360,000 Colombian refugees in 
neighbouring countries and other regions. 
Most of the latter have not been through 
formal asylum procedures and thus do not 
possess a regular migration status, leaving 
them ‘invisible’ in the territories of asylum 
countries.3 The majority of the IDPs and 
refugees (and refugee returnees) live in 
situations of protracted displacement. 
Although armed hostilities have 
diminished thanks to the peace process 
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and related ceasefires, non-state 
armed groups such as those 
rooted in the officially demobilised 
paramilitaries are estimated to 
have members in more than 400 
municipalities, notably in urban 
areas. Similarly, some guerrilla 
fronts heavily involved in illicit 
economic activities may not be 
convinced by a peace agreement 
to lay down arms. Conflicts may 
also arise in connection with 
the implementation of the peace 
agreement, particularly over land. 
In short, the conflict has been 
transforming; while the number 
of armed confrontations between 
the parties to the conflict has been 
going down, organised violence 
has taken new forms and continues 
to trigger emergencies and displacement.
Government’s role
While the government has made significant 
efforts through policies and measures in 
areas such as public health, education, 
income generation and the reparation 
of victims via land restitution, civil 
authorities are absent or only marginally 
present in various parts of the country, 
notably those areas most affected by forced 
displacement. Equally, their resources and 
capacities are often inadequate to prevent, 
respond to and resolve displacement, 
particularly in low-income municipalities. 
The complexity of displacement-
related problems calls for collaborative 
whole-of-government responses and a 
human rights-based approach; however, 
limited coordination between authorities 
– horizontally among different state 
institutions and vertically between central 
and local authorities – frequently leads to 
inefficiencies when it comes to addressing 
displacement-related matters. For example, 
although most IDPs have fled to urban 
centres, the government has not yet adopted 
a comprehensive local integration strategy 
for IDPs in urban contexts. Likewise, 
the capacity and willingness of state 
authorities to consistently accompany 
and follow up on voluntary return and 
relocation movements have been limited. 
The Victims and Land Restitution Law 
adopted in 2011 importantly acknowledges 
the existence of an armed conflict and the 
scope of forced displacement, and provides 
for comprehensive reparations for victims 
of the armed conflict, including IDPs. 
Reparation is meant to serve as a bridge 
towards the sustainable reintegration of 
IDPs. In practice, however, much of the 
government’s work has focused on short-
term assistance and financial compensation 
rather than long-term reintegration 
processes and the coordinated and sustained 
intervention of state institutions. 
Rural and urban development plans
The negotiating parties of the peace 
agreement have committed to boosting 
economic infrastructure, social services 
and good governance in rural areas that 
hitherto had been controlled by the FARC. 
This makes sense given that persistent 
poverty and inequality in rural areas have 
been at the root of the armed conflict. 
Not surprisingly then, the government’s 
general development plans, the UN 
Development Assistance Framework which 
aligns with the government’s development 
priorities, and the UN Peacebuilding 
This indigenous community of Unión Embera Katio, Bajo Atrato, in the department of 
Chocó, Colombia, has been displaced on several occasions.
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Framework for Colombia all focus on the 
rural areas. At the same time, most IDPs 
have fled to urban areas and are unwilling 
to return to their rural communities of 
origin. While international actors advocate 
a holistic approach to development that 
acknowledges rural-urban linkages, the 
agreements are virtually silent about the 
policies needed to integrate the millions 
of urban IDPs. It is significant that none 
of the plans proposes a strategic solutions 
framework for IDPs and refugee returnees.
In a similar vein, the Humanitarian 
Country Team is focused on meeting 
humanitarian needs associated with 
ongoing humanitarian emergencies in 
the country, and thus ignores longer-term 
reintegration needs of IDPs and returnees. 
The absence of structures bridging the 
humanitarian coordination architecture 
and the coordination mechanisms set up 
under the UN Country Team means that 
development and humanitarian actors are 
currently not systematically working together 
to jointly support IDPs and the authorities 
in finding sustainable solutions for them.
Asylum and repatriation
While the government has started to offer 
reparations for human rights violations 
suffered in connection with the armed 
conflict, it has shied away from elaborating 
a comprehensive voluntary repatriation 
and reintegration framework for so-called 
‘victims abroad’. For example, the government 
provides repatriation support to Colombians 
residing abroad who organise their return 
through consulates in the countries of asylum. 
Yet refugees who repatriate spontaneously 
or are forced to return do not receive long-
term reintegration support from the state.
Equally, the government has not made 
efforts to set up tripartite mechanisms 
with individual countries of asylum and 
UNHCR for local integration of Colombian 
refugees who do not want to repatriate. 
This is despite strong pleas by Colombian 
NGOs and victims associations abroad 
to create – in the framework of the peace 
negotiations – a sub-commission on refugees. 
Following the example of the CIREFCA 
Conference and Process that brought the 
problem of displacement to the forefront 
of the peace initiative in Central America 
and sought to find regional solutions for 
the uprooted, they also advocate holding 
a regional conference to promote access to 
durable solutions for the region’s refugees 
and host communities through an integrated 
relief and development approach.4
The role of UNHCR
UNHCR has so far been the only international 
actor in the region to draw up comprehensive 
solutions strategies for Colombia’s 
displaced populations in Colombia and 
neighbouring countries. In addition to 
assisting authorities to facilitate displaced 
communities’ return, local integration or 
relocation where conditions are conducive 
to solutions, UNHCR works with displaced 
people and receiving communities at 
all stages of such processes. It has also 
helped victims associations in countries of 
asylum to reconnect to the government. 
Under the Transitional Solutions Initiative 
(TSI)5 – a joint project between UNHCR 
and UNDP, which aimed to bring national 
authorities together with displaced and 
host communities and find sustainable 
solutions – UNHCR selected 17 communities 
throughout the country, in both rural and 
urban areas, and pursued three lines of 
work: improvement in quality of life (land, 
housing, access to basic services and local 
economic development), organisational and 
institutional strengthening, and protection 
of victims and their rights. TSI encompasses 
local urban integration projects such as the 
legalisation of informal settlements and 
return and relocation projects. UNHCR is 
now using the lessons learnt from these 
projects to promote a comprehensive policy 
on solutions with the national authorities, 
so that the government may replicate the 
projects in other areas of the country once 
a peace agreement has been signed.
In countries such as Ecuador and 
Costa Rica which host large numbers of 
Colombian refugees, UNHCR has adopted 
comprehensive local integration strategies 
and has also resettled Colombian refugees 
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from Ecuador and Costa Rica to other 
countries in the region. The framework for 
this has been the Brazil and Mexico Plans 
of Action and the principles of international 
solidarity and responsibility sharing between 
the main countries receiving refugees 
and the other countries in the region. 
Particular attention has also been given 
to regional migration. For example, in the 
framework of a transnational labour mobility 
project, Colombian refugees in Ecuador have 
access to a two-year residence permit in 
Brazil without losing their refugee status in 
Ecuador. The residence permit provides access 
to rights – notably to work and study – and 
public services, and can become permanent.6
Conclusion
The Colombian government, the UN and 
donor countries approach the displacement 
of IDPs and Colombian refugees primarily 
as a humanitarian issue. This explains 
why the different peace-building and 
development frameworks fall short of whole-
of-government and whole-of-organisation 
approaches and thus fail to address 
displaced populations’ reintegration needs 
in a comprehensive and explicit manner.
If the protracted displacement of 6.9 
million IDPs – 14% of Colombia’s population 
– remains unaddressed, it is likely to become 
a major strain on the peace-building process. 
At the same time, the search for solutions for 
IDPs and refugees may regain momentum 
once a final peace agreement has been signed. 
Although the government may not draw up 
a comprehensive solutions strategy for IDPs 
and refugees, UNHCR – in collaboration 
with IDP communities, victims associations 
and NGOs – may succeed in inserting the 
topic of solutions into the government’s rapid 
response plan and into local development 
plans. In line with the 2014 Brazil Plan of 
Action,7 a comprehensive regional solutions 
strategy uniting Colombia, asylum countries 
and the international community is also 
desirable in order to create synergies between 
the local integration, resettlement and 
voluntary repatriation of Colombian refugees 
and other victims of the armed conflict.
Martin Gottwald gottwald@unhcr.org  
Deputy Representative, UNHCR Colombia 
www.unhcr.org 
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A perspective from the World Bank
Joanna de Berry
The World Bank brings distinctive qualities to the role it can play in furthering the 
humanitarian to development transition and is significantly scaling up its engagement on 
forced displacement. 
The World Bank’s value added is not in 
identifying and addressing the protection or 
short-term humanitarian needs of displaced 
persons, a focus which is well served by 
other agencies. Instead, as a development 
institution, the World Bank’s lens is focused 
on addressing the longer-term, systemic 
impacts of displacement and addressing 
them within the wider development 
context in which those needs are located. 
Its current involvement includes the 
preparation or implementation of financing 
for projects addressing displacement and 
impacts on host communities in Azerbaijan, 
Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Tanzania, 
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Uganda and Zambia, and reviewing and 
revising displacement policy such as 
assessing new directions for IDP subsidy 
schemes in Georgia.1 It also includes a wide 
array of analytic work such as scoping out the 
development needs of the displaced across 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa2 and Horn 
of Africa,3 and poverty profiling of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon and Jordan4 and of the 
Malian displaced across West Africa.5 
Identifying a different set of needs
In Tanzania, the ability of long-term former 
refugees from Burundi to earn an income 
from their agricultural production is severely 
compromised by the geographic isolation of 
their settlements and lack of access to external 
markets. In this case, the need is to work with 
the government to open up access to markets 
through improved infrastructure connecting 
the settlements with the wider area. 
In Turkey, one of the greatest challenges 
of the presence of Syrian refugees – causing 
some resentment among local Turkish 
families – is dramatic hikes in rents 
related to the increased demand for rental 
accommodation by Syrian refugees, combined 
with an already constrained housing market 
and an estimated housing supply lag of 
approximately nine years at the lower end 
of the housing spectrum.6 Here the need is 
to explore with the Government of Turkey 
options for responding to the housing needs 
of refugees – such as vouchers and rent 
subsidies – without causing distortion to the 
housing market for local Turkish families. 
In Georgia, 45% of all internally displaced 
person (IDPs) live below the national 
poverty line as compared to 41% of non-
IDPs. The greatest difference, however, is 
in the sources of household income, with 
37% of IDPs’ household income derived 
from subsidies compared to only 26% for 
non-IDPs. Since this relates to an inability to 
earn money through agricultural production 
due to a lack of access to land, the World 
Bank is working with the government to 
pilot increasing access to land for IDPs 
through rental contracts, an approach which 
creatively tackles constraints on IDPs’ 
ability to own land through formal rights.7 
Applying a different set of tools
Including refugees, returnees and IDPs 
in nationally representative poverty 
assessments can generate disaggregated 
data to compare the poverty and living 
standards of the displaced with national 
23 members of one family live in this community building in the Turkish village of Kanatli, having fled their homes in Kobani, Syria, 2015.
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poverty levels and in comparison with 
hosting communities. All too often needs 
assessments of displaced persons rely on a 
small sample size and do not use nationally 
comparable metrics and indicators of 
vulnerability or poverty. This constrains the 
usefulness of the data for targeting and policy 
purposes. Given the technical support that 
the World Bank offers to many governments 
on implementing regular Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys and other such 
nationally representative surveys, the Bank is 
well placed to integrate displaced populations 
into these instruments either through 
an adapted methodology or innovative 
sampling strategies for displaced groups. 
Area-based planning involves designing 
development solutions for displacement 
settlements and camps through assessment 
and knowledge of the wider spatial and 
planning context. In Tanzania, for example, 
there is extremely restricted access to water 
for the long-term residents of a settlement 
for former refugees; the shallow wells and 
boreholes are dried up, contaminated and 
poorly maintained. Technical advice has 
been that a more efficient solution lies in 
linking the water needs of the settlement 
into the data collection and planning 
of the relevant government water basin 
office. This has not been done to date 
because the settlement is not considered 
part of local government structures and 
is administered through separate, parallel 
arrangements under national refugee law. 
Responses for displaced persons are 
often financed and managed in parallel to 
the delivery of mainstream development 
projects. This can result in marginalisation 
of the displaced from broader development 
strategies and in some inefficiencies; in DRC, 
for example, it was found that health centres 
funded through humanitarian agencies 
were 47% more expensive that those funded 
to the same standard by the government. 
Since World Bank financing is channelled 
through government systems, it can facilitate 
the expansion of existing government 
structures, processes and resources towards 
displaced populations. It can also serve to 
strengthen those institutions in the process.
Opportunities and challenges
As governments and other stakeholders 
are increasingly looking for alternatives 
to camps and to the traditional durable 
solutions of return, resettlement and local 
integration, and to facilitate the self-reliance 
of displaced people, new challenges come 
into play such as socio-economic pressures 
on host communities, deficits in services 
and in the labour and housing markets, 
and the potential for social tensions. 
While World Bank tools are highly 
relevant to identifying and mitigating these 
issues, the use of World Bank approaches 
and financing is not without challenges and 
can only ever be one part of a broader line 
of action in helping those affected by forced 
displacement to improve their lives. For a 
start, there is the political sensitivity for host 
governments of borrowing and repaying 
World Bank loans for refugees, that is, non-
nationals. Secondly, host governments may 
compromise a displacement response by 
restrictions imposed by a government’s own 
policy towards the displaced, requiring 
careful negotiation. Finally, there are 
sometimes incentives for governments in 
keeping humanitarian responses going in 
order, for example, to maintain the image of 
the presence of the displaced as temporary or 
as a source of additional resource injection. 
Joanna de Berry jdeberry@worldbank.org  
Senior Social Development Specialist, The World 
Bank Group www.worldbank.org 
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Humanitarian action and the transformation of 
gender relations
Melinda Wells and Geeta Kuttiparambil
There is value in creating space within a humanitarian response to invest in interventions 
that go beyond addressing the immediate risks and needs. This is particularly the case in 
relation to women’s empowerment. 
When the Women and Girls Oasis Centre 
opened in Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan 
in late 2012, it was a dusty, barren plot, 
surrounded by prefabricated trailers and a 
fence. By the end of 2014, the Oasis compound 
was filled with colourful murals, hanging 
plants grew out of pots made from recycled 
water bottles, and the sounds of children 
shouting, playing and learning drifted from the 
windows of the children’s centre. Women work, 
chat, drink coffee, cry, comfort, tease and laugh. 
Almost all the women who came to the 
Oasis had been forced by the conflict in Syria 
to become the heads of their households. 
Having survived the brutality of the 
conflict, they were faced with the new and 
overwhelming responsibilities of life in exile. 
Few felt equipped to meet this challenge. 
Life in Za’atari, as many of the women told 
us, presents a major contrast to a life in Syria 
defined by culturally prescribed gender roles. 
In humanitarian settings, responses 
targeting women and adolescent girls are 
often limited to aspects of reproductive health 
and protection and response to gender-based 
violence (GBV). Yet a proactive approach 
creating physical space for women can be a 
critical catalyst to women claiming more social 
and political space as well. Where this type of 
approach has been taken, there are encouraging 
stories of women refugees developing 
and articulating individual and collective 
strategies to address their needs. Women 
also express an increased confidence in their 
ability to meet the challenges they will face in 
displacement over the medium and long term. 
Vulnerability and empowerment
Humanitarian crises increase risks for 
displaced individuals and families in a 
number of areas, including vulnerability 
to all forms of GBV, forced recruitment and 
labour exploitation, including child labour. 
Women and girls across all age groups are 
most at risk. This is due to a number of 
factors including the separation of families, 
breakdown of law and order and traditional 
protection systems, and the inability of 
displaced people to meet their most basic 
needs, resulting in the adoption of potentially 
harmful coping strategies. While prevention 
and response interventions that address 
protection issues are critical, it is important 
to consider the opportunities that such 
massive shocks can also create. For example, 
sudden displacement may offer the possibility 
for a woman to leave an abusive partner, 
to adopt new roles as she is compelled to 
support her family in unexpected ways, 
or to find her voice as she steps forward to 
advocate for solutions to the new challenges 
facing her family or her community. 
Yet the language of empowerment is 
not consistently adopted in humanitarian 
scenarios and gender equality is often put 
aside as a development issue. It is vital 
to recognise the criticality of women’s 
empowerment in humanitarian action and 
of physical, social and political space for 
refugee women to be prioritised through 
programmes such as the Oasis. This type 
of programme emphasises dialogue with 
women about their needs and aspirations, 
and results in interventions that take a longer-
term view to addressing critical protection, 
participation and livelihood objectives. 
The Oasis has allowed for multiple 
narratives which go well beyond an analysis 
of risk and vulnerability to look at capacity 
and at ways of promoting and supporting 
mutually reinforcing coping strategies. This 
is especially relevant when considering the 
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physical and social architecture of space 
for women and girl refugees. In addition 
to the specific protection issues that they 
face as a result of their sex, they also 
need self-reliance and civic engagement 
mechanisms that facilitate their participation 
in community life and decision making. 
With this comprehensive approach, women 
begin to rebuild self-confidence that may 
have been eroded by the often forceful 
separation from their traditional roles. 
According to a recent eport by UNHCR 
(the UN Refugee Agency), 145,000 Syrian 
refugee women now run their households 
alone1 and this is the case of many of the 
women in Za’atari. Despite this evidence, 
humanitarian strategies consistently – 
and unacceptably – categorise women 
and girls as ‘vulnerable’, without clearly 
articulating definitions of vulnerability. 
Programmes like the Women and Girls 
Oasis do not identify affected people as only 
‘displaced’ but bring in their capacities and 
previous aspirations, as lawyers, teachers, 
counsellors, doctors, engineers. This model 
uses the response to immediate protection 
and safety needs as a stepping-stone to 
interventions that help shift women’s self-
perception regarding their ability to cope 
with their circumstances, and provides 
a place where women can more fully 
explore their capacities and aspirations. 
Participation and decision making
In the Oasis, Syrian refugee women are 
offered information, referral and support to 
prevent and respond to sexual and gender-
based violence. Classes and information 
sessions are offered, aimed at enhancing 
life skills, including literacy, language 
training, health and well-being. As a result 
of a participant skills assessment, tailoring 
and hairdressing workshops have also been 
established. The Syrian women volunteer 
in these workshops, which, in turn, offer 
free services to residents of the camp. This 
provides participants with the opportunity 
to develop or strengthen their marketable 
skills while gaining the satisfaction of 
providing valued services to their community. 
Finally, programme participants are offered 
civic participation training and follow-
up mentoring. This training is tailored 
specifically to refugee women, facilitating 
the development of strategies and leadership 
skills for mobilising action on issues of 
concern within their community. 
The goal of safe spaces like the Women 
and Girls Oasis is to provide the conditions 
under which women and girls can raise 
their voices or play a role in community 
decision making. Participation in decision-
making structures is key to accountability 
commitments in humanitarian response. 
Yet often we fail miserably to deliver 
meaningfully on women’s leadership 
and participation, citing cultural factors 
or urgency as barriers. Refugee decision 
making in such a setting often seems 
elusive or even a luxury, but women at 
the Oasis say they want the opportunity 
to define their lives, their needs and their 
aspirations and many of the women link 
their participation in the programme to a 
restored sense of dignity. Similarly, they 
report that, in their context, committees 
structured around the concept of a 50% 
gender balance do not achieve the presumed 
goal of equal participation of women and 
men due to cultural roles that dictate the 
interactions between men and women, and, 
in some cases, to overt intimidation by male 
members leading the women to withdraw. 
To ensure that community decision-
making structures are defined by women’s 
terms of engagement and that their voices 
are heard across the agencies in Za’atari, 
the lead agencies for camp management 
and community mobilisation have tapped 
into the Oasis resources to host women’s 
committees. It is critical to make a distinction 
between situations where women are 
not participating, and the assumption 
that women do not wish to participate. 
While participation of women, overall, in 
Za’atari camp committee structures is low, 
a group of women approached the Oasis 
staff requesting that, in addition to Arabic 
literacy, they also receive English classes 
so that they could better argue their case 
with the largely English-speaking decision-
makers in the humanitarian community. 
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This is not the story of victims but, rather, 
of women survivors who are supported in 
taking steps towards constructing a new 
world and life for themselves and their 
families. It should not be forgotten that many 
of these women were professionals before 
they became refugees. These women tell 
us they do not want to be defined solely as 
victims or aid recipients but rather as women 
actively engaged in a process of establishing 
new strategies for moving forward in 
the face of their current circumstances. 
Post-conflict recovery approaches need to 
create space for women’s empowerment 
to allow this narrative to fully unfold. 
Melinda Wells melindawells@gmail.com  
Gender and humanitarian policy advisor
Geeta Kuttiparambil grits71@hotmail.com  
Member of the GenCap and NORCAP rosters 
The views expressed in this article are the views 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of their respective organisations. 
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An age-sensitive approach to durable solutions
Ana Mosneaga and Michaella Vanore 
Elderly people are likely to face specific constraints in displacement, yet the durable solutions 
devised by many states tend to follow a one-size-fits-all approach. The implementation of 
transitional but workable solutions can at least alleviate some of the adverse socio-economic 
and psychological challenges that displacement poses for the elderly. 
There are few interventions catering to 
the needs of the displaced elderly, and 
their situations in conflicts and disasters 
are seldom documented. The invisibility 
of the displaced elderly within data 
and subsequent programming reflects 
the limited profiling of the specific 
vulnerabilities and needs of particular 
population groups within larger displaced 
populations. Existing examples show, 
however, that humanitarian emergencies 
disproportionately affect older populations 
in both conflict and disaster settings. 
In Japan, 66% of 15,681 people who died 
(and whose age was subsequently verified) 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake 
and tsunami of March 2011 were older 
than 60. Likewise, a study undertaken 
in the context of the 2012 refugee crisis 
in South Sudan found that the mortality 
rate of the population aged over 50 was 
over four times that of 5-50 year olds.1
Older people are generally among the last 
to flee from an unfolding conflict or disaster 
due to both their often more limited mobility 
and their reluctance to leave a familiar 
environment. Once displaced, older persons 
may face greater difficulties in restoring 
their livelihoods and are often economically 
disadvantaged compared to younger 
people. Their search for durable solutions, 
whether through return to their original 
communities, integration in their places 
of refuge or settlement elsewhere, can be 
further impeded by frail health, which often 
deteriorates while they are in displacement.
Such vulnerabilities specific to the 
elderly are largely omitted from the existing 
international instruments that address 
internal displacement and durable solutions. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement and the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable 
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) do acknowledge older people as one of 
the vulnerable groups that require attention 
to their “special needs”.2 However, despite 
specifically elaborating on these needs for 
women and children, the Guiding Principles 
do not elaborate on the needs of the elderly, 
and the IASC Framework explicitly mentions 
the needs of the elderly as a vulnerable group 
only in the context of family reunification 
following family dislocation in displacement. 
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Ageing societies: Georgia and Japan
Protracted and repeated displacement 
further exacerbates the vulnerability of older 
people. In Georgia, over 90% of the 267,323 
IDPs registered by October 2015 had been 
displaced since the early 1990s; over 33,000 
of them were aged 60 or older. The 2008 
conflict produced a new ‘cohort’ of IDPs 
while further enhancing the vulnerabilities 
of IDPs from the old cohort. The renewed 
conflict once again disrupted livelihoods 
and social networks, which presented 
especially difficult challenges for the elderly 
struggling to adapt to unfamiliar settings.3
Similarly, the elderly who experienced 
displacement several times after Japan’s 
2011 disasters and those who lived alone are 
considered to be particularly vulnerable. 
A survey of IDPs since the nuclear disaster 
in Fukushima found that people have 
on average moved 4.6 times. Repeated 
displacement often resulted in a change of 
household structure, with younger adults 
moving into different types of temporary 
accommodation than older generations, 
splitting up extended families. Older people 
also tended to stay in pre-fabricated or other 
temporary housing arrangements for longer 
periods. In Miyagi prefecture, which was 
the worst affected by the tsunami, 43.8% of 
residents in prefabricated housing were over 
65 according to a survey conducted in 2014. 
In general, the elderly tend to face greater 
challenges than the young in restoring their 
pre-disaster standards of living and regaining 
their economic welfare. In Georgia, high rates 
of unemployment and low public pensions 
have been particularly problematic given 
high and persistent health costs among the 
displaced elderly. Although Japan has a well-
developed pension and social security system, 
many older IDPs, especially from the rural 
areas contaminated by radioactive fallout, 
have experienced soaring living costs. Many 
previously had land on which to produce 
most of their food and had often benefitted 
from rich natural resources available in 
their communities. Once displaced, their 
perception was that investing in buying 
new land or agricultural equipment was 
both too costly and risky due to persistent 
uncertainty over how long they would remain 
displaced and for how long they would live.
The elderly among both cohorts of the 
displaced in Georgia reported high rates 
of chronic health problems (for example, 
hypertension, mobility problems, heart 
disease and diabetes) often exacerbated 
by poor living conditions, such as those 
experienced by IDPs resettled in buildings 
that were hastily re-purposed as collective 
accommodation centres. Elderly IDPs, 
particularly those living in collective centres, 
have also reported psychological health 
outcomes of concern such as higher rates of 
life dissatisfaction, depression, and anxiety 
due to feelings of social isolation combined 
with exceptionally bad housing conditions.4
Protracted displacement resulting from 
Japan’s 2011 disasters has also taken a heavy 
toll on the physical and mental well-being 
of the elderly. Living conditions in the 
prefabricated housing, though much better 
than in the emergency evacuation centres 
where people were housed in the immediate 
aftermath of the disasters, remain dismal. 
Similarly to the Georgian case, many of the 
elderly residents have thus experienced 
worsening chronic health conditions and 
Close-up (taken in June 2014) of pre-fabricated temporary 
housing for IDPs displaced in 2011 following the nuclear 
disaster, Fukushima prefecture, Japan.
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higher prevalence of 
sleeping disorders, 
anxiety and depression. 
In Fukushima prefecture, 
the death toll resulting 
from health problems and 
suicides after the nuclear 
disaster has exceeded that 
from the direct impacts 
of the earthquake and 
tsunami, with people 
over 66 years of age 
accounting for more than 
90% of such fatalities.
For many of the 
elderly, the experience 
of being displaced 
– particularly the 
uncertainty resulting 
from protracted 
displacement and 
decreasing prospects of regaining normality 
with each year that passes in limbo – can 
erode their sense of agency, making them 
dependent on assistance from the government 
or their families. For some of the elderly 
displaced by the nuclear accident in Japan, 
this has resulted in a feeling that they cannot 
independently decide where to spend the 
remainder of their lives. While many of them 
wish to return to their native homes and 
communities, they know that their children 
and/or grandchildren are often unwilling to 
do so. This reflects the great inter-generational 
divide in the perception of return as a 
potential durable solution: the elderly often 
see return as more desirable than the younger 
generations do, as the latter tend to be more 
concerned about risks posed by remaining 
radiation. While returnees in Georgia face 
fundamentally different risks upon return, a 
recent UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) study 
has also found that older people favour return 
to their original communities much more 
than do younger people, many of whom see 
limited prospects for economic and physical 
security in their communities of origin.
The disruption of community life 
and social networks can further alter the 
positions of the elderly in their families and 
communities. Many of the elderly who were 
displaced by the 2011 disasters in Japan 
missed tending their land and lacked space 
to host their children and grandchildren 
after moving into temporary housing. Elderly 
men in particular became more withdrawn 
following the loss of status and authority 
that they had enjoyed in their communities 
of origin. Many also experienced disruptions 
in their kinship networks. Fearing to be 
left alone, some of the elderly moved to the 
same towns or cities as their children or 
their younger relatives immediately after the 
disaster, but many eventually opted to move 
back and live in temporary housing closer 
to their original communities as they felt 
insecure living in unfamiliar environments.
The displacement from physical spaces 
has similarly disrupted the way the elderly 
in Georgia construct their own sense of 
self and relate to members of their (former) 
social networks. Many elderly men who were 
displaced from the conflicts in the early 1990s 
were reported to have poor psychological 
health due to feelings of guilt and failure 
related to their inability to protect their 
families and homes during the conflict. 
Moreover, many of the displaced elderly 
faced further social alienation because a large 
number of the collective accommodation 
centres have many floors (and no elevators) 
Pre-fabricated temporary housing for IDPs displaced in 2011 following the nuclear 
disaster, Fukushima prefecture, Japan. (photo taken June 2014)
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and few communal spaces, which limits 
social interaction, particularly among the 
elderly with poor mobility. The assignment of 
individuals from the same villages to different 
accommodation centres also meant that many 
elderly were disconnected from their old 
networks and consequently live alongside 
complete strangers. Another problem in 
such centres is the lack of access to plots of 
land, which many elderly identified as being 
important not only for their economic stability 
but for their ability to feel productive. 
Appropriate durable solutions for  
the elderly
Both the Japan and Georgia cases suggest 
that the elderly are a radically different 
population cohort when considering durable 
solutions. While the elderly are often the last 
to leave in evolving emergencies, the elderly 
are also often the last ones to transition out 
of temporary arrangements. The elderly 
tend to see greater risk in transitioning into 
unfamiliar environments, and in this sense 
their concern for losing the little continuity 
and familiarity that their present situation 
offers tends to be greater than their concern 
about the potential risks such situations 
pose. This reasoning affects elderly IDPs’ 
perceptions of durable solutions. In many 
cases, the elderly feel 
that, owing to their 
age, health and the 
disruptive impact of 
displacement on their 
economic well-being 
and social positioning, 
they do not have time 
to wait for a genuinely 
durable solution.
Designing 
transitional but 
workable solutions that 
can at least alleviate 
some of the adverse 
socio-economic and 
psychological challenges 
that displacement 
poses for the elderly 
means paying 
due regard to the following factors:
Including the elderly in programme 
design: The loss of productivity and the 
resulting dependency on government 
assistance and/or younger generations 
affect elderly people’s well-being and 
feelings of self-worth, making them 
prone to isolation. Response-to-recovery 
and humanitarian-to-development 
transition schemes could address such 
vulnerabilities (while also benefitting from 
older people’s knowledge and experience) 
by actively involving them as advisors.
Allowing a graduated transition and 
retention of some continuity: Older people 
may have a limited capacity to adapt to new 
solutions in general. Every experience of 
displacement further exhausts their capacity 
and willingness to invest in integrating 
and restarting lives in new environments. 
Displacement solutions for the elderly 
should thus aim to ensure some degree of 
continuity in the process of transition while 
reducing the overall number of necessary 
transitions. This means adapting the 
assistance to changing needs at the same time 
as enabling the elderly to predict how their 
lives would be affected by such a transition.
Preserving community cohesion: 
Disrupted social and kinship networks 
are more concerning for the elderly than 
Tserovani IDP settlement, Georgia, 2012.
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for the young, with the latter often finding 
it easier to build new networks. Thus 
resettlement from emergency shelters 
to temporary accommodation should, 
as far as possible, be carried out with an 
emphasis on preservation of community 
ties. Supporting the elderly to run their own 
associations, clubs or cooperatives could 
also contribute to preserving or building 
social cohesion in relocated communities.
Weighing up the risks: Planning 
transitional solutions requires weighing up 
different risks. For example, while the dire 
living conditions of the emergency shelters 
or prefabricated housing may demand 
speedy transition into better housing, hasty 
resettlement is likely to result in further 
disruption of communities and to exacerbate 
the isolation of the elderly. Thus, where 
possible, the speed of improving the living 
conditions of the displaced populations 
should be balanced with measures aimed at 
ensuring continuity of social networks and 
community cohesion.
While any approach needs to be 
context-specific, the need for age-sensitive 
approaches to durable solutions emphasises 
the importance of better profiling of displaced 
populations so that the solutions are designed 
to meet the specific needs and vulnerabilities 
of different segments of the affected 
populations.
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New aid architecture and resilience building around 
the Syria crisis
Gustavo Gonzalez
The international community has been piloting an integrated humanitarian, development 
and government response to the crisis in the region of Syria.
As middle-income countries, Jordan,  
Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt to a large extent, 
and Iraq and Syria to a lesser extent, saw 
declining official financing flows supporting 
their development in the years preceding 
the current Syrian crisis. In middle-income 
countries, financing for development 
relies primarily on national resources 
and international borrowing. The flows of 
refugees have put national budgets under 
stress due to the growth in the volume of 
subsidies for basic goods and services and 
to mounting security costs, with Jordan and 
Lebanon facing higher public debts than 
their Gross Domestic Products (GDP). 
The effectiveness of the support of the 
international community has also been 
weakened by the prevalence of separate 
humanitarian, development and climate 
adaptation financial ‘silos’. The three 
have different aims and follow different 
principles. They have evolved separately 
and operate over different spatial and 
temporal scales, are aligned with different 
budget lines and rules, and are managed 
by different actors. A multitude of 
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multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental 
initiatives exist with their individual 
funding streams – with communication 
and coordination among initiatives often 
lacking even within an individual donor’s 
own aid architecture, within individual 
governments’ line ministries and among UN 
agencies. Although some donors have been 
working to overcome the divide between 
humanitarian and development initiatives 
and funding channels, the response to 
protracted crises has remained fragmented. 
One of the lessons from the Syria crisis 
is that the prevailing aid architecture for 
crisis response is not fit for purpose.1 
Towards a paradigm shift in responding to 
protracted crises
In late 2013, within the framework of the 
Regional United Nations Development 
Group (R-UNDG), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) established 
a Sub-regional Response Facility2 in 
Amman, covering the six countries most 
affected by the crisis, to work closely with 
humanitarian and development stakeholders 
and governments to find a more sustainable 
and affordable response to a protracted 
crisis. There have been four critical 
milestones in this challenging journey: 
First, the adoption of the Resilience-
Based Development Response to the Syria 
Crisis3 by the R-UNDG, which set a new 
programming and organisational framework 
for the integration of humanitarian and 
development interventions. The resilience-
building approach included an innovative 
resilience toolbox (Stress Index, Resilience 
lens, Vulnerability analysis, Resilience 
system assessments), an expanded scope 
of intervention (refugees and also host 
communities), new partners around the 
table (private sector, international financial 
institutions, development funders) and 
an enhanced role for the governments 
of the five countries hosting refugees. 
Second, the formulation of the Regional 
Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), co-led 
by UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) and 
UNDP, with the participation of five countries 
and more than 200 partners, including 
relevant UN agencies, and national and 
international NGOs. The 3RP is innovative 
inasmuch as it (a) integrates humanitarian 
and development interventions in a single 
crisis response programming platform, (b) 
enhances national ownership by centralising 
the planning process around national plans 
(for Jordan and Lebanon), (c) refocuses 
investment in local delivery systems, 
particularly municipalities, and, finally, (d) 
has introduced multi-year programming 
to enhance financial predictability.4 
Third, the Resilience Development 
Forum in November 2015 at the Dead Sea, 
Jordan, gathering senior representatives 
of governments from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Turkey, UN agencies, 
international organisations and international 
financial institutions, donor countries, 
international and national NGOs, research 
institutions and private sector leaders. The 
output was a resilience-building roadmap, 
the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda,5 which 
has codified and captured in five principles 
and ten recommendations the new business 
model for protracted crises. It is intended to 
inform the next round of responses in the 
region, including inside Syria, to strengthen 
the ongoing national planning processes and 
to continue leveraging development resources 
and partnerships for durable solutions. 
Four, the organisation of the London 
Conference – Supporting Syria and the 
Region in February 2016 to mobilise financial 
resources for resilience building, involving 
traditional and non-traditional donors, 
governments of the region, international 
financial institutions, philanthropists, the 
private sector and a wide range of national 
and international NGOs. Here, for the 
first time, a Syria pledging conference was 
structured around the resilience building 
themes of livelihoods and education, with 
protection as the third one. 
The Conference also moved away from 
traditional pledging exercises by introducing 
‘commitments for policy change’. Jordan, 
Lebanon and Turkey committed to opening 
up their labour markets and increasing 
economic opportunities for refugees and 
host communities. In turn, external actors 
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agreed to support host countries in areas such 
as preferential access to markets, access to 
concessional financing and increased support 
for public and private sector job creation. 
This new deal is a concrete example of how a 
crisis can be transformed into a development 
opportunity. 
New resilience building opportunities 
The resilience agenda in the context of 
the Syria crisis has introduced a series 
of new investment and cooperation 
modalities, which will certainly influence 
the next generation of crisis response. 
Among the most promising are: 
Private sector engagement: Across Syria’s 
neighbours, national resilience plans have 
identified business development as a key 
pathway to socio-economic resilience building 
in affected communities. Governments, 
through special tax and other incentives, 
could also catalyse, shape and drive foreign 
private investment (including Syrian 
investments) to generate jobs for refugees 
and host communities through Special 
Economic Zones. The objective is to attract 
businesses and create jobs along the border 
to reduce migration and prepare the ground 
for reconstruction. The role of government 
in providing security to these special 
economic zones is fundamental, while aid 
can serve as seed funding to attract more 
private investment. In existing industrial 
zones in Turkey, aid-funded vocational 
training programmes have been established, 
gradually receiving more private funding and 
benefitting from cooperation agreements with 
governments to use some public facilities. 
Pooled funding: This type of funding, 
administered by a group of international 
stakeholders, can gather fragmented 
contributions to reach a critical mass 
of resources to fill critical funding 
gaps. It can then provide sector budget 
support at the request of governments 
while fostering better coordination and 
consistency of programmatic objectives 
and risk management. Pooled funds 
are in place for Lebanon and Jordan.
Debt to Development, Nature or 
Equity Swaps (DDS, DNS, DES): These 
are instruments that may reduce the 
indebtedness (currently above 100% of 
GDP) of some of the countries neighbouring 
Syria while funding development projects 
to address the demographic shock. 
Trilateral coordination among the UN, 
international financial institutions and 
national governments provides a negotiating 
platform for all these development 
swaps and to identify national capacity 
gaps for such financial transactions. 
South-South and Triangular 
Cooperation: What is needed is the 
consistent engagement of national actors 
in the region with potential suppliers of 
solutions elsewhere. From efficient energy 
and water management to high-impact social 
entrepreneurship and cohesion-building 
techniques, there are lessons that can be 
drawn upon by countries affected by the 
crisis, given the wealth of experience and 
knowledge of Southern countries in coping 
with a wide range of human-made crises.
Although resilience building still 
remains a vague concept in the sub-region 
(subject to different technical interpretations 
and political interests), it has played a 
remarkable partnership-building role by 
gathering a wide range of stakeholders 
– humanitarian, development and 
government – around a common objective 
of optimising capacities, knowledge and 
resources for durable solutions. Through 
resilience, we aim to stop the spread of 
the humanitarian crisis while preserving 
human capital and vital assets, creating 
momentum for reversing the negative 
impact of the crisis and ultimately ending 
the tragedy for millions of human beings. 
Gustavo Gonzalez gustavo.gonzalez@undp.org 
UNDP Sub-regional Development Coordinator, 
Syria-related crisis www.undp.org 
1. www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/whs_finance/
hlphumanitarianfinancing
2. www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/ourwork/
SyriaCrisis/in_depth.html
3. www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/CPR/a-
resilience-based-development-response-to-the-syria-crisis.html 
4. See Zetter R (2014) ‘Development and protection challenges of 
the Syrian refugee crisis’, Forced Migration Review issue 47  
www.fmreview.org/syria/zetter 
5. http://tinyurl.com/DeadSeaResilienceAgenda 
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Development cooperation and addressing  
‘root causes’
Steffen Angenendt, Anne Koch and Amrei Meier
Development has its place in dealing with the roots of displacement but it is not an 
alternative either to important measures in the realm of foreign policy, trade policy and 
humanitarian assistance, or to taking responsibility for refugees coming to Europe now.
Following the significant increase in the 
number of refugees entering Europe, calls 
to address the ‘root causes' of displacement 
through development cooperation have 
become louder across the European Union 
(EU), and several EU member states 
have dedicated substantial funds to this 
purpose. However, the increasing over-
use of this terminology and the lack of 
clarity with regard to its meaning pose a 
number of risks. First, it is problematic if 
development funds are not primarily used 
in compliance with their actual purpose 
(to achieve sustainable improvement of the 
living conditions in recipient countries) but 
are used to prevent undesired migration 
to donor states. Second, the mantra of 
addressing root causes of displacement may 
raise unrealistic expectations about what 
development cooperation can achieve in 
situations of mass displacement. Third, a 
debate that focuses solely on tackling the root 
causes of displacement threatens to distract 
attention from the need to reform European 
asylum policy and to achieve greater 
responsibility sharing at the European level. 
In order to clarify the added value of 
development cooperation in situations 
of mass displacement, we need both to 
differentiate between structural and acute 
causes of displacement and to identify the 
range of potential areas of intervention 
beyond the addressing of root causes. 
Approaches to causes of displacement
Structural causes of displacement comprise 
a broad range of negative political, 
economic and social developments, 
including shortcomings in the rule of law, 
the marginalisation of and discrimination 
against minorities, widespread poverty, 
inequality and the destruction of the 
environment. Acute causes of displacement 
can be armed conflicts, civil wars and 
other forms of generalised violence. 
European development actors are well-
equipped to address the former, for example 
through programmes to build up health 
and education infrastructure, through 
instruments aimed at improving resource 
governance, and through anti-corruption 
programmes. This also applies to the 
promotion of the rule of law and economic 
development as well as the fostering of 
social structures. Measures aimed at climate 
change adaptation, such as improved 
methods of cultivation and suitable forms 
of building and settlement, are of increasing 
importance. Through careful analysis of 
the causes of conflict and displacement, 
the role of development cooperation in the 
prevention of crisis or migration through 
desperation can be developed even further. 
However, acute causes of displacement 
such as violent conflict or political persecution 
can only be marginally influenced by 
development policy. These scenarios 
require primarily diplomatic measures, 
humanitarian aid and crisis management. 
In cases like this, expanding development 
cooperation per se will not be able to prevent 
future forced migration. A comprehensive 
developmental approach to situations of 
forced displacement therefore needs to 
include other areas of intervention. 
Other areas of intervention
Even though meeting the basic needs 
of refugees and integrating them into 
society currently present the EU with 
great challenges, it must not be forgotten 
that many developing countries face even 
30
FM
R
 5
2
May 2016www.fmreview.org/solutions
Thinking ahead: displacement, transition, solutions
greater challenges regarding the reception 
of refugees. This is especially so for 
least developed countries, for example 
when refugees and the local population 
compete for jobs or scarce resources 
such as living space or health care. 
Major refugee movements can, moreover, 
affect the internal security of states. There 
are situations, for example in Pakistan, the 
Sahel and East Africa, in which militant 
groups engage in helping refugees and 
at the same time try to mobilise them 
for their own goals. Young people, who 
usually form the majority of refugees, are 
especially vulnerable to such actions. 
Therefore, one important task of 
development cooperation is the support 
of countries hosting large numbers of 
refugees. Humanitarian responses, though 
essential, typically fail to address the long-
term perspectives of displaced individuals 
and families. Refugees living in camps for 
an extended period of time do not have a 
realistic chance to lead a self-determined life, 
and in the medium term protracted refugee 
situations can result in onward migration. 
Development-oriented measures, 
in contrast, can offer hope and support 
for refugees in first countries of asylum. 
Examples of important interventions – 
especially in protracted crises – include 
education (in order to prevent the 
development of a lost generation) and the 
integration of refugees into the labour 
market, with the right to work, freedom of 
movement and the right to acquire land. 
In addition, development cooperation 
can support the reintegration of former 
refugees who choose to return home. 
The process of reintegration may need 
to be accompanied by civil mediation 
measures in order to resolve conflicts 
over land or other unresolved issues. 
If refugees return to former war areas, 
comprehensive support in the reconstruction 
of material and social structures becomes 
necessary. Practice shows that the success 
of any reintegration measures depends 
on the voluntariness of return. 
With regard to any of the measures 
outlined here it is, of course, crucial that the 
local population is not discriminated against 
but benefits from the measures as well. 
Conclusion
In light of the large refugee numbers globally 
and in the EU, many European countries 
agree that greater development-oriented 
engagement is desirable. The often-heard 
claim of the need to tackle the root causes of 
displacement is thus helpful in so far as it has 
contributed to the provision of more financial 
resources for development-oriented projects 
in countries of origin or host countries. 
At the same time, the focus on tackling 
the root causes of displacement carries 
risks. There is the risk that successful 
structural programmes, aiming at long-
term effects, are replaced by short-term 
projects to prevent acute refugee movements. 
This would be the case if, for example, 
development funds earmarked for the 
development of schools were redirected 
to the promotion of police cooperation. 
In the case of violent conflicts in Syria, 
Iraq, South Sudan or the African Great 
Lakes region, development cooperation can 
only make a partial contribution to tackling 
the root causes of displacement. Here, 
involvement of other policy areas, such as 
foreign policy, security policy, trade policy 
and economic policy, is primarily called 
for. Only if these policy areas get involved 
can the factors driving displacement 
and the war economies be overcome. 
Meanwhile, European host states 
ought to avoid any trade-offs between 
developmental responses to situations of 
forced displacement and the reception 
of refugees on their own territories. 
Steffen Angenendt 
steffen.angenendt@swp-berlin.org 
Head, Research Division Global Issues
Anne Koch Anne.Koch@swp-berlin.org 
Associate, Research Division Global Issues
Amrei Meier Amrei.Meier@swp-berlin.org 
Research Assistant, Research Division Global 
Issues
German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs www.swp-berlin.org/en/start-en 
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Labour mobility as part of the solution 
Sayre Nyce, Mary Louise Cohen and Bruce Cohen 
While refugee families lack access to work and struggle to survive, there are skills gaps 
around the world that could benefit from skilled refugees’ talents. Developing a system for 
refugees to be able to compete for international jobs with multinational companies would 
provide a legal migration path for many. 
Syrian refugees have very limited options for 
supporting themselves. Resettlement in other 
countries is only available for a very small 
percentage of the most vulnerable refugees 
and there appear to be no options either for 
long-term integration in the neighbouring 
countries or for imminent return.
Many of the refugees currently living 
in the Middle East are professionals or 
other skilled workers whose talents could 
help fill labour gaps around the world, 
especially in developing nations. Engaging 
the private sector to take advantage of this 
unacknowledged pool of talent could provide 
a new solution for many thousands of refugee 
families. 
There is a desperate need for alternative 
solutions. International work opportunities, 
for example, would enable refugees to find a 
livelihood and self-reliance. Many countries 
around the world legally admit labour 
migrants, especially those with special talents 
and skills, and many multinational employers 
globally recruit and deploy skilled workers. 
A survey by UNHCR (the UN Refugee 
Agency) in December 2015 found that 86% of 
refugees who had recently arrived in Greece 
had a high level of education, at secondary 
or university level.1 There are substantial 
numbers of engineers, accountants, 
computer programmers, doctors, nurses 
and teachers among the Syrian refugees 
living in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.
Developing a system for refugees to be 
able to compete for international jobs with 
multinational companies would provide a 
legal migration path for refugees. Refugees 
who take jobs in other countries would 
be able to gain an income to support their 
families, maintain or increase their skills, 
acquire new work experience and end their 
dependence on limited humanitarian aid. 
Furthermore, facilitating the movement 
of refugees for work opportunities would 
alleviate some of the pressure on Syria’s 
neighbours, and on Europe, by providing 
refugees with safe and legal alternatives. 
Need for workers
There are shortages of trained workers in 
almost every nation, especially in parts of 
South America, Africa and central Asia where 
there is a need for engineers, IT professionals, 
nurses and other skilled employees and 
professionals. A recent survey of more than 
41,000 hiring managers in 42 countries and 
territories by Manpower Group concludes 
that “globally, 38% of employers are having 
difficulty filling jobs in 2015.”2 Refugee 
employment can help solve this problem 
for companies by making available skilled 
employees for hard-to-fill job assignments. 
In recent years there has been much 
discussion about alternatives to the three 
traditional durable solutions for refugees 
of voluntary return home, resettlement 
and local integration, with labour mobility 
being one of the ideas widely discussed. 
Matching skilled refugees and international 
work opportunities is a pathway that has 
not been utilised since the period following 
the First World War, when the International 
Labour Organization matched refugees 
with work internationally. Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees without legal papers 
were at that time issued Nansen passports 
that allowed them to travel for work.3
Around the world there are multinational 
companies currently hiring foreign talent for 
hard-to-fill jobs. Many countries are open to 
providing work visas to encourage skilled 
labour. Migrants, including forced migrants, 
can contribute to the local economies of 
other countries and regions, as the World 
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Bank’s 2015/2016 Global Monitoring Report 
explains.4 They can bring productive skills 
to communities and help complete essential 
development projects in places where those 
skills do not exist among the local population. 
The fact that several of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) include a focus 
on migration shows increased recognition 
that migrants contribute to international 
development. Labour mobility of refugees 
could help advance three of the SDGs 
directly and many more indirectly. Providing 
productive employment, furthering 
development and cooperating internationally 
support Goals 8, 9 and 17. Having skilled 
refugees engage in productive work has the 
potential to shift attitudes as more people 
see how refugees contribute to development, 
communities and local economies. Skilled 
refugees will be seen as assets, people 
who can make valuable contributions. 
Opportunities and challenges
Labour mobility opportunities will mean 
refugees having more options to decide 
for themselves where to work and how 
to support themselves. All refugees, 
including unskilled refugees, should be 
allowed the opportunity to work locally 
and internationally. Regrettably, this is 
currently far from the reality – but labour 
mobility for skilled refugees is a beginning. 
There are a number of operational 
challenges, including making sure 
that refugees have access to accurate 
information, conducting language and skills 
verification, arranging travel documents 
and determining post-employment options, 
but none are insurmountable. Labour 
mobility supplements the traditional 
durable solutions – an additional option 
to address a vast problem and an 
opportunity to engage new partners and 
additional countries in a global effort. 
A key to moving forward is the desire 
among the private sector and governments 
to facilitate these opportunities. Fortunately, 
there is interest from the private sector 
in contributing to solutions for forced 
displacement, and numerous companies have 
signed up to be members of the Solutions 
Alliance.5 The private sector is playing an 
important role with the response in Europe 
as an increasing number of companies 
appear to be willing to hire qualified 
refugees. But more companies need to 
consider hiring from the refugee talent pool 
and governments need to support inclusive 
business practices by providing work visas, 
in addition to resettlement slots, for refugees. 
Labour mobility will also allow the private 
sector – as well as countries that have not 
yet been part of the response to the crisis 
in the Middle East – the opportunity to 
participate while simultaneously benefitting.
The global refugee crisis needs new 
initiatives and solutions. Labour mobility 
can become a reality as it was almost 100 
years ago. It can be part of the answer to 
the current humanitarian crisis by granting 
refugees a legal pathway for becoming 
self-reliant and building for their future. 
Companies and countries will have 
opportunities in September 2016 to pledge 
their support for labour mobility for refugees 
at the forthcoming UN and US high-level 
meetings on mobility and refugees. 
Sayre Nyce snyce@talentbeyondboundaries.org 
Executive Director, Talent Beyond Boundaries
Mary Louise Cohen 
mlcohen@talentbeyondboundaries.org  
Bruce Cohen  
bcohen@talentbeyondboundaries.org 
Founders, Talent Beyond Boundaries. 
Talent Beyond Boundaries was founded to 
provide a private sector pathway for skilled 
refugees to find international employment. 
www.talentbeyondboundaries.org
1. UNHCR (2015) ‘UNHCR questionnaire finds most Syrians 
arriving in Europe coming directly from Syria’  
www.unhcr.org/5666c8de6.html
2. Manpower 2015 Talent Shortage Survey  
www.manpowergroup.fi/Global/2015_Talent_Shortage_Survey-
full%20report.pdf 
3. Long K (2015) From Refugee to Migrant? Labor Mobility’s 
Protection Potential, Migration Policy Institute 
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/refugee-migrant-labor-
mobilitys-protection-potential
4. World Bank (2016) Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: 
Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change  
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/ 
10/503001444058224597/Global-Monitoring-Report-2015.pdf
5. www.solutionsalliance.org 
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Palestinian professionals in Lebanon: an exception
Palestine refugees in Lebanon, being 
classified as foreigners or migrants, suffer 
restrictions on their employment. Generally, 
non-Lebanese nationals who want to work in 
the professions in Lebanon can do so under 
the ‘principle of reciprocity’ between nations. 
However, Palestinians were excluded due to 
the fact that this principle presupposes the 
existence of a legally recognised state with 
which to have a reciprocal relationship.  So 
the Lebanese Ministry of Labour had the 
Cabinet approve an interpretation of the 
law to grant an exception to Palestinian 
workers – provided that they were born on 
Lebanese territory and officially registered 
with the Lebanese Ministry of Interior.
However, problems remain for 
Palestinians. The reciprocity principle 
entitles foreign workers to obtain work 
permits or receive social security benefits 
provided that their state grants the same 
benefits to Lebanese workers. But the law 
did not take into account the fact that the 
Palestinian refugees have no state, and there 
are cases where the rights provided for in 
the Labour Code are denied, citing the non-
availability of reciprocity, despite Lebanon 
having ratified the 1958 Convention on the 
elimination of discrimination in employment 
and occupation. Whatever the normative 
position, there have been warnings of the 
risk, both in human terms and in terms of 
security, of exclusion of Palestinians from the 
Lebanese labour market. The work to provide 
for the rights of self-employed Palestinian 
workers in professions in Lebanon is a 
central part of the struggle to provide civil 
rights for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
Mahmoud Al-Ali mmukhtar01@hotmail.com 
A scientist who specialises in Palestinian refugee 
affairs
Doing business in Ecuador
Oscar M Sánchez Piñeiro and Regina Saavedra 
Engaging refugees in the economic development of Ecuador’s Esmeraldas Province would 
provide them with livelihoods and also combat the perception that they are a burden on 
society. 
Esmeraldas, one of Ecuador’s least developed 
provinces, has seen the arrival of over 6,000 
refugees and 18,000 asylum seekers in the 
past ten years, mostly from the Pacific Coast 
of Colombia. Their considerable humanitarian 
needs have only increased over time, as have 
negative local attitudes towards them.
In the complex environment of Esmeraldas 
with its high unemployment rates and scant 
industry, UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) 
has engaged with government, private sector, 
social entrepreneurs, NGOs and academic 
and financial institutions in a programme 
that is the first of its kind in Ecuador. The 
goal of this initiative is to help make refugees 
economic actors in their communities and 
agents of their own integration in Ecuador, 
while also contributing to the development of 
the province by generating employment and 
supporting the creation of small businesses. 
The programme concentrates resources 
on increasing production, manufacturing 
and service activities, supporting markets 
and establishing a ‘business incubator’ to 
foment private sector development with 
a social component – in other words, the 
development of small enterprises that create 
employment and wealth for refugees and the 
local community. 
The business incubator
The business incubator concept refers to an 
entity that helps new and start-up companies 
develop capacities to become successful. 
In North America, a number of business 
incubators have been set up in major business 
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universities or technological hubs but they 
have also been created to bring economic 
dynamism to impoverished communities 
there. In Ecuador UNHCR partnered 
with the Pontifical Catholic University of 
Ecuador in Esmeraldas (PUCESE) from 2011 
to provide refugees, asylum seekers and 
vulnerable local people with entrepreneurial 
skills to develop their businesses in an 
otherwise under-developed region.1 
In Esmeraldas the business incubator2 
works like other business incubators 
but, unusually, offers refugees, asylum 
seekers and vulnerable local populations 
an opportunity otherwise inaccessible 
to them. Its specific objectives – over and 
above the business development objectives 
– include local integration and conflict 
resolution, the fostering of solidarity with 
refugees, and the promotion of gender 
equality through female-led businesses.
The process of securing inclusion in 
the incubator is competitive, using an 
assessment of the entrepreneur’s capacity 
and economic and social indicators. A 
committee composed of private and public 
entities determines winners against the set 
selection criteria. The winners receive a range 
of practical support for the expansion and 
consolidation of their businesses, including:
  training in, for example, administration, 
management, accounting, market 
assessments, business planning and 
marketing; 
  technical assistance and monitoring by 
PUCESE technicians; 
Refugee entrepreneur beneficiary of the business incubator.
UN
H
CR
 E
sm
er
al
da
s
35
FM
R
 5
2
May 2016 www.fmreview.org/solutions
Thinking ahead: displacement, transition, solutions
  and finally a grant to be used as growth 
capital to strengthen enterprises’ expansion 
and consolidation.
Ecuador offers many challenges, with 
poverty rates for refugees and asylum 
seekers reaching 25%. UNHCR has 
mitigated the risk of leaving the most 
vulnerable of these refugees and asylum 
seekers out of this business opportunity 
by encouraging the new businesses to hire 
other refugees or vulnerable populations. 
More than just business
As the idea was for refugees and local 
populations to share a common purpose 
around the business interactions, UNHCR 
has combined traditional business indicators 
with social parameters in order to monitor 
and analyse the impact of this model. 
Thus far, this initiative has supported 26 
enterprises. Four that have failed did so 
due to deaths in the family or resettlement 
to a third country, not as business failures. 
For the surviving businesses, 13 achieved 
a 10% increase in earnings within the first 
quarter, a further three during the second 
quarter, and one during the third. The rest 
are on course to meet their financial targets 
in the coming year. Some have seen clear 
success, and have been awarded thousands 
of dollars’ worth of state contracts. Two 
entrepreneurs have been selected to take part 
in nationwide business accelerator initiatives 
which will bring their products to the shelves 
of the supermarket chains. Data from the 
Esmeraldas business incubators is being 
compared to the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor3 standards to determine how 
refugee-led businesses compare to the overall 
enterprise development. With over 95% of 
businesses in Esmeraldas failing within their 
first two years, the failure rate for UNHCR-
PUCESE-supported businesses is down to 
15%. Given the success of the project this year, 
30 ongoing enterprises will enter the Business 
Incubator for further technical support 
and capital funding and 15 new female 
refugee-led start-ups will be supported. 
Although the businesses are still, in 
some ways, lacking in terms of diversity and 
innovation, they are finding market niches 
and capacities for growth. Moreover, some 
of the enterprises are entering into joint 
ventures together or with local entrepreneurs 
to generate greater capacity and scale up 
their business opportunities. Refugee-led 
businesses are generating employment for 
refugees and members of the local population 
and are combating discrimination and 
negative perceptions toward refugees. 
Another unusual element was 
incorporated three years ago in the form 
of follow-up by a social worker to mitigate 
conflict within enterprises or between 
entrepreneurs and their families. One of the 
priorities had been to generate female-led 
businesses but issues of equal voices within 
the home and distribution of income had 
created some domestic conflict. The social 
worker would incorporate conflict resolution 
techniques so that families would be able 
to prosper and share the responsibilities 
for the house and business equitably. 
UNHCR in Esmeraldas also developed 
a related set of partnerships – with local 
NGOs, government ministries, business 
networks, etc – that enabled it to reach 
beyond humanitarian and social services 
actors. By helping with the development 
of public policy in relation to economic 
development, by supporting small-scale 
agriculture, markets and service provision, 
by opening new marketing avenues and by 
securing micro-finance services (including 
micro insurance to protect business 
investments from external shocks), UNHCR 
secured access to economic development 
for refugees. UNHCR also supported the 
development of the provincial development 
strategy, which focused on agricultural 
production, entrepreneurial development 
and productive financing, thus securing the 
inclusion of refugees in that strategy also. 
Conclusions
After four years of interventions, the main 
lesson to be drawn is that humanitarian aid 
can be directed towards the construction 
of small business development, not only 
creating wealth for individuals but also 
delivering social goods and promoting the 
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The contribution of the private sector to solutions  
for displacement
Glaucia Boyer and Yannick DuPont
The Solutions Alliance is exploring ways of better engaging with the private sector – local 
small and medium-sized enterprises as well as international companies – to harness their 
capacity to turn displacement challenges into development opportunities.
Over recent years businesses with a social 
conscience have increasingly been moving 
from pure philanthropy and promotion of 
responsible business practices to business 
partnership models. This means the role 
of businesses has expanded from being 
donors or service providers to being 
commercial and entrepreneurial actors in 
responses to disasters or humanitarian 
crises, although so far they have mainly 
addressed short-term life-saving needs. 
The scale and complexity of needs 
emerging from large flows of populations 
into host communities bring opportunities 
to identify and open up markets, upgrade 
infrastructure, create jobs and make 
profits. However, weaknesses in policy 
and regulatory frameworks, restrictions 
on refugees working, over-saturated and 
unskilled local labour markets, high levels 
of informality, unreliability in sourcing 
materials and simple lack of information have 
been reasons for businesses not to take up 
those opportunities. It is therefore important 
to identify the benefits to businesses in 
engaging in solutions for displacement as 
well as the benefits of engaging businesses 
in solutions for displacement before looking 
into matching the needs of displaced 
people with economic opportunities. 
Benefits of engaging businesses 
Beyond undertaking outsourced elements 
of humanitarian response, arguably the 
private sector’s role in potentially generating 
growth, wealth and jobs is the main reason for 
engaging businesses in seeking solutions for 
displaced people and their host communities. 
In the Kampala area of Uganda a Somali 
Ugandan-owned oil company employs nearly 
60 Somali refugees as shop keepers, cashiers, 
security guards and clerks in only one of 
local integration of thousands of refugees. 
This experience has shown that even in 
an economically deprived region it is 
possible to find ways to generate economic 
development opportunities for refugees and 
the local population. Directing humanitarian 
assistance at creating economic growth 
through small enterprise development 
generates economic development and 
also increases the capacity of the local 
community to continue to receive refugees. 
Taking into account that economic factors 
are often the biggest variables in the 
integration of refugees, it make sense to 
invest more in programmes that support 
the economic viability of refugees. The 
Refugee Business Incubator could be a 
model to be explored in other refugee 
operations. We are currently approaching 
existing business incubators to adapt their 
models and services to accommodate to 
the particularities of refugees’ situations. 
Oscar M Sánchez Piñeiro sanchezo@unhcr.org 
Livelihoods Officer, UNHCR 
Regina Saavedra saavedra@unhcr.org  
Livelihoods Monitoring Associate, UNHCR 
www.unhcr.org 
The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the United Nations or UNHCR. 
1. Special thanks for their help and support in the development 
of the Refugee Business Incubator at PUCESE go to Albert 
Vañó Sanchis, Víctor Pérez Prados, Rafael Luque de Dios and 
Roxana Benítez. 
2. http://emprendimientopucese.blogspot.co.uk/ 
3. www.gemconsortium.org/ 
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its many franchises.1 The transformative 
impact of, for example, mobile phone and 
money transfer groups holds great potential if 
applied to finding solutions for displacement. 
Specifically, making use of market 
systems can offer greater access to products 
and services that improve both the 
quality of life of displaced populations 
and host communities. Skills upgrading 
through training, apprenticeships or 
on-the-job training that are offered 
directly or in close collaboration with 
businesses will better address the market 
demand and effectively enable displaced 
persons to access job opportunities.  
Opportunities to link small and medium-
sized local enterprises (SMEs) owned 
by displaced persons to value chains of 
more established companies can also help 
make the former more viable enterprises, 
capable of accessing new niche markets and 
increasing volumes of transactions. Working 
with larger, more established companies 
is nowadays considered one of the most 
promising ways to upgrade SMEs in fragile 
and development contexts. These market-
driven approaches have the potential to 
‘achieve scale’ and sustain the impact of 
interventions. Finally a major shift can be 
made through the creation of economic zones, 
with preferential trade access for refugee-
made goods and where domestic as well as 
foreign investors can relocate supply chains.2
Benefits to businesses 
For businesses the gains can be in accessing 
new producers, consumers and markets in 
displacement contexts – that is, generating 
revenues while contributing to tackling 
displacement challenges. Situations of 
displacement can provide opportunities 
to innovate, test new products and enter 
new markets, leading to increasing value 
and opportunities for the company and its 
stakeholders, including the opportunity 
to increase competitive differentiation. In 
addition a demonstrable commitment to 
corporate social responsibility can result in 
positive public image and brand value.
To make this work, businesses will need 
to gain knowledge about the long-term needs 
of displaced persons and host communities 
as potential consumers and clients, and work 
out how to mitigate the risks and costs of 
operating in displacement contexts. In the 
long term the aim would be for international 
organisations and local governments 
to work to secure the sustainability of 
businesses by creating the conditions for 
an enabling environment, which would 
incentivise and attract new investments. 
Hygiene specialist Saraya Co., for example, 
decided to expand the manufacture and 
distribution of its range of health-related 
products and services into Uganda, with long-
term benefits of their activities to both Uganda 
and their market share. Opportunities 
to expand their work into the displaced-
affected areas of Uganda could be a concrete 
contribution to the Solutions Alliance Uganda 
National Group’s efforts to finding solutions 
for refugees and their host communities.3 
“Displaced persons, in particular refugees, should 
not be singled out for business interventions, but 
instead be seen as the wider potential labour force, 
entrepreneurs and consumers.”
2015 Solutions Alliance Business Consultation
The way forward: a platform for interaction 
A shift towards building resilience in 
displacement contexts requires genuine 
leadership in businesses, new thinking 
about what generates value and innovative 
ways of connecting with societies. The 
question is what actors working on 
displacement issues and businesses 
interested in contributing solutions for 
displacement should do differently to ensure 
that ‘offer meets demand’. Conversations 
between and among the two communities 
invariably point to the need to explore 
the creation of a platform for interaction, 
where ‘matchmaking’ opportunities 
could be created in displacement 
contexts and business commitments 
consolidated and disseminated widely. 
It could be a multi-stakeholder virtual 
platform and occasionally materialise in the 
form of ‘solutions for displacement business 
fairs’ as well as concrete on-the-ground 
collaboration. It could be a ‘displacement 
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chapter’ within the Connecting Business 
Initiative (CBI) being launched at the 
World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016. 
It should also interact with the Business 
Mechanism established by the Global Forum 
for Migration and Development4 and ensure 
interconnectedness with the existing UN 
Global Compact5 and Business Call to Action6 
platforms. It should support the Solutions 
Alliance Private Sector Group to work with 
the National Groups to connect them to 
businesses of all sizes. Finally, it should be 
user-friendly for businesses and articulate 
the ‘ecosystem’ of support for businesses 
to engage in displacement solutions.
Although this platform for interaction 
will address practical challenges such as 
simple lack of information on needs and 
opportunities, there are other related obstacles 
to be worked out, whose implications 
stretch further than the role of the private 
sector. These include dealing with over-
saturated or unskilled local labour markets 
and finding creative ways to overcome 
obstacles to the right of refugees to work. 
Glaucia Boyer glaucia.boyer@undp.org 
Policy Specialist, Development Solutions for 
Displacement, UNDP 
Yannick DuPont y.du.pont@spark-online.org 
Director, SPARK www.spark-online.org 
The authors are the co-chairs of the Solutions 
Alliance Thematic Group on Engaging the Private 
Sector and have consolidated this piece on 
behalf of the members and the Group, which 
explores ways to better engage the private sector 
and apply its strengths to turn displacement 
challenges into development opportunities. 
See www.solutionsalliance.org/thematic-groups/
engaging-the-private-sector-in-finding-solutions-
for-displacement/ for the members of the Group.
1. Betts A, Bloom L, Kaplan J and Omata N (2014) Refugee 
Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions Humanitarian 
Innovation Project, Refugee Studies Centre  
www.oxhip.org/resources/refugee-economies-rethinking-popular-
assumptions/ 
2. http://tinyurl.com/WEF-EconomicZones  
3. See article by Alexander Betts, pp74-5.
4. http://tinyurl.com/GFMD-BusinessMechanism 
5. www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
6. www.businesscalltoaction.org/ 
Syrian refugees’ tented settlement in the village of Gaza, in the Bekaa Valley, east of Lebanon, 2014.
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Conceptual challenges and practical solutions in 
situations of internal displacement
Chaloka Beyani, Natalia Krynsky Baal and Martina Caterina
In situations of internal displacement, a variety of political, operational, ethical and practical 
challenges complicate our understanding and response, and the adequate implementation 
of durable solutions. 
As of January 2015 there were an estimated 
38 million persons internally displaced by 
conflict and another 19.3 million displaced 
by disasters in 2014 alone.1 The parameters of 
internal displacement – from its causes to its 
solutions – are broadly clear at the conceptual 
level and well documented in the legal and 
policy spheres. The Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement2 and subsequent 
regional and national legal frameworks 
provide clarity on the causes and rights of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) before, 
during and after displacement. The 2010 Inter-
Agency Standing Committee’s Framework 
for Durable Solutions for Internally 
Displaced Persons (the IASC Framework) 
has complemented this by defining and 
describing what constitute durable solutions 
for IDPs.3 However, on the ground one of 
the challenges is determining the end of 
displacement and therefore appropriate 
support for the search for durable solutions. 
The IASC Framework – widely recognised 
as the internationally agreed benchmark 
for work towards solutions for IDPs – says 
that “a durable solution is achieved when 
IDPs no longer have specific assistance and 
protection needs that are linked to their 
displacement and such persons can enjoy 
their human rights without discrimination 
resulting from their displacement”. It 
further outlines three routes to durable 
solutions – sustainable reintegration, 
local integration or integration in another 
part of the country – through which this 
can be realised and thereby provides a 
clear starting point for comprehensive 
analysis, advocacy and programming.
The Framework goes on to outline 
eight criteria that can be used to determine 
the extent to which a durable solution 
has been achieved: safety and security; 
an adequate standard of living; access to 
livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and 
property; access to documentation; family 
reunification; participation in public affairs; 
and access to effective remedies and justice.
This highlights the fact that the search 
for durable solutions is a complex process 
that requires the timely and coordinated 
intervention of humanitarian, development 
and peace-building actors. That is, solutions-
oriented responses to displacement require 
a wide variety of stakeholders (with their 
different areas of expertise), potentially 
significant resources and a comprehensive 
analysis of the situation on the ground in 
order to most effectively target interventions 
and ensure complementarity between actors.
A solutions-oriented analysis of any 
displacement situation should be broad in 
order to take into account the different facets 
of the eight criteria outlined, rather than 
narrowly looking at a few in separation from 
the rest. The need to strengthen efforts to 
pursue such a shared and comprehensive 
analysis is becoming more widely recognised 
and advocated for at a high level but it is 
not yet common practice and pursuing 
this goal is more easily said than done. 
Not only return and reintegration
Governments and other actors are sometimes 
eager to promote return as the preferred (and 
in some cases only) solution, and are often 
pressurised to accept something that is less 
than ideal by reducing a ‘solution’ to the mere 
physical movement of return or resettlement, 
bringing down the IDP population figures 
accordingly. However, durable solutions 
strategies must consider IDPs’ preferences 
and should take into account whether 
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conditions are conducive to return and what 
possible obstacles may persist; they should 
also keep open other appropriate channels 
for seeking solutions such as local integration 
and integration elsewhere in the country. 
Comprehensive analysis of the preferences, 
opportunities and obstacles to pursuing 
durable solutions through processes such 
as profiling can help in advocacy for more 
appropriate strategies and approaches.
For example, a profiling exercise carried 
out in Yemen in 2010 helped to inform the 
government’s durable solutions strategy. 
Undertaken by the Government of Yemen, 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) and 
the Danish Refugee Council, the exercise 
provided the evidence required for the 
strategy to promote alternative solutions 
instead of focusing only on return, as the 
policy had previously done. A crucial 
finding of the profiling in Yemen concerned 
IDPs’ intentions to return to their pre-
displacement place of residence and 
compared this with the conditions upon 
which possible return was based. Results 
showed that around 25% of respondents were 
at risk of protracted displacement, should 
a narrow focus on return alone remain.
Another common challenge is the 
increasing urbanisation of displacement 
coupled with limited availability of relevant 
information about displaced people in 
urban areas. Often the urbanisation of 
households and communities can render 
returns to rural areas less feasible and, 
especially in protracted urban displacement 
situations, displaced and non-displaced 
persons can face similar living conditions 
but distinct protection challenges, while 
the paucity of disaggregated information 
can leave the differences unnoticed. 
A comparative analysis between displaced 
and non-displaced (or other relevant groups, 
such as economic migrants or returning 
refugees) can be a game-changer. Such an 
analysis often informs a more targeted 
response by building on a more nuanced 
analysis of the skills and capacities as well 
as the needs and protection concerns of the 
different groups. With this comes a better 
understanding of development issues faced 
by displacement-affected communities 
in common with their non-displaced 
neighbours, and identification of specific 
vulnerabilities displaced persons may have. 
A recent example comes from two urban 
profiling exercises in Mogadishu and Hargeisa 
in Somalia that focused on populations living 
in informal settlements across the two cities. 
Undertaken in collaboration with central and 
local authorities, both exercises have provided 
a clearer picture of the scale of displacement 
in the two cities and solid evidence for 
development actors and urban planners 
to pursue a more displacement-sensitive 
approach to their planned programmes. 
The findings from Hargeisa show very 
small differences in the living conditions of 
economic migrants, IDPs, host communities 
and refugee returnees in the settlement. 
The implication is for longer-term solutions 
for the displaced to be pursued as part of 
urban poverty reduction strategies and for 
inclusion of the settlements in city-wide urban 
planning.4 However, findings from the same 
exercise also highlight that IDPs from south-
central Somalia are more vulnerable, which 
means that continued protection monitoring 
and advocacy interventions are required, 
Home destroyed by airstrikes in the Nahdah neighbourhood, 
Sana’a, Yemen, January 2016. 
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particularly regarding their 
access to public services. 
Displacement data for 
development actors
There is widespread 
agreement within 
the international 
community on the need 
for greater involvement 
of development actors in 
displacement response, the 
importance of considering 
forcibly displaced persons 
not only as recipients of 
assistance but as active 
economic agents, and 
the value of supporting 
their self-reliance and 
resilience in pursuit of 
sustainable solutions. 
These discussions have 
been present both in the lead-up to the 2016 
World Humanitarian Summit and within the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Central to this debate is the need for more 
‘development-relevant’ data and analysis 
on displacement to help justify or trigger a 
more ‘displacement-sensitive’ development 
approach in affected countries. Discrete 
efforts are underway in different contexts 
to address this gap including large-scale 
studies undertaken by the World Bank 
in the Great Lakes5, the Middle East and 
elsewhere, increased support for academic 
research that focuses on the economic impact 
of displacement6 and multiple household 
survey exercises that aim to compare the 
living conditions of displaced and non-
displaced people residing in similar areas. 
In addition to these country- and region-
specific initiatives, there are also early stages 
of work at the global level going on.7
However, truly common analysis between 
humanitarian, development and peace-
building actors generated through genuine 
collaboration during the research, design 
and implementation process remains rare. 
Due to the different ‘logic’ of each discipline 
(including differences related to planning 
cycles, mandates, priorities, terminology, 
resources, government relations, and 
approaches to partnership), it is difficult to 
generate an analysis that serves all actors’ 
information needs and to reach agreement 
on evidence-based priorities for response. 
When this does happen, more often than not 
it relies on personality-driven rather than 
institutionally supported momentum. Even 
so, the trust and ownership generated through 
the collaborative process can pave the way for 
hugely increased impact and use of results.
Although this very practical challenge 
is difficult to overcome, there are a growing 
number of cases of significant positive 
impact. In order to develop the Durable 
Solutions Strategy in Côte d’Ivoire, for 
example, UNHCR and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
supported the government and worked 
closely with the National Statistics Office to 
conduct a profiling exercise in Abidjan and 
displacement-affected areas in the west of 
the country during 2014-15. Although the 
process faced considerable delays, particularly 
because of the outbreak of Ebola and planned 
national census activities, it used a list of 
indicators based on the IASC Framework 
developed jointly by humanitarian and 
development actors (a detailed methodology 
shaped for both urban and rural 
displacement-affected areas) and ultimately 
produced analysis of the displacement 
situation that fed directly into the national 
development plan for the coming years.
In other examples, similar profiling 
processes, jointly shaped and implemented by 
humanitarian and development actors (often 
alongside relevant government ministries 
and national statistical offices), have enabled 
results to feed into the development of policies 
and joint durable solutions programming. 
Importantly, these processes have also 
provided crucial baseline data for monitoring 
progress of solutions-oriented action in 
displacement contexts. This has happened 
(or is happening) in contexts as varied as 
Colombia, Kosovo, Iraq and Somalia.8
Limited guidance
Despite broad conceptual clarity around 
durable solutions for IDPs through the 
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IASC Framework’s definition, 
principles and criteria, there 
are a number of obstacles to 
overcome when trying to apply 
this analytical framework 
in real-life displacement 
situations. A non-exhaustive 
selection of these includes: 
political challenges such as 
the common prioritisation of 
return and the tendency to 
count physical movements of 
return or relocation as a durable 
solution; operational challenges 
that often peak in busy urban 
areas, alongside ethical 
challenges related to invisible 
populations and the protection 
concerns of urban IDPs; and 
practical challenges associated 
with enabling humanitarian, 
development and peace-
building actors to genuinely 
collaborate and ‘read off the same page’.
Profiling, as a context-specific 
information-gathering process that 
prioritises collaboration, transparency 
and joint decision making at every stage, 
is a useful tool to overcome (or at least 
minimise) some of these challenges. Done 
well, it can provide a common evidence-
base to be used for advocacy, strategy 
development and programmatic decision 
making in response to IDP situations. 
A frequent request from government, 
and humanitarian and development partners 
directed to the Special Rapporteur’s Office 
is for help to ‘operationalise’ the text of the 
IASC Framework, in particular for help to 
use the eight criteria it lays out, in order to 
better analyse the displacement situation 
on the ground. In response, the Special 
Rapporteur’s Office and the Joint IDP Profiling 
Service (JIPS) have teamed up to try to fill 
this gap by combining the IASC Framework’s 
definition, principles and criteria for durable 
solutions with JIPS experience in facilitating 
collaborative profiling processes. The aim is to 
develop a global toolkit for analysing durable 
solutions and developing a strong baseline 
against which to monitor progress over time.
Chaloka Beyani C.Beyani@lse.ac.uk  
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons 
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/
IDPersonsIndex.aspx 
Natalia Krynsky Baal coordinator@jips.org  
Coordinator, Joint IDP Profiling Service 
www.jips.org
Martina Caterina caterina@unhcr.org  
Formerly Durable Solutions Project Coordinator at 
JIPS and currently Legal Adviser to the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons
1. Estimates produced by the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) www.internal-displacement.org 
2. http://tinyurl.com/GPsInternalDisplacement 
3. http://tinyurl.com/IASC-IDP-Framework  
4. www.jips.org/files/1076 
5. See article by Joanna de Berry, pp17-19. 
6. This topic has been prioritised by the Solutions Alliance’s 
Thematic Working Group on Data, Research and Performance 
Management: http://bit.ly/1VY6FIy 
7. See for example the 2015 workshop http://bit.ly/236hFWf and a 
forthcoming report by World Bank’s Global Programme on Forced 
Displacement and the German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP).
8. For more details of different examples see www.jips.org 
IDPs in Mogadishu, Somalia, 2011.
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Potential of protection capacity building to assist 
transition  
Sarah Deardorff Miller and Julian Lehmann
If protection capacity building is successful, it can contribute to establishing asylum systems 
that lead to local integration. 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) frequently 
seeks to develop protection capacity 
of refugee-hosting states, for example 
through creating or adapting national legal 
frameworks; assistance in registration 
and status determination; knowledge 
transfer in government institutions; 
support of civil society institutions through 
training or material support; and assisting 
governments with creating frameworks 
for economic, social and legal integration 
of refugees.1 However, the extent to 
which such efforts successfully help the 
transition to durable solutions is not clear. 
Protection capacity building can induce 
host states to bear more of the responsibility 
for refugees, simultaneously building up 
national authorities to be able to better 
respond to future refugee situations, and 
freeing up UNHCR resources. It can be 
an opportunity to bring refugees into 
mainstream national development plans, 
and to professionalise sometimes small and 
under-funded national refugee authorities. 
Yet protection capacity building also faces 
political and administrative challenges. 
First, donors and host states have 
contrasting interests in undertaking 
protection capacity building. Host states 
tend to want to have as much control as 
possible over refugee situations, while 
having to pay for and be responsible for 
implementing as little as possible. Protection 
capacity building for them is often linked to 
failures in responsibility sharing, pointing 
at disproportionate admission of refugees 
in regions of origin, or fear that a high level 
of protection will lead to readmission of 
refugees from other countries. Besides, they 
often have little appetite to formalise refugee 
protection through legal frameworks. In 
contrast, donor states are likely to want 
host states near refugees’ countries of 
origin to bear the bulk of the burden and 
to replicate formalised refugee protection 
as found in the Global North. For them, 
protection capacity building is primarily 
about assisting host states in ‘doing their job’, 
either by adhering to their legal obligations 
or by establishing a (legal) framework for 
refugee protection in the first place. 
Second, in situations where the basic 
functions of an asylum system are not 
assured, UNHCR is likely to prioritise setting 
up systems for registration, refugee status 
determination and securing non-refoulement. 
In these instances, it is particularly 
challenging to make durable solutions part of 
a clear roadmap beyond the ‘protection basics’, 
to remain engaged, and to secure funding for 
durable solutions once the ‘basics’ are met.
The examples of UNHCR’s 
cooperation with the European Union 
(EU) and its attempts to hand over status 
determination to the Kenyan and Ugandan 
governments can serve to illustrate 
these opportunities and challenges. 
UNHCR and partners building capacity 
Amongst cooperation priorities between 
UNHCR and the EU, durable solutions tend 
to be a low priority. From 2006 to 2013, the 
EU’s Thematic Programme for Migration 
and Asylum funded projects primarily on 
reception and registration capacity but also 
on promotion of ratification of refugee law 
and on local integration. The biggest projects, 
called Regional Protection Programmes 
and implemented by UNHCR, did also 
attempt to foster durable solutions – for 
example not only to ensure non-refoulement 
but also to improve access to health care and 
education, and to provide aid, counselling 
and opportunities for self-reliance in Egypt.2 
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However, the final evaluation of the EU 
funding instrument concludes that donor 
and host states were most eager to cooperate 
on projects against irregular migration, 
and that the link between migration and 
development was insufficient.3 A discussion 
paper, relying on UNHCR project reports, 
concludes that these programmes did not 
sufficiently coordinate with development 
and humanitarian aid policies, and that 
local buy-in was insufficient.4 Current EU 
aid to Turkey, in particular the EU Regional 
Development and Protection Programme for 
the Middle East, could be an improvement 
in that respect, because it does attempt to 
foster socio-economic development for 
host communities and refugees in addition 
to improving asylum procedures. 
Some of UNHCR’s most visible 
protection capacity-building efforts relate to 
establishing refugee status determination 
(RSD) procedures. In some protracted refugee 
situations, UNHCR has carried out RSD for 
decades, and now seeks to hand over these 
responsibilities to a newly built-up national 
authority for refugees. Kenya’s Refugees Act 
of 2006, for example, was meant to bring RSD, 
and reception and care of refugees, fully 
under the responsibility of Kenyan authorities 
by ‘constitutionalising’ RSD, establishing a 
Department of Refugee Affairs and setting 
out a comprehensive institutional framework 
for RSD. While there has been some success 
in this ongoing handover, a number of 
challenges have emerged, including: 
building up and retaining national staff to 
carry out RSD at the same qualitative and 
quantitative level as UNHCR; data sharing 
and technology transfers between UNHCR 
and the Department of Refugee Affairs; 
maintaining funding levels for nationally 
run RSD; and creating additional institutions 
and legal tools needed to carry out RSD.5 
In central Uganda in the late 1990s, 
UNHCR sought to shift responsibilities for the 
Kiryandongo refugee settlement to Ugandan 
authorities, despite the authorities insisting 
that the international community continue 
to pay for refugees, whom they saw as an 
international, not national, concern. At the 
same time, Uganda insisted that it maintain 
full control over refugee settlements, having 
a role in decision making on all matters. 
As in the case of Kenya, resources were 
a constant concern for those involved in 
the handover. This case also demonstrates 
the importance of tone and rhetoric in a 
protection capacity-building endeavour of 
this nature; Uganda did not like UNHCR’s 
language that the settlements needed to 
be ‘handed over’ because Uganda did not 
ever see them as being out of its possession. 
Other lessons learned include: the need 
for careful planning whenever the actors 
in charge of refugee protection change; 
setting and adhering to realistic timeframes; 
committing and ensuring delivery of 
sufficient resources from UNHCR and 
national authorities; and the importance of a 
strong national legal framework that reflects 
international refugee and human rights law.6
Both of these UNHCR handover cases 
demonstrate that protection capacity building 
can in theory foster a new division of labour 
and free up UNHCR resources for work 
on durable solutions. However, success 
in handing over responsibility for legal 
protection may mean that UNHCR and its 
partners are tempted to pull out once the 
basics of registration and non-refoulement are 
secured, leading to a deterioration on the 
ground. National authorities and UNHCR  
are theoretically committed to using 
protection capacity building as an important 
step toward local integration – for example, 
bringing refugees into national development 
plans and national judicial processes – but 
they have not yet found clear roadmaps 
for translating handovers and protection 
capacity-building efforts into durable 
solutions for refugees. Rather, then, handover 
transitions have only changed actors’ 
responsibilities and capabilities.
Conclusion
Protection capacity building can at worst 
entrench a purely material understanding 
of burden and responsibility sharing in 
refugee protection, by which donor countries 
seek to ‘contain’ refugees to their region of 
origin and transitions to durable solutions 
are lost out of sight. Yet, branding all efforts 
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at protection capacity building as part of 
an externalisation strategy would miss the 
point, for it would inhibit the analysis of 
concrete shortcomings and achievements in 
contributing to durable solutions, and deter 
addressing other questions. For example, will 
refugees be more likely to find prospects for 
local integration when protection capacity-
building efforts result in more national 
institutions, processes and procedures? Is the 
formalisation of refugee protection through 
legal frameworks always the best approach 
to improve the situation for refugees?
Whatever the answers, the goals of 
protection capacity building should be to 
achieve results for refugees, to strengthen 
access to asylum and international burden 
and responsibility sharing. Protection 
capacity building does have the potential 
to be an important step in working towards 
durable solutions. Host states that are 
better equipped to deal with incoming or 
long-staying refugees, and that are well 
supported by other states and international 
actors, may also be more likely to work 
in cooperation with refugees and other 
actors to facilitate local integration. 
Sarah Deardorff Miller 
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Energy solutions with both humanitarian and 
development pay-offs
Owen Grafham, Glada Lahn and Johanna Lehne
The normal approach to energy delivery during refugee crises tends to lock in reliance on 
dirty, dangerous and expensive fuels. Sustainable energy solutions require a long-term 
planning framework. There are opportunities to align the energy resilience and access  
goals of host nations with the greening of humanitarian operations and objectives for 
refugee self-reliance. 
Energy services are essential to the most 
basic human needs. Whether for eating (fuel 
to cook), moving (fuel for transportation of 
people and goods), maintaining a liveable 
temperature (heating or cooling), education 
(light to read by) or earning a living 
(electricity to power homes and businesses), 
energy underpins almost all daily activities. 
But people who have fled their homes 
due to conflict have special needs and 
face acute difficulties in obtaining energy 
services. These include long distances 
(from urban centres, public services and 
utilities), temporary forms of shelter, health 
problems, insecurity of settlements, lack of 
legal status, low and insecure incomes, and 
the need to communicate with relatives.
Recent research undertaken by Chatham 
House suggests that approximately 90% of 
displaced people in camps have minimal 
access to lighting and approximately 
80% have only the absolute minimum 
amount of energy required for cooking.1 
Negative coping strategies such as under-
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cooking of food or reducing the number 
of meals are commonplace for almost all 
displaced people – those living in rural and 
urban areas as well as those in camps. 
Globally, forcibly displaced populations 
are overwhelmingly reliant on dirty and 
inefficient fuel sources, with a majority 
predominantly using firewood or charcoal. 
Although the per capita fuel use among 
forcibly displaced populations is small, 
the relative inefficiency of the fuel they 
are using means that much more has to be 
combusted and more emissions released 
in order to generate the same amount of 
energy. Deforestation is also a major problem 
for many regions hosting refugees. 
These conditions have huge impacts on 
health and protection, especially for women 
and girls who often carry the greatest 
burden in terms of household cooking 
(indoor air pollution) and in going out to 
collect firewood (high risks of gender-based 
violence). Applying global estimates from 
the World Health Organization would 
suggest that some 20,000 displaced people 
die prematurely each year due to indoor air 
pollution. Médecins Sans Frontières have 
reported that 82% of 500 women and girls 
receiving treatment after sexual violence 
over one four-and-a-half-month period in 
South and West Darfur reported that the 
violence occurred when they left camps in 
search of firewood, water or animal fodder.2 
Improving the way energy needs are met 
therefore has significant benefits for health, 
protection and livelihoods. So why has 
energy not been a greater focus before now? 
What’s the problem with energy? 
A range of factors have contributed 
to energy’s relatively low priority in 
humanitarian response. The first is under-
funding for humanitarian crises in general. 
But beyond a lack of funds, energy has not 
been seen as of equal priority with other 
issues such as food, shelter and protection. 
This has resulted in a dearth of qualified 
personnel with the requisite technical skills. 
As a result, there is a system-wide failure 
to collect the kind of data that would be 
essential to implementing systematic energy 
planning in and around humanitarian crises. 
Humanitarian agencies are, moreover, 
ill-equipped to respond to protracted 
crises, while energy infrastructure and 
sustainable financing schemes are likely to 
require a longer time frame. The approach 
of humanitarian organisations to energy 
management has most often followed a short-
term emergency approach. Products such 
as stoves or solar lanterns are distributed 
(almost always for free), with little attention 
paid to maintenance arrangements, 
cultural appropriateness, distribution 
mechanisms or the effects on local markets.
While a handout strategy of this nature 
may be the most appropriate response in 
the immediate aftermath of a crisis, refugee 
crises tend to be protracted, and many 
refugee settlements have grown into small 
cities. If energy planning is not taken into 
account in the initial humanitarian response, 
displaced people and the agencies serving 
them can end up locked into prohibitively 
expensive and inadequate energy practices. 
Za’atari camp in Jordan is a case in 
point. When the camp was first built, aid 
operations were connected to the national 
electricity grid but no provisions were made 
for energy to households themselves. In 
order to power their homes and businesses, 
refugees therefore resorted to informally 
tapping into the grid through street lights and 
thus ramping up consumption to the extent 
that UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) was 
landed with an electricity bill of $8.7 million 
for 2014-15. The agency then cut informal 
connections and in response those running 
businesses bought in diesel generators, 
In Dadaab’s Ifo 2 refugee camp in Kenya, a girl shows her ration 
card for firewood collection from UNHCR. 98% of households in 
the camps use firewood as a cooking fuel.
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increasing reliance on fuel supplies as well 
as sources of local pollution. While a new 
system is now being implemented to ensure 
adequate access to energy for households 
and businesses at a more reasonable cost 
to the agency, greater foresight in the 
initial crisis planning process could have 
mitigated the financial and human costs.
The short-term nature of humanitarian 
responses is not just a product of the system 
but a reflection of the fact that governments 
and donors often remain reluctant to admit 
that refugee crises are anything but short-
term emergencies. Most governments do not 
allow long-term infrastructural investment in 
settlements. In addition, communities living 
side-by-side with large refugee populations 
are often not much better off, and providing 
hi-tech facilities exclusively to refugees 
would be likely to breed resentment.
Budgeting in the humanitarian sector 
tends to be structured around donor 
funding time frames of one year or less. 
This means that agencies cannot justify 
capital investments in efficiency upgrades 
or renewable energy equipment that 
would have a payback period of several 
years. Where such investments have 
been funded by specific donations, they 
tend to be limited pilots that do not make 
provision for sustainable scale-up. 
Bridging development and humanitarian 
modes
Key questions with regards to energy 
provision are thus also central to smoothing 
the transition from short-term humanitarian 
responses to national resilience, and ensuring 
that responses to crises do not hamper 
longer-term development. Development 
solutions aimed at improving energy 
provision have tended to focus on national 
energy access, neglecting those people 
who fall outside national strategies, such 
as displaced people. Energy provision in 
humanitarian response for the displaced 
has tended to coalesce around ad hoc 
distribution of products without provision 
for local market development and better 
quality services. Development actors and 
private sector companies working on energy 
access, whose expertise is crucial when it 
comes to designing viable energy systems, 
have valuable experience to contribute 
to meeting humanitarian challenges.
Modelling done by Chatham House 
as part of the Moving Energy Initiative3 
suggests that the introduction of simple 
In order to support school children in their studies, UNHCR recently distributed over 12,000 solar lamps in 48 schools in the five Dadaab 
camps. Priority has been given to female students, who have less time to study after school. 
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technological solutions could save money 
and lives. For example, even basic changes 
such as the worldwide introduction of 
more efficient cooking stoves and solar 
lanterns could save forcibly displaced people 
around US$323 million annually after 
an upfront capital investment of US$335 
million by humanitarian agencies. Such 
an intervention would reduce indoor air 
pollution and reduce the amount of time 
women and girls spend collecting firewood. 
Field surveys in Dadaab (Kenya), 
Goudoubo (Burkina Faso) and Dollo 
Ado (Ethiopia) show that most refugee 
households are already paying for energy. 
Indeed, forcibly displaced people pay 
over the odds for the meagre amounts 
of energy they consume. In the Dadaab 
refugee camps in Kenya, households spend 
roughly 24% of their income on energy 
(firewood and torch batteries for the most 
part), as opposed to 4% in the UK.4 
Private sector energy companies have 
developed technologies and services that 
address low incomes and the disparate 
geographical locations of low-income 
consumers in rural locations. The energy 
access field is quickly gaining experience 
from a rapid expansion of small- to medium-
sized technology companies taking risks 
and exploiting mobile money services, 
pay-as-you-go energy systems, smart-grid 
technology, and remote sensing (allowing 
companies to monitor from HQ the 
performance of their technology). A 2015 
UNHCR study in south-east Nepal found 
that for example some 80% of households 
in two refugee settlements had photovoltaic 
solar panels, most of which they had 
purchased themselves.5 The fact that refugee 
populations are often concentrated in a 
geographical location, and supported by 
international donor agencies, also offers 
private sector companies the opportunity 
to overcome barriers normally associated 
with the off-grid energy market. Finding 
the right financing models and the right 
distribution of responsibility is key in this 
situation. The increasing use of cash grants 
and pre-loaded debit cards by humanitarian 
agencies is likely to support this momentum. 
However, in order to make real 
structural changes to the way energy is 
used and supplied, energy systems must 
be understood holistically. Making real 
structural changes, such as introducing 
market-based solutions, genuinely clean 
cooking solutions and renewable power 
systems, is not cheap and will involve an 
increase in capital costs for humanitarian 
agencies and potentially also an increase in 
annual energy costs for displaced people. 
But, if implemented well, these can yield 
significant health, livelihood and social 
cohesion benefits for displaced people and the 
host populations that live alongside them, as 
well as protecting local environments, which 
are often both fragile and highly contested. 
The economic case does exist and valuing 
these outcomes will be critical to funding 
the shift in technology and practices. 
Owen Grafham OGrafham@chathamhouse.org  
Programme Coordinator, Energy, Environment 
and Resources 
Glada Lahn GLahn@chathamhouse.org 
Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and 
Resources 
Johanna Lehne JLehne@chathamhouse.org  
Research Assistant, Energy, Environment and 
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Uganda’s approach to refugee self-reliance 
Kelly T Clements, Timothy Shoffner and Leah Zamore
Uganda has chosen inclusion over marginalisation; rather than coerce refugees into camps, 
Uganda upholds their rights to work, to attend school and to move freely. 
Headlines and hashtags speak of the refugee 
‘crisis’ as if the mere presence of people from 
another country poses a threat. Even among 
humanitarians, refugees are often understood 
as a ‘burden’ to be shared. This rhetoric 
obscures the reality that refugees’ ability to 
contribute to the societies where they are 
living depends precisely upon those factors 
most outside their control: the policies of host 
governments; the availability of public services; 
the health of local and regional economies; the 
budgets of humanitarian organisations; the 
priorities of international development actors; 
national and regional security; and so on. 
More often than not, these factors – 
individually or together – deny refugees the 
very rights and opportunities that enable 
people to take care of themselves. As the 
heads of the United Nations development 
and refugee agencies recently explained, 
refugees’ vulnerability is not inevitable; 
rather, it stems from circumstances that 
are “imposed upon [them] and reinforced 
by the world’s incomplete response.”1
But the opposite effect is also possible. 
Properly aligned, the above-mentioned 
factors can empower refugees to benefit 
their host communities and not to burden 
them. This is no surprise. Nationals and 
refugees are similarly affected by local and 
regional development challenges, such as 
inadequate access to health care or education. 
Addressing those challenges benefits everyone 
in the area, like a rising tide lifts all boats.
Such enabling environments are 
tragically rare. Uganda, where refugees have 
consistently found asylum since the Second 
World War, offers an important exception. 
Today, Uganda hosts more than 500,000 
refugees. More than 100,000 arrived in 
2015, mostly from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Burundi and South Sudan, 
where conflict and instability foreclose the 
possibility of repatriation any time soon.
Uganda has chosen inclusion over 
marginalisation; rather than coerce refugees 
into camps, Uganda upholds their rights to 
work, to attend school and to move freely. 
And it has striven to do so sustainably, by 
cultivating an environment that supports 
the self-reliance and resilience of entire 
communities, including the refugees among 
them. The three pillars of its refugee policy are:
  equality, dialogue and mutual support, 
leading to community resilience
  sustainable livelihoods support that takes 
account of the demographic, cultural and 
economic contexts of each community
  inclusion of refugees in local government-
managed systems, such as for public health 
and nutrition, the environment, education, 
gender-based violence prevention and 
response, and child protection services.
Crucially, this pioneering approach is based 
on two premises: firstly, that displacement 
is an area of shared responsibility for 
governmental, humanitarian and development 
actors; secondly, that it is an area of shared 
opportunity for refugees and Ugandans alike. 
Shared responsibility
As to the first premise, a notable feature is 
the division of the work among the various 
stakeholders in ways that play to everyone’s 
strengths. Development actors and donor 
states support agricultural projects, including 
by promoting access to land, introducing 
new techniques that lead to more lucrative 
crops, and improving market linkages. Private 
sector and other actors such as microfinance 
institutions and employers – working in 
conjunction with international NGOs, 
multilateral development banks and UN 
agencies – support non-agricultural livelihoods 
by promoting waged employment, identifying 
viable livelihoods opportunities and providing 
credit as well as skills training in business 
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literacy and small business development. The 
Ugandan government also enhances social 
service delivery capacity in refugee-hosting 
areas, with a view to integrating services for 
refugees into local government systems.
Within this cooperative environment, new 
ideas and new approaches are proliferating. 
Uganda has already incorporated refugees 
into its National Development Plan. In rural 
areas, refugees have long received plots of 
land to grow crops for personal consumption.  
The government, along with its international 
partners, is now exploring larger-scale 
agricultural projects that are designed to 
benefit both refugees and host communities.
Any programme of this size has its 
pitfalls, and Uganda’s history reveals mixed 
results. Past efforts have been hampered 
by, for example, insufficient consultation 
with affected communities, who are not 
only the beneficiaries of a self-reliance 
programme but also its agents. This fact 
requires a pragmatic approach to ensuring 
that each individual, whether refugee or 
citizen, gets the support they need until 
they are actually prepared for the transition 
away from assistance. Adequate funding is 
essential, as is pragmatic engagement with the 
political economy in which the programme 
must operate. The competing 
priorities and interests of local 
governments, for example, 
have sometimes resulted in 
refugees being disfavoured 
when funding began to dry up.
Fortunately, Uganda has 
been learning from those 
past lessons and is moving 
forward with a holistic 
approach that addresses the 
distinct development needs of 
girls, boys, women and men, 
whether Ugandans or refugees. 
The model that Uganda has 
adopted sequences short/
intermediate-term humanitarian 
interventions and longer-term 
development approaches in 
order to help participants 
gradually increase their degree 
of self-reliance and resilience.
Shared opportunity
This welcoming environment is bringing 
tangible benefits and renewed dignity for both 
Ugandans and refugees. Hence the second 
premise of Uganda’s policy: that displacement 
represents a shared opportunity. A recent 
economic study of refugees in Uganda 
described a “refugee community that is 
nationally and transnationally integrated, 
contributes in positive ways to the national 
economy, is economically diverse, uses and 
creates technology, and is far from uniformly 
dependent on international assistance.”2
The evidence presented is strong: 
of refugees living in rural Ugandan 
settlements, just 1% depend entirely on 
humanitarian assistance. Many operate 
their own businesses and even employ 
Ugandans. Likewise, in the capital Kampala, 
an estimated 1 in 5 refugees employs non-
family members, and roughly 40% of those 
employed by refugees are Ugandans.
Rather than stealing jobs, “refugees 
are more likely than nationals to start new 
businesses, increasing rather than reducing 
the number of available jobs”. Refugees 
contribute in other ways as well, including 
by paying taxes, by stimulating demand 
Joël Mutabazi, a tailor and a Burundian refugee now living in Kashojwa village, Nakivale, 
Uganda. Refugees in Uganda have the right to work and start their own businesses.
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and by bringing new ideas and skills that 
local residents may not have. Together, 
these benefits “significantly outweigh 
the costs of additional social services and 
environmental protection measures”.3
Of course, economic inclusion of refugees 
is also the right thing to do. Pope Francis 
recently lauded how Uganda enables 
refugees “to rebuild their lives in security 
and to sense the dignity which comes 
from earning one’s livelihood through 
honest labour”.4 Many of Uganda’s leaders, 
including President Museveni, were once 
refugees. They are well-placed to appreciate 
the dignity and hope that self-reliance 
can bring. Through their inclusive vision, 
Uganda and its international partners have 
discovered what much of the world has 
refused to accept: the benefits of refugee 
self-reliance outweigh any associated costs. 
Kelly T Clements clements@unhcr.org  
UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees
Timothy Shoffner shoffner@unhcr.org  
Law and Policy Consultant 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) www.unhcr.org
Leah Zamore lzamore@post.harvard.edu    
Law and Policy Consultant
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Limitations of development-oriented assistance in 
Uganda 
Ulrike Krause
In camp-like settlements, the aid provided by aid agencies with a development orientation 
can do little more than improve livelihood conditions.
The idea of linking refugee protection and 
assistance programmes with development 
aid is far from a new idea, with its potential 
as a win-win situation for donors and 
asylum states and, in theory at least, for 
refugees as well. As long ago as the 1960s, 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) tried 
to link its refugee assistance programmes 
with development aid. It moved from an 
‘integrated zonal approach’ during the 1960s 
to Refugee Aid and Development in the 1980s 
and Returnee Aid and Development in the 
1980s and ’90s. Since the new millennium, 
Targeted Development Assistance (TDA) 
and the Transitional Solutions Initiative 
(TSI) have been used to make the link. 
What all these approaches have in 
common is the attempt to link short-term 
refugee aid with medium-term development 
projects, offering both refugees and the host 
population access to services, and using a 
local settlement approach instead of camps. 
Yet, each approach did it differently. Since 
the 1980s, the idea has been promoted of 
refugees becoming self-reliant especially 
through agriculture, a concept that is related 
to recent debates about resilience and is 
still used today.1 In the 1990s, quick impact 
projects (QIPs) were used to promote efforts 
through small-scale and short-term measures.
Although the approaches had benefits and 
disadvantages, the main reasons for failure 
were similar in each approach: insufficient 
support by and cooperation of humanitarian 
and development agencies, ineffective 
(short-term) programme planning, polarised 
positions between Northern donor states 
and Southern refugee-hosting states, lack 
of political will and insufficient funding.2 
Hence, despite these initiatives over several 
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decades, refugee protection and assistance 
are still characterised as humanitarian, 
short-term emergency assistance, 
differentiated from medium- and long-term 
development aid. Ironically, these ‘short-term’ 
interventions are – given the global trends 
of protracted refugee situations – lasting 
for an average of nearly twenty years. 
The case of Uganda 
Refugee assistance in Uganda is seen as 
progressive due to a new refugee policy and 
its development orientation. The new refugee 
policy entered into force in 2009 and included 
a number of revisions to the previous 
relatively restrictive policy. For example, 
refugees now have rights to property, work, 
agriculture and freedom of movement.3 In 
recent years, the Government of Uganda 
has also included refugees in its national 
development and poverty-reduction plans.
Since the 1960s, Uganda has hosted 
refugees especially from neighbouring 
countries, with refugees located in 
rural settlements close to the borders in 
northern and western Uganda. Refugee 
assistance in Uganda has development-
oriented components as evidenced 
by the nationwide use of local rural 
settlement for which the government 
has allocated more than 3,300 km2. 
There are three explicit strategies 
outlining the development orientation of 
refugee aid: the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS), 
the Development Assistance for Refugee 
Hosting Areas (DAR) strategy and the 
Refugee and Host Population Empowerment 
(ReHOPE) strategy. SRS was established 
in 1999 and aims to promote refugees and 
nationals living in refugee-hosting areas 
to be able to support themselves, as well 
as to integrate local service structures into 
national systems. Building on SRS, DAR was 
established in 2003 and targets improving 
the living conditions of refugees and 
nationals. The more recent ReHOPE strategy 
also aims to empower refugees to become 
self-reliant through livelihood measures.
All three strategies therefore are 
directed at integrating service structures 
into national systems and promoting 
refugees to become independent from aid 
structures and deliveries. The integration of 
local services not only allows nationals to 
have access to services such as education or 
medical care established in a humanitarian 
context but also to sustain such facilities 
on a long-term basis even after refugees 
have repatriated to their countries of origin. 
Refugees’ independence from aid structures 
is especially pursued through agricultural 
approaches. For that, refugees receive two 
plots of land – one to live on, one to farm – as 
well as the necessary means to work the land. 
The refugee settlements are all relatively 
extensive. For example, Rhino Camp 
Settlement in the North West, established 
in 1992, has a carrying capacity of 32,000 
refugees and covers an area of about 225 
km2. Kyaka II Refugee Settlement in central 
Uganda was established in 1983 with an 
area of about 84 km2 and a capacity of 
17,000 refugees. The settlements are village-
like where refugees live side by side with 
nationals and both are able to access the 
services provided by aid agencies. Several 
primary schools (although very few 
secondary schools) are spread throughout 
the settlements. In each settlement, there are 
markets where refugees and nationals can buy 
and sell harvest and other products. Rhino 
Camp also has a skills training centre where 
a certain number of refugees and nationals 
received vocational training in, among other 
skills, carpentry, tailoring, tinsmithing and 
blacksmithing. In Kyaka II, refugees produce 
locally made sanitary pads, MakaPads.4
Constraints
However, these settlements are geographically 
limited spaces in remote rural regions which 
are relatively isolated from flourishing 
urban areas. The land was allocated 
because it was sparsely populated before 
the refugees settled there. Notwithstanding 
the development orientation of refugee aid 
that aims to improve livelihoods, refugees 
still face various restrictions and limitations 
in the settlements, and despite the revised 
refugee policy, the refugees are unable to 
manage without external aid. They have few 
opportunities to find formal employment, 
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restricted in how far they can travel due to 
decisions made by the Office of the Prime 
Minister‘s local office and the high travelling 
costs; the allocated plots are too small and 
the soil quality is often too poor to yield a 
sufficient harvest; and the area is also too 
small to leave parts fallow for a season, which 
is necessary for long-term production. Hence, 
refugees remain partly dependent on aid.
In spite of the development orientation, 
aid agencies’ programme-planning cycles 
are annual which does not adequately 
allow for medium-term planning. Also, 
the assistance in settlements is mainly 
carried out by implementing partners of 
UNHCR, not by development agencies, 
which leads to the question of where these 
agencies are. If the work is supposed to 
be development-oriented, why are there 
seemingly no or very few development 
agencies implementing programmes? Thus, 
the kind of aid that has been provided 
remains similar to humanitarian aid rather 
than medium-term development aid.
At a policy and strategy level, criticism 
could be levelled at programmes which work 
for the integration of services into the national 
system locally but not for the integration of 
refugees. Politically the aim is the repatriation 
of the refugees – rather than allowing them 
to stay and integrate locally – while the 
service structures remain for the locals. 
More questions than answers?
The refugee assistance strategies in these 
settlements in Uganda reveal a certain 
political willingness and an interest in 
linking refugee protection with development 
aid. However, challenges remain which 
render the whole structure questionable. 
It may initially seem obvious that 
refugee-hosting regions should benefit from 
development measures such as improving 
infrastructure and service delivery. But 
do refugees benefit from such measures? 
Despite the village-like rural settlements, 
in effect refugees remain encamped, facing 
restrictive living conditions and with a certain 
dependency on external aid. Moreover, by 
focusing on agriculture as a means to become 
self-reliant, refugees are implicitly assumed 
all to be farmers but their diverse interests, 
capacities and competences are neglected.   
There seems to remain an overall 
question unanswered: why are aid agencies, 
donors and asylum countries interested in 
linking refugee and development aid? 
It seems that each of them is pursuing 
specific goals which may not overlap with 
each other. For refugee aid organisations 
suffering from limited funding especially 
in protracted situations, the development 
orientation offers a way to access other 
funding pots or possibly to reduce costs. 
While donor countries may provide additional 
funds, they may also be trying to find ways to 
keep refugees in the Global South. Countries 
of asylum such as Uganda use the approach 
in a smart way to improve the infrastructure 
of the refugee-hosting region which is 
often remote and neglected. And as for the 
development agencies, they were reluctant 
to factor in refugees in order to promote 
sustainable development, although several of 
them have been showing more interest and 
commitment in recent initiatives such as TSI. 
These institutional discrepancies 
reveal that it is not clear whether the aim 
of development-oriented refugee assistance 
in the case of the settlements in Uganda 
is to develop a region, to improve the 
living conditions of refugees in camps and 
settlements, or to enhance programming 
efforts in protracted situations. For as long 
as the overall aim is unclear, the potential to 
make effective linkages will be thwarted. 
Ulrike Krause 
ulrike.krause@staff.uni-marburg.de
Research Fellow, Center for Conflict Studies, 
Philipp University Marburg  
www.uni-marburg.de/konfliktforschung/  
1. See also Easton-Calabria E E (2014) ‘Innovation and refugee 
livelihoods: a historical perspective’, Forced Migration Review 
Innovation & Refugees supplement  
www.fmreview.org/innovation/eastoncalabria
2. Krause U (2013) Linking Refugee Protection with Development 
Assistance. Analyses with a Case Study in Uganda. Nomos.
3. Uganda (2006) The Refugees Act 2006.  
www.refworld.org/docid/4b7baba52.html 
4. Musaazi M (2014) ‘Technology, production and partnership 
innovation in Uganda’, Forced Migration Review Innovation & 
Refugees supplement www.fmreview.org/innovation/musaazi   
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Telling it like it is
Tammi Sharpe and Elias Schneider
Oral histories provide a means to productively include forcibly displaced people, through their 
voices, in the work and practices of those looking for solutions for displacement crises.
A central element in the search to better 
understand and find durable solutions 
for displacement – and one that regularly 
eludes us – is how those directly affected by 
displacement can best contribute towards 
this process. Often lost in the search for 
solutions are the voices of those who faced 
discrimination, have been marginalised and 
denied basic rights, and have experienced 
displacement first-hand. They have 
perspectives on their plight and on the roots 
and drivers of the conflict and they also 
hold views on what is needed to heal and 
rebuild the torn fabric of their community. 
Oral histories collect memories, personal 
commentaries and data garnered through interviews 
with participants in, or observers of, significant 
events or times. Oral history interviewing is “a field 
of study and a method of gathering, preserving and 
interpreting the voices and memories of people, 
communities, and participants in past events”.1 
Open-ended questions are posed to the interviewee 
who therefore retains control of the interview. The 
practice of building oral histories is not new and is 
relatively common in many social contexts; it has 
been used, for example, in Australian resettlement 
programmes to better understand newly arrived 
refugees from South Sudan.2 In such contexts there 
has to be a mutual, clear understanding between 
interviewer and interviewee that participation in 
the project will not yield any physical or asylum- or 
protection-related benefits.
In the past, the recordings of refugees’ 
stories has been limited to either a technical 
determination of refugee status – generally 
of a confidential nature and limited in their 
use – or isolated glimpses into individual 
testimonies that were suitable for advocacy 
purposes. Especially in a refugee camp 
context, and following successful repatriation 
or resettlement, current and former refugees 
could be interviewed to allow them to 
share their insights, experiences and 
views for finding solutions. In the future 
the interviews would not only add to the 
historical record of the crisis but could 
also inform reintegration, stabilisation, 
peace-building, transitional justice and 
reconciliation strategies. The interview on 
its own can also have a healing impact. 
Such stories can be a powerful tool for 
necessary political change. The author of the 
blog Humans of New York3, which regularly 
features individual anecdotes or life stories 
of the city’s inhabitants, travelled along the 
Balkan route and recorded testimonies from 
Syrian, Afghan and many other refugees. 
These accounts generated widespread support 
and sympathy for the plight of these persons. 
A side-event to the 2015 High 
Commissioner’s Dialogue for Protection 
yielded insights as to what kind of a 
role oral histories could play in volatile 
contexts where the work of humanitarians 
is dominated by curfews and securitised 
compounds that tend to separate aid 
workers from the very populations they 
aim to help. In such instances, oral histories 
would serve as a valuable tool to circumvent 
security constraints and bring about a 
better understanding of the fears, hopes 
and incentives of affected populations. 
This would in turn enhance programme 
and policy development by providing first-
hand insights for human rights activists, 
peace mediators and state officials.
 Oral histories could be relevant for 
the future of countries at war and thus 
the solutions for their displaced. In Syria, 
for example, prior to the war the different 
communities co-existed in peace. The memory 
of this is increasingly overshadowed in the 
context of the unfolding of the conflict and 
biased narratives being crafted to serve 
political agendas. Similar challenges face 
other war-torn countries such as the Central 
African Republic or South Sudan. Recording 
such individual experiences and histories will 
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allow for a more comprehensive historical 
record of the conflict. Such a record will help 
to mend the torn social fabric of the country 
and thereby help to lay the foundation 
for a renewed peaceful coexistence. Such 
stories would be of value to peace actors, 
researchers and transitional justice actors to 
enable a better understanding of the roots of 
conflict in the search for lasting solutions. 
Tammi Sharpe sharpet@unhcr.org 
Senior Adviser (Development and Solutions), 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) 
Elias Schneider schneiel@unhcr.org  
Carlo Schmid Fellow, UNHCR www.unhcr.org
1.Taken from the definition of the Oral History Association  
www.oralhistory.org/about/do-oral-history/ 
2. McKirdy C (2015) Practicing Oral History with Immigrant 
Narrators, Left Coast Press
3. www.humansofnewyork.com/ 
Somalia-Yemen links: refugees and returnees 
Maimuna Mohamud
The strategies of Yemeni refugees in Somalia are extensively based on the social networks 
and cultural linkages that exist between the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Meanwhile, Somali 
refugees returning from Yemen need to find safer areas within Somalia.  
Many of the hundreds of thousands of 
Somali refugees to whom Yemen offered 
prima facie refugee status over the decades are 
having to return as a result of the fighting 
in Yemen. Meanwhile, uprooted Yemeni 
populations have been crossing the Gulf of 
Aden in ever greater numbers in hope of 
finding refuge and protection in Somalia 
and other states in the Horn of Africa.
It is at reception centres that Yemeni 
refugees and Somali returnees meet their first 
challenge – if they survive the perilous sea 
journey. As part of the registration process, 
refugees are required to produce documents 
that prove either Yemeni nationality or, in the 
case of returning Somali refugees, refugee 
status in Yemen. These centres – such as in 
the port cities of Berbera and Bossasso – are 
set up under the auspices of the regional 
Somali governments of Somaliland and 
Puntland to register refugees and returning 
Somalis. They are intended only to provide 
arriving refugees with emergency assistance 
like food and shelter, and as such are not 
equipped to make provision for the long-term 
settlement of the refugees or the returnees. 
Somali returnees
Somaliland, Puntland and the Federal 
Government in Mogadishu have all 
expressed willingness to take back their 
returning refugees. However, such rhetoric 
is problematic. The governments seem to 
advocate assisting returnees to go back 
to their regions of origin soon after their 
arrival, regardless of whether the factors 
triggering their displacement still exist 
there. Each of the administrations have 
thus far been reluctant to put in place 
overarching policies and frameworks 
that can ensure the safety of returnees by 
supporting their relocation to safer regions. 
Each of the political administrations is 
unable (and in some instances unwilling) 
to protect and integrate Somalis who are 
faced with the abrupt transition from being 
refugees in Yemen to being returnees. 
Yemenis’ strategies
In the context of Yemenis displaced to 
Somalia, UNHCR’s encampment approach is 
being challenged by refugees. Many refugees 
have come to believe that registration and 
encampment will render them helpless in 
making important decisions like where 
to live and when to return home. 
Because of the long history of contact, 
Yemeni refugees consider Somalia to be 
culturally familiar, despite the linguistic 
differences; this helps to instil confidence 
in their ability to navigate the challenges of 
urban life there. There is a trend of Yemeni 
refugees preferring to ‘self-settle’ in the 
capital cities of Hargeisa and Mogadishu, 
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where help can be 
obtained from the 
existing populations 
of Yemenis. To 
date, the policy of 
the government of 
Somaliland allows 
Yemeni refugees 
to settle in urban 
areas with relative 
ease and many 
Yemeni refugees in 
both Hargeisa and 
Mogadishu have set 
up small businesses. 
In each of these two 
cities there are Yemeni 
Diaspora Chapters. 
These Chapters work 
to track the numbers 
of Yemenis arriving, 
informally register them and assist them with 
finding information and shelter. The Yemeni 
Diaspora Chapters also fulfil the purpose 
of coordinating between refugees and 
authorities, whether local or national. These 
Chapters play an essential role in refugees’ 
decisions about where and how to settle.     
Yemeni refugees in Somalia draw on 
two important resources to survive with 
autonomy: long-standing economic and 
cultural ties between the two nations, 
and the support of other Yemenis in 
the diaspora. These resources enable 
refugees to explore alternative means of 
survival rather than relying on assistance 
in refugee camps. However, despite the 
high level of self-sufficiency of Yemeni 
refugees living in Somalia’s two largest 
cities, the protection of their legal rights 
remains largely unaddressed. 
Self-settlement and assistance
There are two important questions, not 
only for UNHCR and its partners but 
also for the Somali governments: firstly, 
how the government(s) can provide 
institutional protection and assistance 
to refugees and, secondly, how the aid 
agencies can provide assistance and 
protection to urban communities who are 
opposed to resettlement in rural camps and 
deterred by the long-term consequences of 
encampment on their freedoms and dignity.
Given the consequent reluctance of 
most refugees to register officially with 
UNHCR, promoting better relations between 
Yemeni Diaspora Chapters and international 
organisations is critical for gathering 
information about urban refugees in order 
to support their needs over time. It is also 
essential that local Somali governments 
maintain and encourage favourable 
attitudes towards refugees regardless 
of residency; if the Somali authorities 
allow Yemenis to establish businesses 
with as few restrictions as possible, the 
refugees can contribute positively to the 
economic development of the region.
The Somali authorities’ political and 
practical capability to coordinate responses 
to refugees and returnees must start with 
revising current ad hoc policies and laying 
the groundwork for realistic institutional 
responses across the Somali region – for 
Somalis to return sustainably and for Yemenis 
to be able to create active lives in exile.
Maimuna Mohamud 
maimuna.mohamud@heritageinstitute.org 
Independent researcher 
The market place in Basateen, the Somali-majority area of Aden in south Yemen.
UN
H
CR
/H
ug
h 
M
ac
le
od
 
57
FM
R
 5
2
May 2016 www.fmreview.org/solutions
Thinking ahead: displacement, transition, solutions
Family allowance extended to refugees in Brazil
The Brazilian government has extended an 
allowance, which was created to assist poor 
Brazilian families, to refugees. The family 
allowance (Bolsa Família) consists of a small 
cash transfer programme granted to poor 
families. Established in 2004,1 it unified 
scattered initiatives, such as school, food 
and fuel allowances which previously came 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education, Ministry of Health and Ministry 
of Mines and Energy respectively. 
The purpose of the allowance is to reduce 
poverty in families and break the cycle of 
poverty, primarily by keeping children 
attending schools and promoting better 
health practices, thereby also promoting 
the Millenium Development Goals of 
reducing malnutrition, achieving universal 
education and reducing child mortality. 
It has been successful in achieving its 
goals so far since it boosted the middle class 
from 45 million to 105 million in about a 
A role for market analysis 
Host governments and communities are often 
concerned with the impact refugees will have 
on their economy. One idea for addressing 
this concern is to guide response – from the 
moment of refugees’ arrival – in a way that 
capitalises on refugees’ economic involvement 
that is helpful to a host community. In order 
for a response to be designed in a way that 
does this, a market analysis detailing both 
the gaps in the domestic labour market 
and the skills present in the new refugee 
community – matching a country’s market 
needs with an available workforce – needs 
to be conducted. With this information, 
governments and practitioners could identify 
housing, work and aid dissemination 
options with an eye to self-sufficiency. 
The skills needed to conduct quick and 
accurate market analyses are not abundantly 
present within the current refugee response 
community. It is therefore important to 
partner with research institutions that 
collect data and can offer templates for 
swift data collection by academics or 
practitioners. Institutions like the World 
Bank or various private sector organisations 
are skilled in quick and sometimes complex 
market analyses. This kind of expertise 
could help refugee response practitioners 
quickly suggest alternatives to encampment 
which are capable of promoting economic 
development in the early stages of 
displacement and also of informing policy 
advocacy efforts aimed at helping refugees 
in protracted situations to access markets. 
Market access alone does not guarantee 
that refugees are protected from exploitation, 
however. For this reason, there must also 
be guidance on practical access to formal 
employment and labour protections, 
including minimum wage protection. 
Livelihoods programmes that are 
informed by market analyses and that 
prioritise formal, non-discriminatory access 
to the market are only some of the pieces 
of a broader roadmap. Other pieces of an 
effective roadmap may include approaches 
for connecting livelihoods programmes with 
partners skilled in work rights advocacy, 
approaches for helping refugees access 
vocational training, and approaches for 
building shared economic spaces accessible 
by both refugee and local populations.
Diana Essex-Lettieri  
diana.essex@asylumaccess.org  
Deputy Director, Asylum Access
Jessica Therkelsen 
jessica.therkelsen@asylumaccess.org  
Global Policy Director, Asylum Access  
www.asylumaccess.org
Anna Wirth anna.k.wirth@hotmail.co.nz  
Independent
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Transitional policies and durable solutions for 
displaced Kashmiri Pandits 
Sudha G Rajput
The continuation of the predicament of those who remain displaced from the Kashmir 
Valley since 1989 results from the unintended consequences of past policies. Transitioning 
from the ‘temporary’ policies that keep the displaced communities intact in ‘safe zones’ to 
policies that aim to secure long-term solutions presents moral dilemmas for policymakers.
The lives of those displaced by a conflict 
are greatly affected by the initial policies 
formulated to address the crisis as it 
unfolds. In addition to the challenge 
of ‘starting over’, groups displaced by 
conflict continue to be marginalised by 
members of host communities as well as 
by the policymakers, who may label them 
as, for example, migrants, minorities or 
guests so as to obscure the real cause of 
their displacement. Often the policies 
formulated to address the crisis of such 
displacement is an outcome of such 
labelling; this was the case with the policies 
that were crafted to address the forced 
eviction of Kashmiri Pandits from India-
administered Kashmir Valley in 1989. 
Those who fled now constitute the 
approximately 250,000 displaced Kashmiris 
dubbed by the Indian government as 
‘migrants’. Added to these numbers is a 
full generation of youth born and educated 
outside Kashmir. The displacement of this 
community has now extended beyond 25 
years, yet the ‘temporary’ policies embedded 
in the initial positions of the policymakers – 
designed to serve the ‘transitional needs’ 
of those displaced – remain intact.
decade, remarkable progress in a country 
with a population of 200 million people.2 
The extension of the allowance to refugees 
was made possible on the grounds of the 
Foreigner’s Act of 1980 which provides 
that: “the foreigner who has residence in 
Brazil enjoys all the rights recognised for 
Brazilian nationals”.3 In order to receive 
this benefit, the migrant or refugee has 
to be a legal resident in Brazil, has to 
be registered in the Unified Household 
Registry (Cadastro Único para Programas 
Sociais), has to meet income eligibility 
criteria and must comply with the standard 
conditions attached to receiving it such as 
school attendance, vaccination and so on.4  
In response to the criticism that migrants 
and refugees have different needs from 
Brazilians, Brazil’s National Committee 
for Refugees (CONARE) argues that it 
meets those different needs by additional 
grants to states, local governments and 
civil society organisations, which are 
then responsible for providing them with 
shelter, Portuguese language classes, 
legal and mental health assistance and, if 
necessary, financial assistance as well.   
Although providing the same 
allowance that Brazilian nationals receive 
to refugees and migrants is a good step, it 
should not prevent the government from 
developing specific public policies for 
refugees since their inclusion in assistance 
designed for Brazilians can serve to 
conceal the refugees’ specific problems.  
Lilian Yamamoto lilianmitsuko@yahoo.it  
Member of the Human Rights and Vulnerabilities 
research group, Universidade Católica de Santos, 
Brazil www.unisantos.br 
1. Lei no. 10.836, 9 January 2004. 
2. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/new-middle-class-driving-
brazil-economic-makeover 
3. Article 95 of Foreigner’s Act No. 6.815/1980
4. See Lindert K, Linder A, Hobbs J & de la Brière B (2007) The 
Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Implementing 
Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context, World Bank SP 
Discussion Paper No 0709  
http://tinyurl.com/WB-BolsaFamilia 
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As for all displaced communities, the 
unplanned move was a daunting challenge 
for those displaced from the Valley. Forced 
eviction broke up families, cut social and 
cultural ties, and interrupted employment, 
education and marriage opportunities 
for many. In addition to the social and 
psychological trauma, the community 
faced the challenges associated with 
the hot climate of Delhi and Jammu and 
having to navigate larger, more congested 
and more bureaucratic societies. 
Females of the community were, on the 
whole, more resilient and able to regain 
their sense of composure at a faster rate than 
the men; men’s experience of trauma was 
aggravated by having to take on what they 
perceived to be humiliating jobs required for 
survival in new cities. The women, however, 
acquired new business skills to support 
their spouses in managing the ‘temporary’ 
shops allotted to those displaced. The 
metamorphosis from respectable traders 
and Pandits of the Valley to anonymous 
migrants made for an extraordinary 
experience for all community members, 
complicated by the ambiguous and ad 
hoc ‘migrant’ and ‘temporary’ policies. 
Policy framework 
Even after 25 years, the national government 
continues to characterise this displacement 
as the outcome of a “temporary disturbance 
in the Valley”, tenaciously holding onto its 
position that the “families must go back”. 
Consequently, a spectrum of official policies 
has evolved over the decades to “serve 
the transitional needs of the migrants”.1 
This contrasts with the families’ own 
understanding that this crisis is irreversible, 
having permanently “damaged their 
community”. Consequently, the families 
judge the transitional policies as “useless”, 
“humiliating” and even “irrelevant”.2 
Over the years, policies have evolved in 
response to the changing needs of this 
community; however, the policy portfolio 
has yielded mixed results, for both the 
beneficiaries and the policymakers. 
Official classification: Social inclusion 
and access to services for the Kashmiri 
community have been limited, given their 
official categorisation as migrants. While 
recognising the importance of using labels 
as tools for identifying legitimate members 
of a group for the purpose of distributing 
rations and benefits, such labelling has 
led to the host communities of Delhi and 
Jammu keeping the Kashmiri community 
out of their social and economic circles. In 
addition, as the ‘migrant’ label suggests a 
voluntary departure from the Valley, such 
labelling has allowed officials to avoid the 
need to confront the perpetrators of the forced 
evictions, who still remain unaccountable. 
Housing: The official response to what 
was called the “temporary disturbance” was 
to provide this community with township-
like settlements outside the Kashmir Valley 
as a safe haven and a ‘close to home-like 
experience’. Consistent with the official 
position that saw this displacement as a 
temporary crisis, the government retains 
ownership of the townships, allowing the 
residents to stay till normality returns to 
the Valley. As temporary occupants of two-
room tenements in multi-storey complexes 
in Jammu, the families continue to lament 
the loss of their ancestral homes. The 
transitional nature of this accommodation 
does nothing to address the deeper concerns 
of this community – restoring their sense 
of normality and providing long-term 
security. However, policymakers face a moral 
dilemma; transitioning the families into 
the mainstream community would signal 
the recognition of the crisis as more than 
temporary and might crush all hope among 
those who wish eventually to return. 
Livelihood: Securing access to economic 
opportunities is challenging for any displaced 
community, and the added pressure that spills 
into the host communities often manifests 
as heightened tensions between groups. To 
alleviate such pressures, the policy package 
for the families included the temporary use of 
shops made available for their use in the host 
communities. In the short term, this allowed 
families to at least partially regain their sense 
of dignity and economic well-being; however, 
the government retains the ownership of the 
shops and prohibits expansion. A transition 
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from these temporary shops to more durable 
means of income generation requires the 
recognition that the displacement has 
rendered return to home impossible. 
Education: In contrast to the policies 
that have had less than the intended 
impact on the beneficiaries, one policy has 
been praised by the families as having 
made a positive impact in their overall 
displacement experience. Under the Special 
Allocation for Children of Kashmiri 
Migrants, children of the displaced families 
have been able to take advantage of the 
host societies’ school systems, bypassing 
the bureaucracies required for school 
admissions. This thoughtful initiative not 
only kept the children from becoming 
victims of the streets and child labour 
but it also empowered young Kashmiris 
with survival tools, instilling in them a 
sense of resilience and confidence. This 
contrasts with the survival strategies of 
many displaced communities around 
the world. The education policy for the 
displaced Pandits is a commendable 
example of a policy that can yield visible 
rewards, not only for those displaced but 
for members of the host communities and 
the nation as well. Such practices serve as 
an exemplary model to replicate in similarly 
displaced communities around the globe.
Acknowledging the hazards of  
‘transitional policies’ 
While the townships arranged by the 
government had a crucial role to play in the 
initial years of displacement, over the years 
of protracted displacement these townships 
have in fact created a cultural and societal 
divide between the local communities and 
those displaced, and have reinforced the 
stereotypical image each has of the other. 
Ironically, despite being surrounded by 
members of their own community, with 
temples, schools and shops, Kashmiri Pandit 
families resent living where there are no 
economic opportunities or political space. 
It is time to recognise that a policy which 
continues to reinforce parallel societies 
makes a breeding ground for new conflicts 
and creates moral hazards for all involved, 
including putting the host community  
in jeopardy. 
Unfortunately the policies will continue 
to deepen the divide even as the new 
national government unfolds its plan of 
designating a piece of land in Kashmir for 
those willing to return. Such a plan may 
only guarantee the continued separation 
of the two communities that once co-
existed in Kashmir, thus aggravating 
the policymakers’ moral dilemma.
In search of durable solutions, the 
Kashmiri Pandit youth, born and brought 
up in communities outside Kashmir and 
now empowered by their education, should 
capitalise on newly acquired skills by 
partnering with local non-governmental 
organisations, grassroots leaders and 
policymakers to ensure that community 
building rather than community divide 
becomes the policy. These young people 
have an important role to play in planning 
and achieving durable solutions, and are 
in a position to demand participation in 
bringing about the required community 
development and societal reforms – for 
community members not only to move from 
transitional accommodation to mainstream 
housing but also to be recognised as 
productive and contributing members of 
society. It is time for the inclusion of new 
voices in the decision-making process.
Whatever policymakers do they 
will continue to face moral dilemmas 
and hard choices, whether unveiling 
policies for return or for integration 
into the host communities. 
Sudha G Rajput srajput2@gmu.edu 
Professor, School for Conflict Analysis and 
Resolution, George Mason University 
http://scar.gmu.edu/ 
This article is based on research carried out for 
the author’s doctoral dissertation (see endnote 2 
below).
1. Ministry of Home Affairs, Indian government. Personal 
communication, July 2011. 
2. Rajput S (2015) ‘Internal Displacement of Kashmiri Pandits’ in 
Kukreja S (Ed) State, Society, and Minorities in South and Southeast 
Asia. Lexington Books 
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Gendered limits to the returnee village programme  
in Burundi 
Yolanda Weima
While officially refugee return is counted as return to within the borders of one’s country of 
citizenship, ‘home’ for returnees must also be considered against other parameters. Gender 
and kinship intersect with other important factors in differential experiences of return.
Following conflict in 1972, and then a decade-
long civil war beginning in the 1990s, over 
a million Burundians sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries, predominantly 
Tanzania. After the signing of peace accords 
in 2000, subsequent ceasefires and changing 
regional and global asylum policies, 
over 700,000 former refugees returned 
to Burundi between 2002 and 2009. 
The Rural Integrated Villages (VRIs) 
programme in Burundi was designed to meet 
the immediate shelter and other humanitarian 
needs of returnees who were no longer able 
to access their land, or were now unsure 
of where it was, or who simply had no 
land. It was envisaged by policymakers as 
contributing to reconstruction, longer-term 
sustainable development, peacebuilding 
and social cohesion in a post-conflict 
context. Instead, it created a situation that 
many returnees experienced as continued 
displacement even in their country of 
citizenship and generated feelings of 
disappointment, abandonment, and social 
distance from family and Burundian society. 
Return to a country of origin, like 
displacement itself, can differentially affect 
men and women, and affect and be affected 
by pre-existing gendered relationships, as 
individuals, households and communities 
re-negotiate and re-establish their lives in 
new places. While many other factors such 
as the lack of genuine peace at the national 
level are fundamental to the failure of these 
villages, important lessons about gender 
and transitions can be learned from the 
ways that gender and kinship relations were 
transformed by return and villagisation, 
making certain returnees more vulnerable. 
The first ‘Peace Villages’ programme 
in 2004 provided housing but many of the 
villagers lacked adequate access to basic 
services. The subsequent VRI programme 
took a more holistic approach, providing 
land – although many households have yet to 
receive arable land – and including a range of 
supporting projects, with the expectation of 
long-term sustainable integration of returnees 
in a predominantly agrarian setting with 
limited land and livelihood opportunities. 1  
Village creation programmes are not 
new in this region of Africa and have often 
been criticised for the ways in which they 
changed resource use with detrimental 
effects for surrounding environments and 
gendered division of labour. For example, 
a higher concentration of people makes 
the everyday task of collecting firewood 
more difficult as all village residents need 
to walk longer distances to seek wood, 
compared with when they had lived in 
dispersed rural homesteads. Where firewood 
collection is considered women’s work, as in 
Burundi, this impact is clearly gendered.
Counting women
Gender analysis in the VRI programme 
seems to have been largely limited to 
aiming for gender parity in activities. In a 
statement echoed by staff of several agencies, 
one UN agency employee stated simply, 
“We had transversal themes like gender; 
… in the identification of beneficiaries 
[…] at least 50% had to be women.” 
It is often supposed that there are more 
women than men in refugee populations 
but when counted there were nearly equal 
numbers of men and women Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania in the 1980s.2 This 
makes the results of counting women in 
this village creation programme even more 
striking, because there are many more 
62
FM
R
 5
2
May 2016www.fmreview.org/solutions
Thinking ahead: displacement, transition, solutions
women than men in the VRIs. This is largely 
because of the parity aims mentioned 
above, and the consequent inclusion of 
female-headed households. While male-
headed households usually also have 
adult women present, most female-headed 
households do not include adult men.
Village residents and programme staff 
alike surmised that the reason for the high 
number of women in the villages was related 
to laws and practices around women’s land 
inheritance. Most women do not inherit land 
from their parents, widows do not inherit 
land from their spouses, and divorced 
women usually do not have a right to land 
from former husbands. The gendered effects 
of land inheritance did not only affect 
women but also determined the presence of 
many men, including those whose mothers 
were divorced, or those who had not been 
acknowledged by their fathers and therefore 
had no recognised right to inherit land. 
It is true that the VRI programme did 
provide housing in Burundi to returnee 
women who may not otherwise have 
had access to housing of their own upon 
return. However, the fact that more women 
are affected by villagisation becomes 
problematic because of the disproportionate 
challenges to reintegration and the re-
establishment of livelihoods faced by 
women in this resettlement programme.
Gendered labour
The presence of large numbers of landless 
villagers increased the supply of agricultural 
labourers so that waged work opportunities 
in surrounding villages are scarce. Wage 
rates have decreased, and to meet their 
basic needs many households rely on 
the labour migration of family members 
to other regions of Burundi or back to 
Tanzania. As women are more likely to 
have responsibility for children, they are 
less able to migrate for work. Consequently 
female-headed households do not have 
access to sources of income which are 
vital to the survival of other families.
Returnee women highlighted the 
transition from livelihoods established 
over decades in Tanzania, where they had 
greater access to land and resources, or 
rights to the distributive humanitarian 
regime in refugee camps that assured the 
basic necessities of daily life. For villagised 
returnees the inability to consistently 
provide meals for their families was tied to 
gendered expectations of women’s role in the 
household, gendered labour, and the ways in 
which prior experiences shape perceptions 
and expectations of life in the village. 
Related and important factors for many 
returnees were whether they considered the 
village to be in their region of origin, and 
whether they had extended family in the 
region to which they returned. Returnees 
for whom village resettlement is near to 
extended family highlighted the importance 
of family to having access to land to cultivate, 
opportunities for compensated labour 
or mutually shared labour in cultivating 
and building, childcare, assistance when 
ill, and participation in ceremonies. 
Sinarizi, a returnee in one of the villages, 
described being resettled far from his region 
of origin: “…living here we continue to 
live like refugees, even though there was 
a village near [our place of origin] where 
we could have easily had family …. I’ve 
spent five years here and I’ve never seen 
anyone [of my family] come to visit. … 
The UN, together with the Tanzanian and 
Burundian governments, said that each 
person will return taking the direction of 
his province of origin. Which is why we 
found it interesting then, because we wanted 
to return, to see our home. … Because a 
person cannot be planted like the banana.”
Yolanda Weima yweima@gmail.com  
PhD Student, York University (Toronto) 
www.yorku.ca 
The research on which this piece is based was 
funded through a Canadian Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council Masters-Level 
Canada Graduate Scholarship. 
1. See Falisse J-B and Niyonkuru R C (2013) ‘Peace villages for 
repatriates in Burundi’, Forced Migration Review issue 43  
www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/falisse-niyonkuru 
2. Daley P (1991) ‘Gender, displacement and social reproduction: 
Settling Burundi refugees in Western Tanzania’,  Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 4(3) http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/3/248.abstract 
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Naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania
Amelia Kuch 
Tanzania’s offer of citizenship to some 200,000 refugees received international attention 
and support. Acknowledging the strengths and flaws of this model could potentially help 
unlock other situations of protracted displacement around the world. 
In 2007 the Tanzanian government, in 
partnership with the Burundian government 
and UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), 
adopted the Tanzania Comprehensive 
Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS) which 
outlined a plan for durable solutions for 
the Burundian refugees who had been in 
Tanzania since 1972. Initially, TANCOSS 
included three pillars: voluntary repatriation 
to Burundi, processing of citizenship 
applications for those who opted for 
naturalisation in Tanzania, and relocation 
of the naturalised refugees from the refugee 
settlements to other regions of Tanzania. 79% 
of refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship 
while 21% opted for repatriation (and duly 
returned to Burundi). The relocation plan 
was subsequently suspended, however, 
with naturalised refugees permitted to 
choose if they wish to be relocated or 
remain in the areas of the settlements. 
Conditions and drivers
The close affinity of the groups living in the 
area of Burundi and western Tanzania and 
their historical mobility across what is now 
the border were important preconditions 
for local integration of refugees. The 
refugees often cited historical affinity and 
acquired familiarity with Tanzania as 
important factors in their decision to opt for 
naturalisation. Similarly, many Tanzanians 
expressed the opinion that living with 
the refugees was possible due to ethnic, 
religious and linguistic similarities. 
After fleeing Burundi in 1972, the refugees 
had been allocated land to farm and live 
on in three sites in western Tanzania. This 
policy of refugee protection was motivated 
both by President Julius Nyerere’s genuine 
commitment to Pan-African ideals and the 
opportunities that refugees provided for 
attracting resources for the development 
of remote and under-populated regions 
of the country. The nature of the rural 
refugee settlements in which access to land 
was provided played a central role in the 
implementation of TANCOSS and what 
became known as the Old Settlements turned 
out to be a success in terms of agricultural 
production and trade. To a certain extent, 
the design of the policy was only viable 
because the refugees had land, becoming 
self-sufficient and indeed contributing 
greatly to the local economy. Moreover, 
refugees’ decision to opt for Tanzanian 
citizenship was in many cases motivated 
by their inability to obtain land in Burundi. 
This is not to say that land is a prerequisite 
for successful local integration but that the 
ability to achieve sustainable livelihoods is 
crucial, and in many places in Africa this is 
synonymous with securing access to land.
On a macro-political level the key 
drivers of implementation of TANCOSS 
were exceptional leadership and the 
responsiveness of donors – that is, the 
availability of funding. The UNHCR 
Representative and the Tanzanian Home 
Affairs Minister were determined to 
negotiate a solution for the 1972 group 
of Burundian refugees, and UNHCR put 
out a quick and successful supplementary 
appeal, calling on donors to support the 
design and application of TANCOSS. 
Ultimately, a total of $103 million was 
included in the 2011-15 United Nations 
Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) 
for Tanzania meant for relocation and 
integration of naturalised refugees.
Lessons of TANCOSS 
Approximately 45,000 refugees decided to 
repatriate as part of the UNHCR-organised 
repatriation scheme (and many others left 
individually over the years). Those who 
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still had relatives in Burundi and were 
able to regain their property settled in the 
areas they were familiar with. Many others, 
however, were housed in Peace Villages 
built for the purpose of reintegrating IDPs 
and returning refugees.1 Access to land 
became an immediate point of conflict and 
contestation. People’s social networks had 
become extremely weak back in Burundi 
and when in May 2015 civil unrest broke 
out many repatriated refugees fled again 
to Tanzania. Some of them wanted now to 
receive Tanzanian citizenship but TANCOSS 
had stated clearly that the decision to opt 
for repatriation could not be reversed. 
The situation of ‘recycled’ Burundian 
refugees confirms the necessity for adopting 
more flexible approaches to repatriation. 
In this case refugees themselves suggest 
that possible solutions could include: 
allowing a certain amount of time for 
the repatriates to determine if they wish 
to remain in Burundi or still apply for 
Tanzanian citizenship; special affordable 
channels for the ‘recycled’ refugees to apply 
for residence permits and work legally in 
Tanzania; and further strengthening of 
regional cooperation, which could ultimately 
enable people to travel freely between the 
countries and to establish livelihoods and 
businesses in both Burundi and Tanzania. 
In the years 2010-14 the process of 
naturalisation stalled and it was unclear 
if it would be completed. In fact, several 
statements by the Government of Tanzania 
during this period suggested declining 
government commitment to the process 
and the possibility that the decision to grant 
citizenship could be reversed.2 The lack 
of information provided about what was 
happening caused fear and anxiety among 
the refugees, and it highlighted UNHCR’s 
inability to intervene and encourage the 
completion of the process. The delay in 
naturalisation came from a combination of 
factors but included refusal at the district level 
to resettle refugees. Clearly, if future cases of 
naturalisation are to be encouraged, it will be 
necessary to ensure that local representatives 
are better included in the process. 
In October 2014 refugees who opted 
for naturalisation finally received 
citizenship certificates. However, there 
are still at least 40,000 applications 
pending and it is unclear how and when 
they are going to be dealt with. This is a 
pressing issue, which causes continuing 
uncertainty in the lives of many families. 
Burundi refugee woman applying for Tanzanian citizenship in 2008 in Ulyankulu Settlement for the ‘1972 Burundi refugees’.
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Displacement and development solutions in Tanzania
Tanzania’s refugee integration could 
serve as a blueprint for expanding the 
framework of durable solutions globally. 
In 2007, Tanzania developed a Comprehensive 
Solutions Strategy in coordination with 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) to create 
a lasting solution for the Burundian refugees 
still in Tanzania. This involved closing the 
settlements and integrating the refugees into 
21 different communities around the country. 
While many refugees were naturalised 
in the following years, the effort was halted 
briefly, and reopened again in late 2014. 
With the reopening, Tanzania shifted its 
focus to coincide with the current global 
emphasis on sustainable development within 
the refugee context. Tanzania decided to 
offer citizenship to over 162,000 Burundian 
refugees, placing them at the centre of their 
effort to create sustainable local integration 
alongside development. This historic 
decision is unique and the result of a host 
government working with the international 
community to facilitate creative solutions 
for refugees. The former refugees are now 
full-fledged citizens of Tanzania, their new 
status allowing them to carve out a living 
and a future in what is now their country. 
Many challenges still lie ahead. The 
socio-economic integration of a sizable 
group of people will require significant 
investments in the infrastructure of the 
affected areas. Local government will have 
to work closely with the central government 
in Dar es Salaam and the international 
community to secure adequate resources 
to support integration. Moreover, efforts to 
make improvements in local communities 
must ensure that all segments of the society 
benefit, both the newly naturalised refugees 
and the existing Tanzanian population. 
Such processes can only happen if the 
new Tanzanians are incorporated into the 
existing development plans of their country. 
To truly bring this initiative to fruition, 
Tanzania will need to wholeheartedly 
continue with its own implementation 
strategy. The central government will 
naturally take the lead, but the role of new 
Tanzanians, provincial and local govern-
ments, international and local humanitarian 
relief and development agencies, as well as 
the private sector, will have to be fleshed out. 
Tanzania must not stand alone but rather 
walk together with an ever more varied group 
of international and regional partners. 
Erol Kekic ekekic@cwsglobal.org  
Executive Director, CWS Immigration and Refugee 
Program http://cwsglobal.org 
Harrison Mseke  
Director, Refugee Services Department, United 
Republic of Tanzania
Thinking ahead
As refugees changed their status from non-
citizens to citizens, one of the settlements, 
Ulyankulu, which for over 40 years was 
largely marginal and isolated, is now being 
naturalised and incorporated into a new 
district. Over the years many Tanzanians 
from the neighbouring villages moved to 
the area of the settlements in search of fertile 
land and business opportunities. The space 
and the demographics of the settlement are 
transforming rapidly as more and more 
Tanzanians by birth are coming in, attracted 
by the prospects of district formation and 
hoping for better access to infrastructure and 
services. The transformation of a camp into 
an urban centre provides an opportunity 
for development actors and the national 
government to further aid the integration of 
the new citizens and the local population.
Amelia Kuch Amelia.Kuch@ed.ac.uk  
PhD Candidate, University of Edinburgh  
www.ed.ac.uk and Aarhus University  
www.au.dk/en/ 
1. See Falisse J B and Niyonkuru R C (2013) ‘Peace villages for 
repatriates to Burundi’, Forced Migration Review issue 43.  
www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/falisse-niyonkuru
2. Milner J (2014) ‘Can global refugee policy leverage durable 
solutions?: Lessons from Tanzania’s naturalization of Burundian 
refugees’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 27(4).  
http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/08/09/jrs.feu023 
66
FM
R
 5
2
May 2016www.fmreview.org/solutions
Thinking ahead: displacement, transition, solutions
Transitional solutions for the displaced in the  
Horn of Africa
Nassim Majidi and Saagarika Dadu-Brown
Refugees can contribute significantly to the economy of countries of refuge. Legal, structural 
and political backing is crucial to strengthen this contribution and maximise the opportunities 
that are present. 
If the search for durable solutions could be 
disengaged from the migration agenda, rather 
than focusing on movement itself and its 
causes, it could highlight some of the economic, 
political and social benefits of durable 
solutions for countries of asylum as a whole. 
The wide gap in some countries between 
existing provisions in the laws to provide for 
refugees and the implementation and just 
application of these laws on the ground result 
in frequent, severe and troubling restrictions 
on refugees’ access to documentation 
and services, freedom of movement, right 
to work and right to own property. 
What is needed is a mechanism – a system 
– to bring together fragmented efforts under 
a collective agenda to incorporate all actors 
working on solutions, beyond humanitarian 
to include development actors, private sector, 
academia and civil society, and beyond 
national government to include local and 
regional authorities. Such a collaborative 
system is needed to shift public narratives 
beyond insecurity and threats towards more 
innovative discussions and entry points for 
solutions. Security considerations, rather than 
humanitarian and development concerns, 
dominate many of the policies regarding 
refugees in the Horn of Africa region, 
greatly diminishing institutional support 
structures for the local authorities which 
bear the responsibility for refugee issues.
The case of Turkana, Kenya
In Kenya, the process of devolution – the 
transfer of government power from the 
centre to the county level – is a key to 
transitional solutions for refugees.1 
Kakuma refugee camp is located in 
Turkana county of the north-western 
region of Kenya. At the local level, a 
partnership between local actors through 
local interventions is critical to enhancing 
the self-reliance of protracted refugees and 
host communities alike. A key example 
is taxation and county revenue. Refugees 
are an untapped fiscal resource through 
taxation of businesses run by refugees; while 
refugees are indirectly taxed through the 
consumption of products and other payments, 
refugees themselves welcome the need for 
formal taxation mechanisms if it comes with 
formal authorisation to run a business. 
According to a representative of the 
Department of Refuge Affairs in Turkana: 
“Turkana is learning to tap into the importance 
of the refugee camp. The county is collecting 
money from the Kakuma refugees – it is one of 
the collection points for the county.” In Kenya, 
as in other countries of the region, locations 
where refugees live are often marginalised, 
low-revenue and arid or semi-arid areas. 
The local need for greater fiscal strength to 
support county development plans can turn 
into a benefit for the refugees who are ready 
to work or run businesses and pay taxes. 
If refugees are to be able to make greater 
fiscal contributions, they will need to be given 
work permits. At the moment, work permits 
are issued centrally in the capital, Nairobi, 
under the responsibility of the Department 
of Immigration. If this power were devolved 
to the counties, it could benefit refugees more 
quickly, and allow the local administration 
to register them and their businesses, in 
order to tax them. Decentralising other 
Department of Immigration services to the 
camps could provide other avenues for local 
economic integration and local revenue 
generation, giving local economic impetus. 
Establishing a working framework between 
the national government and counties that 
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host refugees would be a starting point 
to effectively engage counties on refugee 
management. Currently with devolution of 
power in Kenya, decisions that once used to 
be made by the central government are now 
made by the county in consultation with the 
community. County administrations are in 
charge of service delivery, conflict resolution 
and development in their jurisdiction – three 
key mandate components affecting refugee 
issues. The five-year development road maps 
of counties’ integrated development plans 
are the place to build on the potential for 
positive impact of the presence of refugees, 
such as trade, education and livelihoods, 
and to address negative repercussions on 
infrastructure and the environment. 
With counties having control over 
resource allocation and funding mechanisms, 
there are ways that they can have a positive 
impact on refugee affairs. Local and 
international civil society are calling on 
counties to use a part of their budget for 
programmes for refugees. This is already 
happening indirectly in Turkana, where 
parts of the county budget and programmes 
benefit both host and refugee communities. 
There are three core components for 
initial engagement of county governments 
with refugee issues: community-based 
development, conflict resolution, and 
health and education. The refugee-hosting 
counties of Garissa and Turkana, and 
aid organisations, already engage in 
service provision to refugees and host 
communities, as they recognise the role 
of refugees as key economic agents. Such 
local-level engagement is a necessity for 
turning transitional solutions into durable 
solutions and can be replicated and scaled 
up in protracted refugee settings. 
Good practice
There are some other examples of good 
practice. They include:
  Kenya, where 1,500 hectares of land 
has been made available by the local 
government for a new settlement, 
Kalobeyei, for up to 60,000 refugees, 
thereby decongesting the Kakuma refugee 
camp. In a new approach integrating local 
and refugee economies in the planning 
of the new site, about 900 hectares will 
be used for settling refugees while the 
remaining 600 hectares will be allocated for 
economic activities, including agriculture. 
  Ethiopia, where there has been an out-
of-camp policy that has allowed Eritrean 
refugees in Ethiopia to live outside refugee 
camps in urban settings. This has been 
seen as a strong start for urban solutions 
as alternatives to encampment. A positive 
sign of engagement in seeking solutions, 
the implementation has so far been slow.2 
  Uganda, where the 2006 Refugee Act and 
2010 Refugee Regulations enshrine many 
of Uganda’s international obligations 
in domestic law, and the Settlement 
Transformative Agenda (UGSTA) aims 
to bridge the gap between emergency 
life-saving responses and more long-term 
development approaches by including 
refugee response in the National 
Development Plan. 
  Somalia, where efforts at durable 
solutions have included advocating for 
Somalia’s displaced to be integrated into 
the government-led and donor-supported 
development framework for Somalia that 
ran from 2013 to 2016. This advocacy has 
led to the inclusion of displacement and 
solutions as a key issue in consultations for 
the National Development Plan currently 
being drafted by the Federal Government 
of Somalia. 
Nassim Majidi nassim.majidi@samuelhall.org 
Founder and co-director, Samuel Hall
Saagarika Dadu-Brown 
saagarika.dadu@samuelhall.org 
Researcher, Samuel Hall samuelhall.org 
This article is based on research conducted by 
Samuel Hall for the Regional Durable Solutions 
Secretariat (ReDSS).
1. ReDSS/Samuel Hall (2015) Devolution in Kenya: Opportunity for 
Transitional Solutions for Refugees?   
www.drc.dk/media/1419712/final_devolution_report_230715.pdf
2. See also Samuel Hall (2014) Living out of camp: Alternative to 
camp-based assistance for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia 
http://tinyurl.com/SamuelHall-LivingOutOfCamp 
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Repatriation and solutions in stabilisation contexts
Giulio Morello
So-called stabilisation contexts are risky for repatriation and therefore it is especially 
important to maintain the legal and practical difference between mandatory and voluntary 
repatriation.
Primacy is normally given to voluntary 
repatriation as the preferred durable 
solution for refugees. This is for reasons 
that are dictated partly by the socio-political 
context generally surrounding refugee 
crises, and partly by the explicit obligation 
of states under international law to admit 
their own nationals. This raises questions 
regarding the meanings of ‘repatriation’ 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention and in the 
1950 UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) 
Statute and on the relation between refugee 
repatriation and cessation clauses. This issue 
is especially relevant in contexts where large-
scale voluntary repatriations are actively 
encouraged but where the change of socio-
political circumstances in the countries of 
origin is not such as to bring about a cessation 
of refugee status. Stabilisation contexts, 
such as Somalia where the same conditions 
that resulted in massive refugee outflows 
still largely persist, are such contexts.
Under the 1951 Convention, when 
refugee status is lost due to a change in 
circumstances in the country of origin 
the host country has a right to repatriate a 
former refugee regardless of their intention 
to return, as long as it does so in accordance 
with applicable provisions of human rights 
law. The change of circumstances needs to 
be fundamental, enduring and resulting 
in a restoration of protection. By contrast, 
the 1950 Statute authorises UNHCR to 
facilitate repatriation efforts only if they are 
voluntary and “even where UNHCR does 
not consider that, objectively, it is safe for 
most refugees to return”.1 The difference is 
thus between mandatory repatriation, based 
on the strict cessation clauses of the 1951 
Convention to which signatory states are 
subject, and voluntary repatriation, which 
can be facilitated by UNHCR even before 
a change of relevant circumstances in the 
country of origin, based on a refugee’s free 
and informed decision. Confusion between 
or poor understanding of these two different 
repatriation frameworks can have negative 
protection consequences for refugees.
In countries that are sometimes 
optimistically deemed to have reached the 
stabilisation phase after a protracted conflict, 
refugees returning from neighbouring states 
are made more vulnerable by the conflation 
of Convention mandatory repatriations 
with voluntary repatriations. The case of 
Somali refugees in Kenya is an example of 
these dynamics. Under the umbrella of the 
voluntary repatriation framework introduced 
with the 2013 Tripartite agreement between 
Somalia, Kenya and UNHCR, 2,589 Somali 
refugees returned from Kenya in a pilot 
scheme during the first half of 2015. This 
pilot has been replaced by a more ambitious 
operational plan with a larger geographical 
coverage. Unfortunately, the momentum 
surrounding the voluntary repatriations 
was accompanied by an increase in forced 
deportations – 359 during April and May 
2014 alone according to Human Rights 
Watch – in breach of the central Convention 
principle of non-refoulement to which Kenya 
is bound – almost as if the existence of the 
voluntary repatriation framework could 
imply a blanket cessation of refugee status for 
a very heterogeneous refugee population. 
It is well known in non-refugee migration 
contexts that the success of Assisted 
Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
programmes partly depends on a credible 
threat of forced return. A similar dynamic 
is at play in the case of Somali refugees in 
Kenya. Frequent statements by Kenyan and 
Somali leaders, either lamenting that the 
return process is too slow or setting very 
high targets for the voluntary repatriation 
programme, reflect the reality that the 
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issue is heavily politicised. In this context, 
pressures to hasten the process are high and 
the rights of refugees tend to be overlooked.
The centrality of protection
Protection considerations must be central 
to the search for solutions for displaced 
Somalis, and these must be rooted in 
a correct understanding of relevant 
Convention provisions. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that in the pilot phase of the 
Somali voluntary repatriation programme a 
number of returnees had to seek shelter and 
humanitarian assistance 
in IDP camps. Cases of 
‘revolving door’ were also 
reported, with returnees 
going back to Kenya after 
receiving their reintegration 
assistance packages in 
Somalia. To avoid such 
outcomes, it is essential 
that Somali refugees in 
Kenya do not feel in any 
way constrained to choose 
between facilitated return 
and forced deportation. 
Similar challenges have 
been reported in other 
stabilisation contexts, most 
notably Afghanistan,2 and 
they reveal the intrinsic 
limits of voluntary 
repatriations to fragile 
states, particularly when these are assumed 
by host countries to open the possibility 
for mandatory repatriations. The different 
legal frameworks regulating mandatory and 
voluntary returns must be clarified to avoid 
potential opportunistic behaviours by states. 
At the very minimum it is advisable to 
  clarify that voluntary repatriation activities 
do not per se authorise other forms of 
repatriation
  reinforce states’ commitment to the 
principle of non-refoulement 
  strive to preserve and reinforce the asylum 
and protection space in host countries 
during the implementation of voluntary 
repatriation initiatives.
A durable solution is not automatically 
attained upon repatriation but depends on a 
complete restoration of rights and protection 
(‘re-establishment’, using Convention 
language). Including displacement 
issues in stabilisation agendas therefore 
requires constructive dialogues between 
humanitarians and policymakers, as well 
as between humanitarian and development 
actors. These dialogues should recognise 
that in complex settings, such as Somalia 
or Afghanistan, humanitarian and 
development needs coexist at the same time.
In situations of chronic instability 
it would be unrealistic to assume that 
voluntary repatriations could offer a 
solution to very large caseloads. In the case 
of Somalia, UNHCR and the international 
community firmly hold that the situation 
in South-Central Somalia is not conducive 
for large-scale returns. In addition, a strong 
culture of mobility and transnationalism 
could make the very idea of ‘returning 
home’ unappealing to many Somali 
refugees in protracted displacement. 
Mobility, besides being a fundamental 
human right, can also be part of a durable 
solution strategy.3 A refugee could voluntarily 
decide to ‘return’ by resuming their home 
country citizenship, while at the same 
IDPs in Kabul, Afghanistan.
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time remaining in the host country (or 
moving to a third country) with a long-
term residential permit. A similar solution 
was adopted in 2007 in Nigeria with 
residual refugee populations from Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, as part of a multipartite 
agreement based on ECOWAS treaties. 
While this may be less viable in the East 
Africa context for lack of a comparable 
regional legal framework, the possibility to 
reconcile temporary host-country residency 
with the resumption of home country 
citizenship deserves to be explored further.
According to UNHCR, 12.9 million 
refugees were living in protracted 
displacement at the end of 2014 and only 
126,800 repatriated voluntarily in the 
same year. With current global trends, it 
could take more than 20 years for refugees 
currently living in protracted displacement 
to return to their countries of origin, 
irrespective of whether such a large-scale 
return is possible or even desirable. Besides 
moving forwards with new repatriation 
initiatives – with the important caveats 
discussed above concerning the distinction 
between voluntary and mandatory regimes 
– the modalities of voluntary repatriation 
should ideally be expanded to include the 
possibility of alternative solutions based 
on transitional migration frameworks. 
Giulio Morello giulio.morello@gmail.com 
Protection Manager, Liberia, Danish Refugee 
Council (DRC) and former Durable Solutions 
Coordinator, DRC Somalia www.drc.dk 
The opinions expressed in this article are those 
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
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33.
3. See for instance Long (2010) Home alone? A review of the 
relationship between repatriation, mobility and durable solutions for 
refugees, UNHCR PDES www.unhcr.org/4b97afc49.html 
Pathway to peaceful resolution in Myanmar’s 
Rakhine State
Ronan Lee and Anthony Ware
Loud nationalistic voices and powerful vested interests stand in the way of cooperation 
between the Rakhine and Muslim communities and solving displacement. 
In 2012 communal violence erupted between 
Rakhine State’s Muslim and Buddhist 
populations. The Muslims – known as 
‘Rohingya’ – bore the worst of the conflict 
and continue to bear the brunt of the 
consequences. The ensuing ‘solution’ has 
involved actively separating Muslim and 
Buddhist communities and severely limiting 
Muslim rights. An estimated 140,000 people, 
mostly Muslims, remain in internally 
displaced people’s (IDP) camps or trapped 
in the Aung Mingalar quarter of the state 
capital, Sittwe. As their lives have become 
increasingly fragile, marginal and insecure, 
many have taken to the Bay of Bengal in 
rickety boats in an effort to migrate. Life for 
the state’s Buddhist majority is also far from 
rosy. Rakhine State is the second poorest 
in Myanmar with a poverty rate of 78%, 
almost twice Myanmar’s national average. 
The ethnic conflict appears to have 
reached a stalemate but there is widespread 
uncertainty about what is likely to happen 
next. Reducing ethnic tensions and preventing 
communal conflict are crucial to ensuring a 
better future for all the residents of Rakhine 
State, including the reduction of further 
displacement of Muslims and the potential 
for ending their internal displacement. 
When undertaking research in poor 
and urban communities in the north of the 
state in 2015, we had expected to find two 
communities wanting little or nothing to do 
with each other and having little or no respect 
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for one another. What we found, however, 
was people ready to consider putting aside 
their prejudices and fears of the other. 
There was, at times, among the Rakhine 
a naivety about the Muslims’ plight and 
maybe a willful blindness to the systematic 
marginalisation of Muslims but, far from 
displaying an aggressive anti-Muslim attitude, 
the overwhelming majority of urban and 
rural Rakhine expressed a cautious desire to 
live peacefully with their Muslim neighbours 
whom they were willing to see granted 
human rights and opportunities for greater 
integration – in the right circumstances. 
They wanted to see the laws applied 
transparently and without corruption and 
for the Muslim community to demonstrate 
a commitment to the responsibilities of 
citizenship. But official recognition of the 
name ‘Rohingya’ they see as a political 
claim which they cannot accede to. 
The peaceful and conciliatory tone of 
the Rohingyas’ responses in turn surprised 
us. Those in the IDP camps were keen to 
talk about the specific injustices they have 
suffered but after that they were ready to talk 
about peaceful solutions and reintegration. 
A common theme throughout was that 
the government and military should be seen 
as those most 
responsible for the 
conflict of 2012, 
having permitted, 
if not instigated, 
the extreme 
nationalism that 
fuelled the violence. 
A widespread 
opinion was 
that Rakhine 
nationalism was 
being used rather 
than it being a 
primary driver 
of the conflict. 
Each community 
we spoke with 
expressed the view 
that the problem 
was caused more 
by the state than 
by either the Rakhine or the Muslims.
The Rakhine and Muslim communities 
each suggested the government’s aim was 
to distract them from the appropriation of 
the region’s gas and other resource revenues 
by the state. And since they each see the 
government as having fuelled the crisis, 
they each believe the government has the 
power to fix the issue whenever it is willing 
to address it. Optimism about the potential 
for Myanmar’s new government to address 
long-standing local grievances was shared by 
both the Rakhine and the Rohingya Muslims. 
The Muslims want to return to 
their former lives in the community, 
they want peaceful relations with their 
neighbours, and they want to have their 
rights recognised, granted and respected. 
They believe the government can easily 
address their situation if there is the 
necessary political will and leadership. 
Ronan Lee ronan@deakin.edu.au  
Former Member of the Queensland Parliament 
and PhD candidate at Deakin University
Anthony Ware anthony.ware@deakin.edu.au  
Senior Lecturer, Deakin University
www.deakin.edu.au 
UNHCR staff visit villagers living in makeshift shelters after their homes were burnt down in  
inter-communal violence in Kyauk Tauw township, north of Sittwe, Rakhine state, Myanmar, 2012.
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Refugee-run organisations as partners in 
development
Evan Easton-Calabria
Incorporating refugee-run organisations into development programmes, potentially as 
implementing partners, provides a means to capitalise on refugees’ skills, reach refugees 
who may not be affiliated with international organisations, and take steps to close the relief-
development gap in protracted refugee situations. 
In Kampala, Uganda, refugee-run 
organisations host activities which aim to 
foster refugee self-reliance and – with their 
focus on language and skills training – to 
actively contribute to local integration and 
development efforts. These organisations 
arose out of grassroots efforts by refugees 
to help each other and are now nationally 
registered or community-based non-profit 
organisations with their own committees, 
boards of directors, websites and logos. In 
short, these are professional organisations 
with hard-working staff, which are 
important to the material and social well-
being of many refugees in Kampala.
Refugee-run organisations, such as Hope 
of Children and Women Victims of Violence 
(HOCW), Young African Refugees for Integral 
Development (YARID) and the Bondeko 
Refugee Livelihoods Center, are important 
sources of social and practical resources for 
refugees in Kampala. These organisations 
offer skills training in a variety of areas such 
as tailoring, arts and crafts, hairdressing 
and computer literacy. Functional adult 
literacy classes and basic to advanced English 
lessons are also provided. Organisations 
also offer community-based micro-savings 
and lending groups run by refugee leaders, 
which address refugees’ abiding exclusion 
from formal micro-finance institutions. 
Importantly, refugee-run organisations 
provide refugee-serving organisations such 
as the Refugee Law Project (RLP), Finnish 
Refugee Council (FRC) and International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) with refugee 
community ‘hubs’ that can be utilised 
to implement livelihoods trainings and 
programmes to sensitise refugees to a 
variety of issues such as maternal health and 
gender-based violence. Several initiatives 
led by refugee-run organisations began with 
support and training from IRC and FRC. 
However, these activities are not labelled 
as partnerships, and thus the integral role 
of refugee leaders and organisations in 
these operations, which are not simply a 
case of benefactors serving beneficiaries, 
remains under-recognised. Instead, these 
interactions comprise a nuanced interplay of 
organisational resources, existing community 
hubs created by refugee-run organisations 
and refugee initiative and leadership 
for particular livelihoods training and 
enterprises. Together, these resources enable 
livelihoods training for refugees that may 
be impossible to operationalise without both 
refugee and non-refugee actors taking part. 
Importantly, directors and members 
of refugee-run organisations do not feel 
sufficiently included in the livelihoods 
creation or development process. Many 
refugees with advanced skills are involved 
in initiatives run by outside organisations 
but only in limited capacities. For example, 
a refugee working at the Bondeko Center1 
was a trained nurse in his home country 
yet is prevented from practising as a nurse 
in Uganda due to the cost of becoming re-
certified. He emphasised, however, that 
he and his fellow refugee nurses could be 
tremendous assets to the refugees at Bondeko 
Center, as well as to Ugandans in the area, if 
they were to receive support to treat instead 
of just educate refugees. Describing a health 
training offered by InterAid, the main 
implementing partner in Uganda of UNHCR, 
the UN Refugee Agency, he said, “InterAid 
gathered all the refugee nurses for a meeting 
but trained us only to sensitise refugees in 
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malaria.… refugees must go all the way to 
InterAid just to get paracetamol. Or they go 
and wait two days to go to Mulago [Uganda’s 
national referral hospital] for malaria. But 
there are many nurses here. We can diagnose 
and treat from right here at the Center!”2 
Although sensitisation on health issues is 
a valuable contribution to communities, the 
main health struggle 
cited by refugees is in 
obtaining medicine 
and good treatment 
at hospitals and 
clinics. Yet the health 
skills of the nurses 
at Bondeko Center 
remain unutilised, 
despite their 
eagerness to work 
and the desperate 
need for health care 
in Uganda. This 
example highlights 
a struggle for 
involvement and partnership that 
extends across the many sectors that 
refugees are qualified to work within.
An example of refugee-led development 
and integration
In efforts to share their skills with others 
and in the face of inadequate assistance, 
refugees across Kampala have founded their 
own organisations. HOCW3 was created in 
2008 by Congolese refugees and a Ugandan 
pastor, and expanded through the support 
of international volunteers who fundraised 
and provided materials. Located on the 
outskirts of Kampala, this organisation 
provides various livelihoods activities for 
both refugees and local Ugandans, as well 
as English lessons and programmes for 
children. The initiative began after women 
expressed the need to diversify their skills, 
as the majority could only find work in 
Kampala washing clothes; it started in 
2013 with a tailoring programme, and now 
runs a range of programmes including 
arts and crafts, hairdressing, mushroom-
growing and business skills. An estimated 
40% of training participants at HOCW are 
Ugandans. Such refugee-run organisations 
have the ability to advance local integration 
through building community networks 
and fostering self-reliance, supporting non-
refugees as well as refugees in their area.
There is an opportunity for national or 
international organisations already working 
with these communities to support them 
through, for example, 
paying rent, either in 
part or in full, for the 
spaces that refugee-
run organisations 
base their operations 
out of. This seems 
especially reasonable 
given that UNHCR’s 
implementing 
partners and other 
organisations serving 
refugees also utilise 
these spaces for their 
own operations, and 
through them gain 
access to refugees who otherwise might not 
be identifiable among local members of the 
urban poor. However, of the organisations 
researched in Kampala, only FRC had a 
programme specifically focused on building 
the capacity of refugee-run organisations. 
In addition to training on leadership and 
finances, it offers refugee-run organisations 
5 million Ugandan shillings (approximately 
US$1,500) per year to start or expand 
programmes that contribute to organisational 
sustainability. Refugees involved in FRC’s 
programme have found this useful and 
felt that their own work and skills in 
creating organisations was acknowledged 
and called upon through this support.
Conclusion
The potential of refugee-run organisations 
to contribute to local integration and 
development is enormous, and in Uganda 
this is already being actualised on a small 
scale. However, these organisations’ capacity 
to reach more refugees is limited by their 
ongoing struggle to meet the basic needs 
of running an organisation – paying rent, 
accruing funds and tools to implement 
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livelihoods training, and providing 
stipends to volunteer teachers and staff. 
The significance of these organisations in 
the lives of refugees as well as in the ability 
of international and national non-refugee 
organisations in Kampala to implement 
activities should be more widely recognised. 
The relative lack of written documentation 
on refugee-run organisations occludes 
recognition of them not only as stakeholders 
but as important partners in livelihoods 
interventions. The capacity for refugees to 
self-organise and provide support is similarly 
unrecognised and this, whether unintended 
or not, serves to perpetuate the perception of 
refugees as merely beneficiaries, even where 
guidance documents are designed to utilise 
their agency. Providing funding dedicated 
to sustaining and strengthening refugee-run 
organisations is an important step to take. 
A shift in current rhetoric and practice from 
seeking refugee participation in programmes 
to forming refugee partnerships to implement 
them is perhaps an even better one.
Evan Easton-Calabria 
evan.easton-calabria@qeh.ox.ac.uk  
Doctoral student, Department of International 
Development, University of Oxford 
www.qeh.ox.ac.uk 
1. www.bondekocenter.com 
2. Interview, Bondeko Center, Kampala, June 2015
3. www.hocwug.net 
A new approach to old problems: the Solutions 
Alliance
Alexander Betts
Over the last three years, the Solutions Alliance has gradually emerged as a multi-
stakeholder initiative to overcome the so-called humanitarian-development divide. 
The question of how to engage the 
development sector – actors, ideas and 
resources – in responses to refugee and IDP 
situations is not new. There is already a 
history of initiatives aiming to overcome the 
humanitarian-development divide in order to 
empower displaced populations, strengthen 
their resilience and harness their capacities. 
However, while the theme is old, the 
Solutions Alliance’s approach to achieving 
these goals is attempting something new.1 
Its aims to reconceive displacement as 
potentially a win-win opportunity for hosts, 
donors and displaced people. The underlying 
premise is that displaced people can 
become agents of change and development 
– for themselves, their own countries 
and the communities that host them. 
Local and global
The model begins with a focus on the national 
level. Specific countries with a particular 
commitment to promoting self-reliance 
opportunities for refugees are selected 
as ‘champions’ and the starting point for 
National Groups. These groups include a 
range of national and local actors capable of 
working towards operational change on the 
ground. They seek to empower the country 
in each case to fully include displaced 
populations in national development plans, 
to build evidence and conduct joint analysis, 
to develop solutions strategies and operations 
that address the specifics of their national 
situation within such frameworks, and to 
draw on the legitimacy and support provided 
by the Alliance thereby benefitting from being 
connected to a global network of actors. 
So far four National Groups have 
emerged, all in Africa: Zambia, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Somali refugees (with a focus 
on Kenya). These National Groups have 
outlined their work plans, focusing on clearly 
defined challenges, including supporting 
pioneering naturalisation processes within 
Tanzania and Zambia, enhancing self-
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reliance and resilience in Uganda, and 
improving synergies between refugee return 
and internal displacement in Somalia. 
Alongside the National Groups, Thematic 
Groups have been constituted comprising 
a global support network committed to 
offering a resource to the National Groups. 
These serve as a potential source of expertise, 
further networks and good practice, from 
which situation-specific strategies can draw. 
The first three of these are: the Private Sector 
Group, which will engage business actors and 
work with National Groups to connect them 
with business (local small and medium-sized 
businesses as well as international companies); 
the Rule of Law Group, which will consider 
regulatory barriers to progressive solutions 
and document rule of law lessons and 
achievements; and the Research, Data and 
Performance Management Group, which 
will offer access to existing research, promote 
relevant new research and support shared 
analysis to inform joint strategy development. 
The Alliance’s particular mechanism 
for achieving change is therefore to connect 
the field and global levels of this multi-
stakeholder network. It brings together 
host and donor governments, international 
organisations, civil society, business and 
academia. Each of these can add value in 
context-specific situations through concrete, 
innovative actions and through advocacy 
for communities affected by displacement. 
Different countries have unique histories 
and challenges, and in each the roles of 
humanitarian, development and private 
sector actors will vary significantly.
The Alliance itself
Although the Alliance is still emerging, 
a number of elements of the process 
are innovative and promising. First, 
its focus on and willingness to reward 
countries as ‘champions’ for including 
the displaced in national development 
plans and supporting self-reliance. 
Second, its creation of a genuinely multi-
stakeholder approach. Third, its focus on 
supporting concrete, operational change 
at the national level through connecting 
the local to a global support network.
The activities have involved a process 
of iterative learning, and at a Roundtable in 
February 2016 a significant amount of clarity 
emerged on what the Solutions Alliance is, 
and what makes it a potentially original 
approach to forced migration governance.2 
It aims to transform internal cultures in 
the humanitarian and development fields 
and to incentivise structures, systems and 
procedures, based on recognising a range of 
systemic challenges that hinder our ability 
to bring together the two fields of work.
The interest and engagement of the 
champions depend on their governments 
perceiving a value to participating in 
the initiative. Meanwhile, the support 
capacity of Thematic Groups also depends 
upon access to funding. So far the only 
resources the Alliance can command are 
the voluntary commitments of others 
– donors, business and academia. 
The Alliance is still in the process of 
defining itself. Nevertheless, the evolution 
of the Alliance model over the last three 
years suggests it has the capacity to resolve 
the question of how to locate itself on the 
spectrum between network and institution. 
On the one hand, as a network it is intended 
to be loose, dynamic and informal. On the 
other hand, it requires institutional capacity 
and resources in order to act. It still lacks the 
resources to directly support the work of the 
National and Thematic Groups and this in 
turn creates a challenge in terms of managing 
expectations, for both host governments 
and those active in the global network.
Alexander Betts alexander.betts@qeh.ox.ac.uk  
Director, Refugee Studies Centre, University of 
Oxford www.rsc.ox.ac.uk and Co-Chair of the 
Solutions Alliance Working Group on Research, 
Data, and Performance Management  
www.solutionsalliance.org/thematic-groups/
research-data-and-performance-management/  
Co-author of (forthcoming, 2017) Refugee 
Economies: Forced Displacement and 
Development, Oxford University Press.
1. www.solutionsalliance.org 
2. This article draws in part upon the Summary Statement from the 
2016 Solutions Alliance Roundtable.  
http://tinyurl.com/SolutionsAllRoundtableSummary 
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What’s going on in Nigeria?
Toby Lanzer
Huge numbers of people in Nigeria’s north-east have been affected by poverty, 
environmental degradation and, specifically, Boko Haram violence. The need to bring  
our collective understanding and resources to such a setting is obvious – so why does  
action to do so remain elusive and what can be done to set things on the right course? 
When one thinks of Nigeria lots of things 
come to mind: energy, money and, 
increasingly, Boko Haram. The group has 
existed in the country’s north-east for years 
but gained international prominence on the 
night of 14-15th April 2014 when over 200 
girls were abducted in Chibok. This incident 
was a precursor of yet more outrages, and 
over the past eighteen months the number of 
people forced from their homes in Nigeria’s 
northeast has risen to a staggering 2.2 million. 
Further, what was largely seen as a ‘Nigerian 
problem’ has taken on a regional dimension 
across the Lake Chad basin encompassing 
northern Cameroon, western Chad, south-
eastern Niger and north-eastern Nigeria.
Why is there seemingly little reporting 
about what is happening and what 
is needed now in order to effectively 
provide protection and assistance?
There is a lack of news from the country’s 
north-east – and indeed the entire Lake Chad 
basin – for all the wrong reasons. Perhaps 
we live in a world of too much news, and 
too many, too severe crises. Remember the 
Sahel in 2013? Or Gaza in 2014? Both were 
overshadowed by Syria. There are only so 
many crises that can make the headlines 
and which the world at large (including 
government officials and aid agency 
managers) can handle. The severity of each 
crisis also seems to have deepened. More 
people displaced; more towns destroyed; 
more villages torched; more lives lost, 
women raped, and children out of school. 
And so one might argue that there is an 
inability to deal with ‘yet another crisis’. 
Just a few days after assuming my current 
role in July 2015, I visited Nigeria’s north-
east. The numbers of people in need and 
displaced, and the lack of action to address 
the situation, surprised me, and I asked my 
most trusted adviser, “How did I miss this?” 
“You were quite busy in South Sudan,” she 
answered. This incisive comment led me to 
conclude that senior leaders and managers 
in capitals or indeed in my own institution 
were “quite busy” with Syria, Ukraine and 
the fast-evolving European migration crisis. 
And when I called on embassies in the 
Nigerian capital Abuja, on donor capitals 
and on my own institution for funding, a 
common comment was, “This is Nigeria, a 
rich country which can help its own people.”
Addressing a crisis in a relatively rich 
country is problematic. Yes, Nigeria is 
wealthy and should have the resources to 
help its own people but issues of governance 
are often a factor as is the matter of the 
‘marginalised north-east’. Yes, aid agencies 
have been known to substitute for institutions 
of the state instead of supporting them, 
and we certainly would not want this to 
be the case in a setting such as Nigeria. 
And, yes, there is always the matter of 
national pride which nobody wants to dent 
and in that sense bringing attention to the 
situation in Nigeria’s northeast is politically 
Nigeria: Total population 182,200,000 
•  Almost 2,152,000 internally displaced (as of end 
2015, IDMC estimate)
•  Plus almost 555,000 internally displaced or 
Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, Chad and Niger  
(as of April 2016, OCHA)
Of the total figure of IDPs, it is estimated that 
12.6% were displaced due to communal clashes, 
2.4% by natural disasters and 85% as a result of 
Boko Haram violence. See IDMC www.internal-
displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/
figures-analysis
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‘tricky’. Given the number of people in 
need, however, much more had to be done, 
and with a greater sense of urgency.
Listening to what people want
In Nigeria’s north-east, I asked people in the 
city of Maiduguri open-ended questions, 
starting with “How are things going?” What 
I heard was enlightening and reassuring. 
The main message from people was, “We 
can and want to take care of ourselves.” The 
main help they needed was for the authorities 
to take back control of their towns and 
villages and to ensure security and safety 
for them, their children and their livestock. 
People also spoke of the need for roads to 
be safe and markets to be open and in so 
doing they underlined their wish to work 
and trade. Parents told me of their concern 
that children were missing the school year. 
One proud woman spoke to me of her nine 
children, whom she had raised almost single-
handedly and who had become doctors and 
lawyers. “I don’t need your blankets and 
buckets. I need to know that my town is 
safe once again, and then I’ll walk home!”
Nobody uttered a word to me about 
‘humanitarian’ this or ‘development’ that. 
For people struck by crisis, especially in 
already fragile settings, such constructs 
are only present in outsiders’ minds, 
not in those of the people affected by 
violence and displacement or of the 
authorities charged with helping them. 
The case of Maiduguri is instructive: 
a city whose population ballooned from 
1 million to 2.6 million in a matter of months 
because of the atrocities committed by Boko 
Haram. Upon arrival the displaced people 
needed shelter, food and water. These basic 
needs persist and the temptation is to carry 
on with an emergency approach to providing 
shelter, food and water – that is, ‘business 
as usual’. Upon reflection, however, we 
should recall what has happened in similar 
settings elsewhere when largely rural 
populations are forced from their homes or 
off their land and who seek refuge in cities. 
The desire to return home does eventually 
cool as time goes on. Accordingly, in the 
case of Maiduguri, creating a city that can 
cope in the long term with a population 
of 2.6 million is what is really needed. Aid 
agencies would do well to bring together their 
short- and medium-term work to help the 
authorities and local people create sustainable 
shelter in settings that have sufficient water 
and sanitation, clinics and schools. 
Other organisations, such as the World 
Bank (not typically associated with response 
in crisis settings), now plan to accelerate 
their work in Nigeria’s north-east and indeed 
the entire Lake Chad basin. Across the 
Lake Chad basin the roots of instability and 
misery lie in the abject poverty of the region 
and in the degradation of its environment. 
Since the 1950s Lake Chad has shrunk to 
20% of its former size, making it harder for 
the population to access water for its needs, 
whether for people, farming or livestock. At 
the same time, the population has soared and 
is predicted to double in the next two decades. 
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Displaced villagers, now in Bama, Borno State, Nigeria, April 2016.
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If they are poor and lack water we can be sure 
that social tensions will mount, and could 
do so even more if violent extremists remain 
there to meddle in an already complex setting. 
Stepping out from our ‘silos’
Different parts of the international 
community need to collaborate with Nigeria’s 
authorities to support their attempts to 
stabilise the situation and lay the grounds 
for peace and stability. First and foremost, 
countries of the region have come together 
to form a Multi-National Joint Task Force 
to address instability. Support has been 
forthcoming from different parts of the 
international community such as the African 
Union, France and the United Kingdom, 
which has itself established a team in 
Maiduguri providing advice to the Nigerian 
security forces on how to tackle Boko Haram 
(and to do so with due respect for human 
rights). While always heeding the principles 
of operational independence and impartiality, 
aid agencies need to collaborate more 
closely with other parts of the international 
system – actors who are part of the setting 
even if they are not aid agencies. In the 
case of Nigeria’s north-east, where various 
institutions work inside the development, 
environmental, humanitarian, human rights, 
political and security ‘silos’, the relevance of 
collaboration and the need for it should be 
self-evident. The alternative – remaining in 
our respective silos – is to lose an opportunity 
to build on the collective understanding and 
resources that we can bring to such a setting. 
This is so seemingly logical, yet illusive.
If we can learn to collaborate more 
effectively, in line with what the communities 
themselves are telling us about the situation 
and in support of the legitimate authorities 
on the ground, we can help people not only 
to survive but also to find their way out of 
the crisis and make their lives better sooner. 
Toby Lanzer twitter.com/tobylanzer   
UN Assistant Secretary-General and Regional 
Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel, and 
former Visiting Study Fellow with the Refugee 
Studies Centre, University of Oxford. He wrote this 
article in a personal capacity. 
The weakness of resettlement safeguards in mining 
John R Owen and Deanna Kemp
Given the levels of uncertainty that surround mining activities, it is questionable whether 
current planning practices can safeguard against the risks associated with displacement 
and resettlement, and whether industry practice is consistent with the responsibility to 
respect human rights.  
Studies of displacement and resettlement 
associated with mining operations continue 
to demonstrate consistently high levels 
of impoverishment among displaced 
people,1 and that knowledge-building and 
management practices within the mining 
industry to uphold international standards 
are weak.2  The implications of this are far 
reaching. Host and settlement communities 
will confront heightened risk of human rights 
violations, poverty and social instability. 
Governments will bear long-term liabilities 
caused by the displacement, including 
pressure to address impoverishment risks in 
remote locations. Companies will experience 
increased opposition and reputational risk 
as well as higher operating costs when 
resettlement issues remain unsolved. 
Finally, international financial institutions 
(IFIs) will feel the effects of heightened 
public scrutiny over their adherence to due 
diligence vis-à-vis basic human rights in their 
lending practices to the extractives sector. 
In 2001, the World Bank established 
its Operational Policy on Involuntary 
Resettlement (OP 4.12), based on a set of 
known displacement and resettlement 
risks, to guide lenders and states in 
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undertaking due diligence for large-scale 
development projects. Michael Cernea’s 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction 
model for resettlement3 is widely recognised 
as the conceptual foundation of both 
the World Bank’s resettlement policy 
framework and the International Finance 
Corporation’s Performance Standard 5 (IFC 
PS5) on Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement.4 The IFC PS5 has become 
the default international standard for 
the mining sector and while civil society 
organisations have not explicitly endorsed 
the IFC standards, there is nonetheless a 
practical acceptance that the standards 
provide a minimum for protecting affected 
populations from known resettlement risks. 
Displacement is a common occurrence in mining 
developments but there is a marked absence of 
data on its scale and frequency. Data are available 
on a case-by-case basis but this is dependent on 
developers or third parties disclosing planning 
documentation. Individual cases include: 
•  Construction phase of the Ahafo Gold Mine 
in Ghana involved the resettlement of 823 
households (2004)
•  Nui Phao Gold Mine in Vietnam resettled 884 
households (2005)
•  Anglo America’s Limpopo mine in South Africa 
resettled approximately 957 households (2005)
•  The Phulbari Coal Mine in Bangladesh reportedly 
resettled 9,760 households (circa 2008)
•  Glencore’s Xstrata’s Prodeco coal mine in 
Colombia resettled 600 households (2010)
Planning in a highly volatile market 
The primary underlying assumption in 
international safeguard standards is that 
the risks associated with displacement and 
resettlement can be predicted and mitigated. 
If developers make efforts to identify the 
risks, and plan accordingly, it follows that 
fewer risks will materialise for the displaced 
population. A second assumption is that 
developers will actively work to protect their 
own self-interest. The standards are thus 
designed to assist companies to diagnose and 
respond to project-based risks and protect 
their so-called ‘social licence to operate’. 
Taken together, these two assumptions 
suggest that resettlement risks can be 
managed and that mining companies will 
invest in resettlement planning because it 
is in their best interests to do so. However, 
there is little evidence to suggest that mining 
companies agree that investing in social 
safeguards makes ‘good business sense’. On 
the contrary, many mining companies fail to 
calculate the full cost of resettlement and tend 
to defer allocating the necessary resources.
The ability of developers to pre-define 
the scope of a large-scale capital-intensive 
project is critical to the ‘planning as a 
safeguard’ proposition. Knowing what land 
will be needed and what impacts will be 
felt in which locations and at which phase 
of the mine’s life cycle under which market 
conditions is pivotal to whether a developer 
will be able to effectively design and resource 
a programme of appropriate and affordable 
measures to minimise the negative impacts 
on people of being resettled. But pre-defining 
these elements is difficult when bringing a 
large-scale mine into production, especially 
given variables such as the availability and 
affordability of land, water, energy and new 
technologies, and rapidly changing market 
conditions, including consumer demand 
for commodities. This can result in projects 
taking over land (and causing displacements) 
on an ad hoc, opportunistic basis rather than 
as an organised ‘front-end’ activity (that is, at 
the commencement of the mining project). A 
high proportion of resettlement events occur 
as the result of project expansions during 
the operational phase of mine life, once a 
project has proven its profitability. Unless 
mining and resettlement planning takes 
into account this element of uncertainty, and 
occurs within an institutional framework 
of responsible governance, planning 
may not be the safeguard instrument 
that it is so readily assumed to be.
Uncertainty, regulation and informed 
consent 
When governments initially permit a 
mining project, permissions are based on a 
project design with stated risks and plans 
for mitigation. Where communities are 
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involved in consultation processes, it is the 
initial project design that is presented and 
discussed. What the project may actually look 
like in future is unknown. Mine expansions, 
even if incremental, result in changes in land 
use, as well as social and environmental 
impacts. A project that – on paper – did 
not involve involuntary resettlement in 
the early stages may soon after necessitate 
resettlement in order for the project to 
remain economically viable. Newmont’s 
Ahafo Gold mine in Ghana, for instance, 
resettled communities in four separate 
stages between 2004 and 2012 in order to 
accommodate additional infrastructure 
and an increasing need for land.
As a front-end activity, resettlement 
planning allows developers and governments 
to make decisions about what social and 
economic services are needed to support 
displaced and receiving communities, 
and how those costs will be met over and 
beyond the life of the project. The planning 
window for displacements that may occur 
in the operational phase of mine life is often 
narrow. This tends to result in short-term 
reactive planning without clear strategies 
for how resettlement risks will be resourced 
and managed into the future. At the Porgera 
Gold Mine in Papua New Guinea, for 
example, over the last thirty years many 
households have been relocated on more than 
one occasion within the geographical area 
covered by the mine’s lease. This practice 
of ad hoc relocation and the uncertainty as 
to whether additional relocations will be 
needed constrain both the mine’s ability 
to operate and the ability of residents to 
maintain a basic standard of living.  
Other front-end considerations bring 
human rights to the fore. The issue of 
‘free prior informed consent’ (FPIC) raises 
important questions about how power is 
exercised in major development projects. 
Although the interpretation of what 
FPIC can offer communities varies, it is 
generally understood as advancing the 
rights of indigenous people, with advocacy 
organisations emphasising the right of 
communities to veto development projects. 
While many in-country jurisdictions do not 
support the right of local communities to 
reject projects outright, FPIC is increasingly 
being promoted as a means to strengthen 
the voice of communities in consultation 
processes, including relating to resettlement. 
As above, a major challenge exists in 
terms of communities providing consent for 
a mining project to have the right to proceed 
when it will inevitably evolve beyond what 
the parties had originally agreed to. While in 
some cases companies may defer resettlement 
until it can no longer be avoided, it is also true 
that companies may not have information at 
hand about how the project will develop in 
future. Even in instances where companies 
have access to this information, they may 
not engage in a process of meaningful 
dialogue with affected communities. 
This is not to suggest that planning cannot 
or does not occur in these circumstances. The 
issue is rather whether planning under these 
circumstances has the safeguarding effect 
that is pre-supposed in international and 
corporate policy frameworks. The provision 
of information, choice and opportunities 
for consultation are all possible, even when 
resettlement planning occurs on an ad hoc or 
opportunistic basis. Participatory activities 
can be constructed even within heavily 
compressed timeframes, and information can 
be disseminated in a fashion that satisfies 
Local people against the Phulbari Coal Project on a seven-day, 
250-mile protest march, October 2010.
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integrity of process is clearly critical to the 
underlying value of planning as a safeguard. 
This would involve resource developers 
taking active responsibility for planning 
and managing resettlement risks. The 
particularities of the mining industry and the 
tendency of companies to defer resettlement 
until deferral no longer makes good business 
sense cast serious doubt on the ability of 
companies to safeguard through planning. 
Unless there is a greater commitment to 
resourcing resettlement – not just planning for 
displacement – impoverishment will continue 
to be forced upon people resettled by mining. 
Ineffective incentives and deterrents
Nation states are progressively updating 
mining and environmental laws relating 
to resettlement in order to bring national 
regulatory instruments into closer alignment 
with international standards and policy 
frameworks. At the same time, NGOs 
are more actively campaigning against 
mining companies that fail to protect 
displaced persons from resettlement risks. 
Even with stronger incentives in place to 
plan for displacement and resettlement, 
however, the particular characteristics 
of the mining industry will continue to 
militate against front-end planning.
The mining sector has long 
promoted the view that it is in the 
industry’s best interests to invest 
in corporate social responsibility 
initiatives and to maintain strong 
relationships with host communities. 
According to concepts such as ‘social 
licence to operate’, mining companies 
need to achieve an ‘agreed’ level 
of social performance in order to 
continue operating within a given 
context. Social licence assumes that 
communities can and will withdraw 
their support for a mining project, 
that withdrawing support will have 
a major detrimental effect on the 
economic viability of the business, and 
that mining companies proactively 
manage the risk of losing their 
social licence out of self-interest. 
Current evidence would suggest, 
however, that mining companies do not see 
resettlement as a significant risk to social 
licence or to the viability of their operations. 
It appears rather that companies ignore 
that risk until such time that impacts ensue 
and a crisis presents a risk to the business. 
In other words, companies are unlikely do 
the right thing solely on the basis that it 
will be bad for business if they do not. 
When lenders are directly involved 
in enabling displacement, one might 
expect their additional oversight to yield 
an improvement in the way developers 
approach the management of resettlement 
risks. However, a recent internal review 
by the World Bank Group and reports by 
various consultants and academics highlight 
the lack of enforcement by lenders, even 
after repeated instances of non-compliance 
have been identified. Rather than reducing 
resettlement risk, lenders have instead become 
complicit in mining’s impoverishing effects.
When resettlement risks materialise, 
displaced persons face real harms and 
deprivations. Significant shifts in mining 
industry practice are required if social 
safeguards are to have a meaningful effect  
on the ground. 
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Causes and consequences of Canada's resettlement 
of Syrian refugees
Anne-Marie Bélanger McMurdo
By the end of February 2016, Canada had fulfilled its promise to resettle 25,000 Syrian 
refugees. However, this initiative has put a considerable strain on the settlement services 
that refugees receive after arrival, and raises questions about fair treatment for other 
refugees. 
Canada’s pledge in late 2015 to accept 
25,000 Syrian refugees for resettlement 
came at a time when certain other countries 
were considering measures such as 
confiscating assets of refugees, registering 
Muslim refugees entering their country 
or closing borders to refugees altogether. 
Why did Canada buck a growing trend 
and what have been the consequences?
A few factors can help explain Canada’s 
action. First, Canadian public response to 
the Syrian refugee crisis had gathered a 
significant amount of momentum over time. 
This was further reinforced by the news of 
the death of three-year old Ayan Kurdi, a 
Syrian child who drowned while travelling 
by boat from Turkey to Greece with his family 
– a family who, it emerged, had previously 
been refused resettlement to Canada. This 
event marked a tipping point, strengthening 
the public outcry for the Canadian 
government to change its previously more 
restrictive policies towards refugees. 
Secondly, national elections in Canada in 
October 2015 proved timely. During the pre-
election phase, prime ministerial candidates 
responded to public opinion in favour of 
increased resettlement by each offering their 
own pledge to resettle Syrian refugees. 
Thirdly, citizens wanted their government 
to match the rhetoric of Canadian identity 
as compassionate, actively engaged in 
the international community and open to 
newcomers. It was no surprise that citizens 
pushed the government to make an effort 
towards resettling Syrians, given the long-
standing willingness of many citizens to 
be actively engaged in sponsoring refugees 
themselves. Civil society in Canada plays a 
significant role in resettlement as individuals 
can resettle refugees through what is known 
as the ‘Group of Five’ scheme, whereby five 
or more Canadian citizens or permanent 
residents apply to sponsor refugees to 
come to Canada and take responsibility 
for supporting them after arrival.1 
Resources for resettlement
Resettlement is a form of responsibility 
sharing and a recognition of international 
cooperation between countries. However, 
there is no legal 
imperative to resettle 
refugees, and countries 
choose to accept 
refugees voluntarily 
and may set their own 
quotas and criteria. 
Canada’s decision to 
accept 25,000 Syrian 
refugees2 was, in this 
sense, its own choice. 
The newly 
elected government’s 
commitment to 
resettle Syrians was 
primarily driven 
by the momentum of the elections, and 
later by the need to demonstrate the new 
government’s capacity to swiftly implement 
promises. In fact, once the government 
had been voted into power in October 
2015, it was not clear how it would fulfil its 
promise to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees 
to Canada. As a result, deadlines had to be 
pushed back from the end of 2015 to the end 
of February 2016. Since being elected, the 
federal government has made huge efforts 
to meet its target of resettling 25,000 Syrian 
refugees but the focus on quantity to be 
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resettled may have been at the expense of 
the quality of settlement services provided. 
Disappointingly, settlement services 
in Canada have not yet received the same 
support from the government as was offered 
in physically resettling the refugees to 
Canada. In other words, with such a huge 
and rapid influx of refugees, settlement 
services have been stretched beyond capacity, 
without sufficient resources to adequately 
address the refugees’ needs, or the time 
to invest in additional fundraising.
After repeated cuts in the settlement 
sector by the previous government, 
‘newcomer’ services – those engaged in 
welcoming and assisting resettled refugees 
and other immigrants – have been struggling 
to respond to the increase in arrivals. As a 
result of the scale of arrivals, enrolling the 
refugees in language classes and/or schools 
and allocating housing, to name but a few 
services, have proved challenging. For 
example, refugees 
have been staying 
in temporary 
accommodation for 
weeks longer than 
usual.3 In response, the 
private sector and civil 
society have played an 
extremely active role 
in responding to the 
needs of the thousands 
of Syrian arrivals to fill 
this gap. Yet there is 
also a need for trained 
professionals to support 
this specific group of 
people and their varied and complicated 
needs, particularly for government-assisted 
refugees, who have greater needs and more 
vulnerabilities than other newcomer groups. 
Fair treatment? 
In responding to popular opinion, the 
Canadian government has been offering 
special benefits to arriving Syrian refugees. 
For instance, Syrian refugees who arrived 
after the new government came to power 
do not – in contrast to refugees of other 
nationalities and previous Syrian refugees – 
have to repay the government’s travel loan 
which enabled their journey to Canada. 
But what of Syrians who came while the 
previous government was in power? What 
about other refugees who are resettling at 
the same time as the Syrians? By trying 
to put forward a helpful and empathetic 
view towards the Syrian population, the 
government has effectively created two 
classes of refugees, disregarding fairness and 
equity. Others – including many in the private 
sector and social services – have followed 
suit in offering various benefits to newly 
arriving Syrians in Canada. Yet this welcome 
has the effect of making invisible any other 
refugees. Refugee experts, practitioners 
and advocates in Canada have been calling 
for fairness and equity in this response. 
Canada is, at a national and international 
level, making a clear and very positive 
commitment to refugees. The amount of 
action taken in the last few months has been 
remarkable for a national government body, 
as has been the welcoming response by 
the general Canadian public. Furthermore, 
Canada has a high standard of settlement 
services given the country’s priority to 
integrate newcomers and the existence of an 
already established settlement system. But 
what thought has been given to the long-term 
settlement implications of these refugees 
– and of others? Given that approximately 
10,000 refugees resettle to Canada in any given 
year,4 25,000 Syrian refugees in the space of 
four months on top of the resettlement of 
10,000 additional government-assisted Syrian 
refugees by the end of 20165 will surely put a 
substantial strain on the provisions of services 
to refugees for the next year and beyond.  
With the recent attacks in Paris 
and Brussels, and subsequent waves of 
Islamophobia, the initiative to resettle 
Syrians to Canada has come in for increasing 
challenge by Canadians. Security in 
resettlement processing has become a point 
of public discussion and contention, with 
the new government undertaking regular 
information sharing about resettlement in 
order to ease the fears of Canadian citizens. 
Only time will tell whether the new 
government will continue to bolster support 
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to the settlement sector and demonstrate – 
after the deadlines have passed and targets 
have been reached – that it values the 
successful integration of refugees. But if this 
much action can be successfully achieved, 
and ambitious quotas can be met given 
the right circumstances, many are hopeful 
that the momentum of this response can be 
maintained for future resettlement initiatives 
in Canada. The question now is whether 
this extraordinary support for refugees 
in Canada will translate into a full-scale, 
stronger post-arrival network of support 
and services for the refugee arrivals as 
well as into maintaining support for large-
scale resettlement in the years to come.  
Anne-Marie Bélanger McMurdo 
abelangermcmurdo@gmail.com   
Former MSc student, Refugee Studies Centre, 
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Assisted Voluntary Return: implications for women 
and children 
Monica Encinas
Assisted Voluntary Return programmes often send women and children back to places of 
insecurity and uncertainty. Analysis of practice in the UK highlights the inherent problems 
and the need to re-examine this type of programme.
Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) 
programmes are schemes to assist asylum 
seekers to return to their countries of origin. 
The programmes normally help refugees by 
arranging their travel and providing them 
with some financial support for establishing a 
new life on return. UNHCR (the UN Refugee 
Agency) and the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) have promoted these 
schemes for more than a decade, and millions 
of dollars have been pumped into them. 
In the UK, AVR is divided into three 
separate programmes: Assisted Voluntary 
Return for Irregular Migrants (AVRIM), 
Assisted Voluntary Return for Families and 
Children (AVRFC) and Voluntary Assisted 
Return and Reintegration Programme 
(VARRP). All three programmes are open 
to failed asylum seekers, and AVRFC and 
VARRP are open to those with pending 
asylum applications. The programme 
pays for travel home and participants 
are given a cash grant up to but not 
exceeding £2,000 (US$2,800). However, 
having an AVR application approved leads 
automatically to an individual’s application 
for asylum being withdrawn and initiates 
a five-year ban on re-entering the UK. 
Causes for concern
Firstly, there are serious doubts about how 
‘voluntary’ AVR programmes actually are, 
especially for women. Repatriation schemes 
are done in close partnership with national 
governments who have a vested interest in 
limiting the number of migrants and refugees 
trying to enter each year. Some NGOs feel that 
many refugees participate only because they 
are pushed into a corner after governments 
strategically cut them off from basic services 
and threaten deportation. They are not alone 
in thinking this. Researcher Anne Koch 
suggests AVR programmes launched by 
UNHCR and IOM should be considered ‘state-
induced’ as they allow Western governments 
to outsource deportation to UNHCR and 
IOM. She further points out that “when 
forced and voluntary returns are pursued 
in combination, the notion of voluntariness 
becomes compromised”.1 In 2013 another 
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study showed that government officials 
admitted to using threats of deportation 
in order to increase participation in AVR 
programmes.2 According to recent research, 
one consequence of the AVR model – with 
its emphasis on ‘choice’ – is that it makes the 
refugee responsible for the consequences of 
their return, absolving the Home Office of 
any responsibility for returning refugees to 
dangerous, life-threatening, situations.3  
An assessment by the UK’s Home Office 
found refugee women felt they had little say 
over whether they participated in the UK’s 
AVR programmes as decisions were made  
by the males in their communities and/or 
households.4 They also feel increasingly 
pushed to sign up for AVR programmes, 
given continuing cuts to essential services. 
For example, in the UK and EU, Afghan 
women are offered more money than men to 
leave, the implication being that if they leave 
they will take their children with them.
It is worth noting that some NGOs who 
were previously critical of AVR programmes 
have since warmed to the idea on the 
basis that AVR is a more humane option 
than deportation and that it has the side-
effect of strengthening public and political 
support for the institution of asylum as a 
whole. Still, serious concerns remain over 
the voluntariness of AVR programmes, 
especially for women and children who 
may have little say or be coerced into 
returning to countries where human rights 
and security remain highly questionable. 
Secondly, return to areas of conflict 
is particularly dangerous for women and 
children. The majority of asylum seekers 
who participate in AVR programmes are 
returning to areas still in conflict (such as 
Afghanistan and Somalia) where safe, long-
term reintegration is nearly impossible. A 
July 2013 UNHCR self-assessment report 
on its programme to return Afghans to 
Afghanistan – UNHCR’s largest ever 
repatriation programme – highlighted how 
the organisation continues to struggle to 
provide support for social and economic 
reintegration in Afghanistan.5 Later that year, 
Human Rights Watch recommended that 
UNHCR and IOM discontinue their emphasis 
on AVR programmes in light of increasing 
insecurity and the inability to adequately 
provide support services following return.6 
The reality for women facing return to 
a home country in crisis is frightening. In 
many of these fragile states, gender-based 
persecution remains a constant threat. 
One study showed that several Afghan 
women opted to have a tubal ligation 
(surgery to prevent conception) prior to 
travel, as they feared that health services 
in Afghanistan would be unable to provide 
contraceptives.7 In another study, Somali 
women expressed concerns that they would 
be subjected to rape and oppressive cultural 
and religious requirements upon return. 
China’s forced sterilisation practices have 
also left many resisting return. The same 
report highlights the added danger of 
secondary or tertiary displacement for women 
unable to settle safely after returning.8 
For child refugees who return to 
areas of conflict, traumatic experiences of 
crisis and displacement are compounded, 
leading to immense psychological harm 
and mental distress, and often there is little 
or no psychosocial support available. 
AVR programmes returning people to 
areas of conflict are unable to provide one 
of the most important things for sustainable 
return: access to networks. Networks 
provide returnee women with access to 
land, employment, education and other basic 
services, as well as to valuable information 
and support from others. These are essential 
for securing and leading independent lives. 
However, building and participating in 
networks is particularly difficult in areas of 
conflict where communities and contacts 
have been severed by years of war. 
Thirdly, there are potentially dangerous 
legal implications in participating. All 
participants of AVR programmes must sign 
a ‘voluntary return declaration’. This is a 
legal document by which they affirm their 
willingness to return voluntarily to their 
country of origin. This is cause for great 
concern as claims for asylum hinge upon 
one main factor: proving a legitimate fear of 
persecution in the country you are fleeing. 
Signing an AVR voluntary return declaration 
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implies you no longer fear persecution and 
is likely to make any future claim – were 
conditions in the return country to change 
for the worse – lose credibility in the eyes of 
the law. A new application for asylum would 
face serious legal barriers given that the 
applicant has gone back home in the past. 
Conclusion
What is clear is that the principle that 
underpins the creation of AVR programmes 
is highly problematic, from both a legal and 
a human rights policy standpoint. It puts 
international actors such as UNHCR and 
IOM in a difficult relationship with national 
governments, with the agencies effectively 
supporting the latter in migration and border 
control through encouraging returns. For 
many, the decision to participate is made 
with the shadow of deportation hanging 
over their head. Decisions to return may 
not always lie with women themselves. 
Moreover, the majority of women and 
children participating in AVR programmes 
return to areas of conflict where they face 
additional hardships, persecution and 
possibly further displacement. National 
governments, UNHCR and IOM need to 
rethink this type of migration policy.
Monica Encinas 
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Psychosocial age assessments in the UK
Debbie Busler
Poor age assessment procedures may have devastating consequences. New guidance for 
social workers in England aims to help ensure that the age of asylum-seeking children is 
assessed more fairly, more ethically and more accurately. 
Age assessment is a process for determining 
the age of unaccompanied young people 
without documents (or who have not shared 
their documents) in countries where they 
are seeking refuge. As the European refugee 
‘crisis’ continues, more unaccompanied 
children are travelling to Europe. And the 
increase in migration makes it ever more 
likely that families will be separated, leaving 
young people to find their own way. 
International law, including the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
an array of national legislation are designed 
to protect children, including children 
seeking asylum. These laws and policies 
aim to ensure more protective immigration 
systems, and/or child welfare systems that 
offer particular benefits and safeguards. 
It is critical for children to be protected 
appropriately, and to receive the services they 
need and are entitled to, such as appropriate 
accommodation and school placements. For 
this, it is necessary to determine the age of 
anyone seeking asylum who may be a child. 
Across Europe, a range of methods 
is employed, from medical to dental 
to psychosocial assessments, or any 
combination of these, but none produces 
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exact results.1 In only a handful of countries 
in Europe are social workers involved in 
age assessments; most countries use an 
age determination interview undertaken 
by immigration officials. The majority (24 
out of 30 countries) use carpal (hand/wrist) 
X-rays, with approximately half using collar 
bone and/or dental X-rays as part of their 
age assessment process. About one-third 
use sexual maturity observations. The 
use of X-rays is in itself controversial; the 
British Dental Association, for example, 
has stated that it is “inappropriate and 
unethical to take radiographs of people 
when there is no health benefit for them”. 2 
Regardless of the type of age assessment, 
the usual range of possible ages is two to 
three years on either side of the suggested 
age. For a young person, this can make 
a huge difference. Approximately two-
thirds of European countries give young 
people the benefit of the doubt during age 
assessments. The controversial and inexact 
nature of age assessments means that the 
practice is discussed regularly in various fora 
but change to the process has been slow.
New developments
The UK has recently strengthened its move 
toward a purely psychosocial model for 
age assessments.  Psychosocial assessments 
involve interviews with and observations 
of the young people (with contributions by 
any other professionals working with them), 
exploring their lives (physical, emotional, 
familial, educational and beyond) particularly 
in relation to their social environment, 
both current and past. These types of 
assessments, carried out by social workers, 
have been undertaken for more than a 
decade in the UK but without any official 
guidance, despite years of requests by social 
workers and NGOs for help completing these 
specialist assessments. With no guidance, 
the quality of age assessments varied widely 
and the resultant legal challenges meant 
that local authorities were spending more 
time and money completing second age 
assessments or fighting judicial reviews. 
Finally in 2013 a task force was created to 
address this gap, and in October 2015 the 
Association of Directors of Children’s Services 
published guidance for social workers in 
England conducting age assessments.3
The new social work guidance seeks to 
provide a framework for the least invasive, 
most multi-disciplinary process that 
adheres to international law and protects 
children. Though the guidance does not 
necessarily contain new ideas, it does 
consolidate case law and good practice in 
social work principles that have not been 
brought together in one place before.4 
It also supports and recommends, for 
example, the principle of the ‘benefit of the 
doubt’ being weighted towards assessing 
a young person as a child. The guidance 
was written by social work practitioners 
and managers and a young person’s asylum 
advocate, with legal advice provided by a 
barrister; the process was overseen by the 
Age Assessment Strategic Oversight Group, 
comprising representatives from a range of 
government and non-governmental agencies.
 The advantages of social workers 
undertaking age assessments are many:
  The assessments produced by social 
workers are psychosocial assessments. 
They do not include medical models, 
which continue to be controversial.
  Social workers focus on the well-being of 
children (and adults), not on immigration 
control, so are (theoretically) neutral in 
matters of immigration. 
  Social workers practising in the UK 
undergo years of training – both theoretical 
and in practical placements – on child 
development, child protection, how to 
complete assessments and, increasingly, 
human trafficking. 
  There are parallels between age 
assessments and needs assessments, 
which demand that social workers assess 
a young person holistically, searching for 
an understanding of a range of factors 
including health, education, individual 
experiences and family background.
  The nature of their work and their 
workplaces ensure that social workers 
are likely to be able to provide a more 
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informal, comfortable environment (in 
contrast to an immigration centre, for 
example) for assessment of a young 
person who may have experienced fear, 
exploitation, torture or abusive behaviour 
in their country of origin or during their 
travels.
Pitfalls and concerns
The ultimate goal of the Age Assessment 
Strategic Oversight Group in the UK 
is to have each of the professions that 
may play a role in the age assessment 
process to complete its own guidance, 
and for these chapters to be merged 
into one book to facilitate collaboration 
between all agencies involved. At present, 
however, the social work guidance 
is the only one that is complete.
Even with social workers being 
responsible for undertaking age assessments 
in the UK, immigration officers may make 
an initial determination on individuals who 
approach the Home Office, and so already 
influence the trajectory of the case. Those 
whose appearance ‘strongly suggests’ – in 
the opinion of the immigration services – 
that they are over the age of 18 will not be 
referred by immigration officers to a local 
authority for social work assessment. 
Informed consent is another critical issue 
when dealing with children. In the UK, 
social workers are responsible for judging 
whether young people have the maturity to 
understand what is being asked of them and 
to provide informed consent to participate 
(or not participate) in the activity. This 
judgement, however, can be quite subjective. 
Furthermore, in some other European 
countries, not all applicants are informed 
about the possible health consequences 
of medical procedures used, which calls 
into doubt how informed their consent can 
actually be. This is compounded by the 
fact that the person being asked to provide 
consent may well be a child, with limited 
understanding of what is being explained 
to them in a language that may not be their 
mother tongue. In about a third of European 
countries, the refusal to undergo a medical 
age assessment can result in automatic 
presumption that the young person is an 
adult. 
It is also critical that young people know 
how to challenge an outcome if they do not 
agree and have the means to do so. In the 
UK, young people can request a judicial 
review of the local authority’s work if they 
disagree with the age they have been assigned 
(assuming that they can secure legal aid 
and representation). In many European 
countries, advice about, availability of and 
access to appeal are severely limited. 
Conclusion
The guidance for social workers in 
England has been downloaded more than 
20,000 times in the first six months since 
publication, and some local authorities 
have revised their policies and procedures 
based on the guidance. It will take some 
time for the practice to become embedded 
and for it to be seen if it leads to better 
assessments and fewer legal challenges. 
A primary consideration of any age 
assessment should be the repercussions 
that may ensue if the assessment is not 
accurate. If a child is assessed as an adult, 
immigration detention and removal 
are very real possible outcomes. The 
psychological effects of detention cannot 
be overemphasised and for children 
detention can be even more destructive. 
Removal to the country from which they 
have fled is devastating. Regardless of the 
age assessment methods employed, those 
undertaking them have a responsibility to 
ensure the safety of those in their charge.
Debbie Busler debbiebusler@yahoo.com  
Head of Refugee Support, British Red Cross 
www.redcross.org.uk and former Head of Asylum 
and Leaving Care for a west London local 
authority (when age assessment project started)
1. European Asylum Support Office (2013) Age assessment practice 
in Europe www.refworld.org/pdfid/532191894.pdf 
2. www.bda.org/news-centre/latest-news-articles/Pages/Xrays-for-
young-asylum-seekers-inaccurate-and-unethical.aspx 
3. Online at http://adcs.org.uk/assets/documentation/
Age_Assessment_Guidance_2015_Final.pdf  The guidance is 
specifically for England but is open for anyone to adopt.  
4. See also the Scottish guidance compiled in 2012  
www.migrationscotland.org.uk/uploads/files/documents/age_
assessment_guidance.pdf 
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Sweden’s U-turn on asylum
Bernd Parusel
Sweden’s recent turnaround on asylum was triggered by various factors, including 
insufficient domestic preparedness and the humanitarian failures of other EU countries.
Sweden has long been one of the main 
destination countries within the European 
Union (EU) for people seeking protection, 
and almost 163,000 people – mainly from 
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq – applied for 
asylum in Sweden in 2015. The country’s 
good reputation among asylum seekers is 
not without foundation. Sweden has had 
one of the highest protection rates in Europe 
for many years; refugees and beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection were granted 
permanent residence; asylum seekers had 
access to the labour market directly after 
lodging their application; and the standards 
of accommodation and of legal and social 
assistance during the asylum procedure were 
comparatively fair. Many new arrivals had 
heard from relatives, friends or smugglers 
that Sweden was a good place to start a new 
life in safety, and that – regardless of whether 
refugee status or subsidiary protection 
was granted – beneficiaries of protection 
had a right to reunite with their families in 
Sweden. After four 
years, recognised 
refugees could become 
Swedish citizens.
By the end of 2015, 
much of this had 
radically and suddenly 
changed. While in 2014 
there had already been 
serious bottlenecks 
in the reception and 
accommodation 
provision for asylum 
seekers, when asylum 
seeker numbers 
climbed to record 
highs during the late 
summer and autumn 
of 2015 Sweden 
could no longer 
guarantee new arrivals 
a roof over their head. Municipalities 
were unable to provide social services 
and schooling as required by law, 
and the processing times for asylum 
applications stretched longer and longer. 
In October, the central government 
suddenly started reacting. A plethora of 
draconian restrictions was announced to 
provide ‘respite’ for the Swedish asylum 
reception system. The number of asylum 
seekers had to be drastically reduced, it 
was argued. Beneficiaries of protection 
would in the future only be granted 
temporary stay, and their right to family 
reunification would be limited to the 
minimum required by international and EU 
law.1 At Sweden’s Schengen borders, border 
checks were temporarily reintroduced and, 
since January 2016, bus, train and ferry 
companies are no longer allowed to carry 
passengers without identity documents 
from neighbouring Denmark or Germany 
to Sweden. Even the approach towards 
Öresund Bridge, which links Denmark and Sweden and serves as the main entry route for 
refugees into Sweden. 
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unaccompanied minors was soon to become 
tougher, according to the government.
After these announcements, and probably 
also as a result of seasonal variations and 
the closure of the irregular migration 
routes across the Western Balkans, the 
number of asylum seekers decreased almost 
at once. In March 2016, weekly arrivals 
were only about 5% of those recorded in 
early November 2015. And while many 
Swedes probably felt relieved at reduced 
immigration pressure, others were taken 
aback by Sweden’s new restrictive stance. 
The government continues to state that its 
turnaround on asylum is temporary, and that 
Sweden will return to openness as soon as 
the reception situation is under control again. 
Yet any normalisation of the situation will 
inevitably take a long time: many thousands 
of affordable rental apartments will need to be 
built, steps will need to be taken to improve 
the ability of new arrivals to integrate into the 
labour market, and a large number of teachers 
and medical staff will need to be recruited 
to keep the education and welfare systems 
functioning. Moreover, the Migration Agency 
has a backlog of pending asylum applications 
(more than 157,000 cases as of 1st April 2016). 
Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and 
Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson 
have said that Sweden’s new restrictive 
approach is intended not only to mitigate 
domestic problems but also to encourage 
other EU Member States to accept more 
refugees, thus easing the burden on Sweden. 
Yet measures introduced by Denmark, 
Norway and others have been even more 
hostile towards those seeking protection. 
So, what can be learned from this? 
First of all, a majority of the Swedish people, 
and their political representatives (except 
those on the extreme right), have long 
held a positive view of migration and the 
need to grant protection yet they failed to 
establish systems that could absorb a rapid 
and substantial increase in numbers. Most 
strikingly, there has been a grave lack of 
affordable housing for quite some time, 
aggravated by the fact that the Migration 
Agency normally rents ordinary apartments 
as accommodation for asylum seekers. 
Those who are then granted protection 
are required to move out of these facilities 
but in practice they will most often need 
the same type of housing even after the 
asylum procedure, while other groups with 
below-average financial means – such as 
pensioners, students and young people – 
compete in the same market segment.2 
More generally speaking, there is 
widespread anxiety that the largely 
deregulated Swedish welfare state is 
no longer strong enough to integrate a 
greatly increased number of beneficiaries 
of protection and subsequent family-
related immigration. Thus, even if the 
mainstream discourse about immigration 
and asylum is essentially compassionate 
and many people understand why Syrians, 
Eritreans or Afghans are not safe in their 
home countries, this does not guarantee 
a welcoming and inclusive attitude to 
protection seekers in the longer run.  
Another point is a lack of solidarity 
within the EU and the inability of its 
member states to adequately deal with what 
has been described as the worst refugee 
situation in modern history. Politicians and 
commentators have sometimes argued that 
if all EU countries had welcomed refugees 
to the same extent as Sweden (in relative 
numbers), Europe would not even have had 
a refugee ‘crisis’. In a common market and 
political union such as the EU, when a few 
countries accept large numbers of asylum 
seekers while others do not, people inevitably 
question the imbalances and inequities. 
When calls for solidarity fall on deaf ears, 
more societies will start closing their doors. 
Bernd Parusel 
bernd.parusel@migrationsverket.se 
Expert, European Migration Network, Swedish 
Migration Agency. This article is written in a 
personal capacity.
1. People with refugee status will still have a right to family 
reunification (spouses, partners and children under the age of 18) 
but not people with subsidiary protection.
2. Parusel B (2015) Focus Migration country profile Sweden, 
Osnabruck/Bonn: Institute for Migration Research and 
Intercultural Studies/Federal Agency for Civic Education  
www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/Country%20Profile%20
Sweden_2015_0.pdf
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Responding to LGBT forced migration in East Africa
Gitta Zomorodi
Following the passage of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act in December 2013, hundreds of 
LGBT individuals fled to Kenya seeking safety. 
Over the past decade, lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender (LGBT) Ugandans have 
sought safety and asylum in various countries 
but never in such numbers or with such a 
high degree of visibility as following the 
passage of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality 
Act in December 2013. Data provided by 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) and 
other service providers in Kenya indicate 
that at least 400 LGBT Ugandans sought 
safety and asylum in Kenya between 
January 2014 and February 2015. The 
overwhelming majority of those identified 
were in their late teens or early twenties 
and identified as gay men. In addition to 
asylum seekers, there were also reports of 
LGBT Ugandans relocating temporarily to 
Kenya, both legally – by passing through an 
official border checkpoint – and illegally. 
International donors, local organisations 
and refugee service providers including 
UNHCR struggled to respond. Meanwhile, 
the Kenyan government had initiated a series 
of severe measures affecting refugees in 
Kenya.1 Given the complexities of the push 
and pull factors involved, as well as the 
challenging context in Kenya, stakeholders 
must consider a variety of strategies both 
to address the causes of the outflow from 
Uganda and to respond to the current 
needs of LGBT forced migrants in Kenya.2 
Push and pull factors
While the Anti-Homosexuality Act was 
the most obvious motivating factor, the 
unprecedented exodus of LGBT Ugandans 
cannot be attributed solely to its passage. 
There were many pre-existing push factors 
in Uganda but these were exacerbated by 
the perceived green light for discrimination 
and abuse given by the law’s passage. 
Ugandan organisations working with the 
LGBT community documented an overall 
increase in 2014 in reported threats and 
incidents of violence, blackmail, media 
‘outings’, loss of employment, and expulsion 
from school.3 A widely held belief that the 
Anti-Homosexuality Act required citizens 
to turn in suspected LGBT individuals led 
to pre-emptive family rejections, evictions 
and reports to the police even before the 
bill was signed into law. At the same time, 
under threat of the law’s clause outlawing 
‘promotion’ of homosexuality, many 
organisations providing services to the 
LGBT community initially suspended or 
scaled back their programmes. Demands 
to support the relocation and welfare of 
LGBT individuals experiencing threats were 
beyond the capacity of such organisations.
The annulment of the Anti-Homosexuality 
Act by Uganda’s High Court in August 2014 
did little to change the hostile environment. 
Some Ugandan activists suggested that, since 
the law was struck down on a technicality and 
not because of its substance, its nullification 
emboldened the public to take matters into 
their own hands. This was reinforced by 
Ugandan members of parliament petitioning 
for the bill’s re-introduction and by reports 
in November 2014 of politicians considering 
a new law targeting the LGBT community, 
the Prohibition of Promotion of Unnatural 
Offences Bill. While specific incidents of arrest 
or violence played a large role in driving 
individuals’ migration, in the general climate 
of fear created by the bill others simply did 
not want to wait for something to happen.
In Kenya, UNHCR and its partners 
initially prioritised the unexpected new 
caseload and expedited the resettlement of 
LGBT Ugandans. In a country where refugees 
wait years hoping for resettlement, at least 
one Ugandan case sped through in a record 
eight months between entry into Kenya and 
resettlement to the United States. For those 
who chose not to go to Kakuma refugee 
camp, a UNHCR partner provided a monthly 
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stipend, at first made available to all LGBT 
Ugandan asylum seekers in Nairobi. Several 
Kenyan LGBT-led organisations made their 
pre-existing services available to the new 
arrivals or created new programmes to address 
their specific needs. The services and support 
available in Kenya and the rapid processing 
by UNHCR acted as increasingly powerful 
pull factors as news of these resources made 
its way back to Uganda. This draw may 
have been especially strong for young LGBT 
Ugandans whose education and employment 
opportunities are limited by stigma and 
discrimination, and whose lack of social safety 
nets makes them particularly vulnerable. 
Challenges
LGBT Ugandans who fled to Kenya expecting 
a safer, friendlier environment and automatic 
passage to the West were quickly disillusioned. 
In terms of homophobic attitudes, Kenya differs 
little from Uganda, and Kenya also has anti-
sodomy laws used to harass and arbitrarily 
detain LGBT individuals. In Kakuma, LGBT 
Ugandans reported discrimination by staff of 
UNHCR implementing partners and by the 
police, threats and harassment from other 
refugees, and physical attacks. Most moved 
into ‘protection areas’ which offered more 
safety but also increased their visibility.4 
Those in Nairobi fared little better. The 
Kenyan government’s encampment policy 
makes it illegal for asylum seekers or refugees 
to live outside designated refugee areas, 
meaning those found by the police outside 
those areas face fines and imprisonment; 
at the same time, the government’s anti-
terrorist stance has made all foreigners 
in Kenya more vulnerable to arrest, 
detention, abuse and deportation. LGBT 
Ugandans struggled to find safe, affordable 
accommodation. Some were reported to the 
police by their neighbours or experienced 
violent attacks. Despite access to financial 
and social assistance from UNHCR and 
other organisations, many LGBT Ugandans 
found it difficult to support themselves in 
Kenya’s comparatively expensive environment 
where they have no legal right to work. 
The initial prioritisation of all Ugandan 
LGBT cases by UNHCR and provision of 
financial assistance to those in Nairobi 
fostered the belief that all Ugandan LGBT 
asylum seekers would receive the same 
support, regardless of differing levels of 
vulnerability, and that seeking asylum in 
Kenya was a sure route to quick resettlement. 
But with a growing caseload and limited 
financial resources, UNHCR and its partners 
were forced to reconsider whether they 
could sustain this approach. Allegations 
of human smuggling and asylum fraud 
further complicated circumstances. By the 
end of 2014, UNHCR and its partners no 
longer automatically categorised all LGBT 
Ugandans as vulnerable but instead began 
assessing needs on a case-by-case basis. 
UNHCR increasingly looked to Kenyan 
LGBT organisations to provide humanitarian 
aid to the Ugandan migrants but the forms 
of assistance that UNHCR hoped they would 
provide, and that migrants demanded, had 
not been part of these groups’ programmes, 
even for LGBT Kenyans. Kenyan LGBT 
groups that did extend their existing services 
to the Ugandans, such as health services 
and counselling, or that created temporary 
housing and assistance programmes for 
them, faced significant strains on their human 
and financial resources. Many also feared 
that providing services to a population in 
Kenya possibly illegally could endanger 
their work, and worried that heightened 
attention to the LGBT community more 
generally could jeopardise the gains 
made by the Kenyan LGBT movement. 
Meanwhile, in Uganda organisations 
working with the LGBT community, while 
deeply concerned for the well-being and 
safety of those in Kenya, felt that providing 
direct support across the border was 
beyond their capacity and jurisdiction.
The situation was exacerbated by 
international activists who launched 
fundraising appeals, sent funds to enable 
LGBT Ugandans to flee to Kenya, and made 
promises to help them ‘escape’ to a safer 
life. The migrants had high expectations 
of their helpers and, as refugee processing 
times lengthened, the challenge became 
how to support a group so focused on 
resettlement to become self-sustaining.
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Recommendations 
Information dissemination is critical 
for helping individuals make informed 
decisions. Ugandan LGBT organisations 
should provide reliable and accurate 
information on the asylum-seeking process, 
the realities of refugee camp life, risks in 
Nairobi, and chances of resettlement. This 
information should be integrated into legal 
and protection trainings for LGBT activists 
and organisations, and disseminated 
to LGBT community members through 
informal networks, using social media, and 
ensuring outreach to rural and poor LGBT 
people. International allies should provide 
the same information and messages as local 
organisations to those seeking assistance.
In order to determine how to make 
temporary relocation to Kenya, and other 
countries in East Africa, a safer and more 
viable option, LGBT-led organisations 
working in the region should collaborate 
in assessing risks, identifying and 
mapping relocation possibilities, and 
developing more proactive and structured 
means of communication. Ugandan 
organisations should also assess whether 
‘know your rights’ trainings in-country 
have had their intended impact. 
Donors and local organisations should 
a) assess current funding and programmatic 
priorities to determine if they address the 
vulnerabilities that lead to asylum seeking 
or migration; b) explore opportunities to 
support and expand programmes on health, 
psychosocial support and livelihoods; and c) 
more explicitly examine how a greater focus 
on these issues could bolster the protection 
and security of LGBT community members. 
In Kenya, refugee service providers and 
LGBT organisations working with forced 
migrants should provide more information 
to new arrivals about their options and 
not immediately advise individuals to 
seek asylum, as many assume it will lead 
directly to resettlement in a third country. 
Resettlement is not and cannot be the 
solution for all LGBT forced migrants. 
Donors and groups in the region 
should support LGBT refugee groups in 
organising themselves and in their work to 
identify their needs, priorities and possible 
solutions. Support from local advisors, 
such as Kenyan LGBT groups and refugee 
service providers, is vital for providing 
knowledge on the local context (such as how 
to get work permits, access services and 
identify safer neighbourhoods) and help 
with personal security strategies, and for 
referrals to LGBT-friendly service providers. 
Given resettlement processing times 
and the fact that not all refugees will be 
resettled, there needs to be support for 
scattered-site housing options in Kenya and 
the development of training and income-
generation programmes. It should be borne 
in mind, however, that protection strategies 
that may work for a small number of LGBT 
asylum seekers may be difficult to scale 
up or sustain with larger numbers. 
Sensitivity training for refugee service 
providers and local LGBT partners is 
critical to ensure that services are accessible 
and responsive to the particular needs 
of this community. More work needs to 
be done to engage Kenyan police and to 
sensitise community and faith leaders, 
particularly in the refugee camps, to 
reduce stigma and harassment.
Joint mapping of roles and resources by 
LGBT organisations in both Uganda and 
Kenya would help to build a picture of the 
overall needs related to the situation and 
to identify funding gaps. This should also 
strengthen their ability to address problems, 
to plan ahead and to advocate jointly – to 
UNHCR, service providers and funders. 
Gitta Zomorodi gittazomorodi@gmail.com  
Human rights and philanthropy consultant. 
1. See Wirth A (2014) ‘Reflections from the encampment decision 
in the High Court of Kenya’, Forced Migration Review issue 48 
www.fmreview.org/faith/wirth  
2. Based on research conducted between December 2014 and May 
2015, commissioned by the Global Philanthropy Project  
http://globalphilanthropyproject.org/. Full report available at:  
http://tinyurl.com/Zomorodi-2016-east-africa See also Forced 
Migration Review issue 42 on ‘Sexual orientation and gender 
identity and the protection of forced migrants’  
www.fmreview.org/sogi 
3. See HRAPF (2015) Uganda Report of Violations Based on Gender 
Identity and Sexual Orientation  
http://hrapf.org/publications/research-papers/ 
4. See Freccero J (2015) ‘Sheltering displaced persons from sexual 
and gender-based violence’, Forced Migration Review issue 50 
www.fmreview.org/dayton20/freccero 
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The legal status of Iraqi refugees in neighbouring 
countries
Mohammad Abbas Mohsen
There is little protection and assistance available for Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries, 
especially as these countries are predominantly non-signatories to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. It is consequently hard for refugees to support themselves – and to keep safe.
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) estimates 
that approximately 4.5 million Iraqis – one 
sixth of Iraq’s population – have been 
displaced. Nearly four million are internally 
displaced, and most of the rest are living in 
countries in the region, such as Lebanon, 
Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Egypt. 
However, Iraqis entering and residing in these 
countries without official documentation 
are considered illegal and therefore benefit 
from only limited legal protection. 
Although Turkey has signed the 1951 
Refugee Convention, it does not grant refugee 
status to people who are coming from 
countries other than European countries. As 
such, Iraqis are only allowed to stay in Turkey 
for a limited period until they get asylum in 
a third country. Lebanon and Jordan are also 
not signatories to the Refugee Convention. 
Iran acceded to the Convention but expressed 
reservation on four articles, including article 
26 which allows freedom of movement for 
refugees. Egypt is a signatory but refuses to 
allow refugees to work (although without 
officially stating so) and also restricts their 
access to services provided by the state; in 
addition, entry to Egypt has become very 
difficult because refugees are required 
to first have a face-to-face meeting at an 
Egyptian embassy which is only possible 
in Amman or Damascus. The difficulty of 
getting entry visas results in Iraqi families 
being separated; additionally, it reduces the 
opportunities for making journeys back to 
Iraq to realise assets to support life in exile. 
The legal protection granted to Iraqi 
refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring 
countries is restricted to the legal principle 
of preventing of refoulement, according to 
which host countries must, as a minimum, 
adopt measures to protect refugees on 
their territory from expulsion back to their 
original country when the conditions that 
caused them to flee are still in place.
Although the governments of these 
countries allow UNHCR or the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) to register 
the refugees, the protection granted by 
such registration is limited. It may enable 
access to services but this does not give 
the refugees the right to seek asylum or to 
obtain legal residency or refugee status. 
This legal situation affects many aspects 
of displaced Iraqis’ lives. They are unable, 
for example, to access basic services and 
employment, nor do they have access to 
registration of births, deaths and marriages.
Iraqis in this situation continually fear 
arrest, detention or deportation to Iraq. Men 
are usually more at risk of being arrested and 
therefore need to stay out of the authorities’ 
sight; as a consequence, women have to 
take the lead in accessing assistance. This 
increases the risk of sexual harassment and 
exploitation while out in the streets and 
at assistance centres but because of their 
illegal status in the country they very rarely 
approach police or concerned authorities if 
they suffer harassment. Even people who have 
some legal status send their children out to 
work instead of themselves because of the 
fear of arrest; as a result, children are being 
deprived of schooling and are more likely 
to be victims of abuse and exploitation.
With little likelihood of a decrease 
in the number of Iraqi refugees in the 
neighbouring countries, the most urgent 
need is to resolve the problems associated 
with legality of refugee status.
Dr Mohammed Abbas Mohsen 
dr.mam1980@yahoo.com  
Assistant Professor of Law, Baghdad, Iraq
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Imprisonment and deportation of Iraqi refugees  
in Lebanon
Qusay Tariq Al-Zubaidi
A non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Lebanon does not grant refugee status to 
Iraqis, many of whom end up spending long periods of time in detention.
The lack of legal status for Iraqi refugees 
in Lebanon has a variety of unwelcome 
consequences. For example, if they find 
themselves exploited or abused – by 
employers or landlords – they are unable 
to approach the legal authorities to file a 
complaint. Moreover, under article 32 of 
Lebanon’s 1962 law regulating the entry 
of foreigners into Lebanon, their stay 
and their exit from Lebanon, foreigners 
entering Lebanese territory illegally are 
liable to imprisonment (from one month 
to three years), fines and deportation. 
For Iraqi refugees, if they are arrested 
and proved to be there illegally, they 
are liable to the same punishments, 
treated as criminals, not as refugees.
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) can 
grant theoretical legitimacy to Iraqis by 
registering them as refugees and providing a 
document which confirms that the bearer of 
the document has been accepted by UNHCR 
as a refugee. But as Lebanon has not signed 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, it does not 
consider itself bound by this designation. 
When a UNHCR-registered refugee is 
imprisoned on charges of illegal stay, 
UNHCR tries to persuade Lebanese officials 
to recognise the individual as a refugee, and 
also regularly visits the Iraqi in prison. All 
detained Iraqis are eligible to register with 
UNHCR if they have not already done so. 
As an Iraqi I worked as a volunteer in 
a humanitarian organisation helping other 
displaced Iraqis in Lebanon but someone 
notified the authorities, telling them that 
I was working for money, rather than as a 
volunteer. The authorities gave me 15 days 
to leave and told me I could not return for 
five years. I could not risk death by returning 
to Iraq so now I move from house to house, 
always in fear. I have come to know the reality 
of living illegally, with no right of residency, 
at risk of imprisonment at any minute. 
I, my friends and thousands of other 
Iraqi refugees are in constant fear of arrest 
and detention. Some try to remain unnoticed 
by refraining from work while others, 
who do work illegally, face exploitation in 
the workplace but are unable to approach 
the authorities to file a complaint.
Ahmad, a 23-year-old Iraqi refugee 
in Lebanon, was arrested at a security 
checkpoint and imprisoned for one month – 
which was extended to six or seven months, 
and then for a further six months. Eventually 
UNHCR took up his case and was able to 
secure him temporary refugee status in 
Lebanon. Ahmad’s story is one of hundreds 
of stories of Iraqis in this miserable situation.
UNHCR estimated that there were 
more 500 Iraqi refugees detained in 
Lebanese prisons in 2015. Once Iraqis 
have completed their prison sentences for 
staying illegally, Lebanon is obliged under 
international law not to deport them by 
force to a place where their lives are at 
risk; however, rather than releasing them, 
the authorities usually continue to keep 
them detained indefinitely. UNHCR is only 
able to help in the release of a very small 
number of them; the majority only gain 
their release by agreeing to return to Iraq.
Even if Lebanon is not bound to 
help and support refugees by giving 
them the opportunity to integrate into 
local society, Lebanon is nevertheless 
required to respect fundamental human 
rights; they could in addition provide 
temporary work permits renewable until 
it is safe for Iraqis to return to Iraq.
Qusay Tariq Al-Zubaidi  
qusaytariq@hotmail.com 
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Communication of information on  
the Thai-Burma border
Victoria Jack
Communication of information has emerged as a particular concern for camp residents in 
Thailand since discussions about repatriation gained momentum in the past few years. 
Roughly 110,000 camp residents – mostly 
ethnic Karen – live in nine camps on the 
Thai-Burma border, where humanitarian 
programmes now focus on preparedness for 
return. The general consensus among the 
humanitarian community is that conditions 
in Burma are not yet conducive to promote 
repatriation.1 However, the lack of official 
information and the uncertainty caused 
by cuts to funding and consequent service 
reductions in the camps have made refugees 
anxious to obtain reliable information 
about their options for the future. 
The Karen Refugee Committee formally 
highlighted the need for improved 
information sharing with refugees as a 
priority concern at the first workshop on 
repatriation in June 2012. UNHCR (the UN 
Refugee Agency) and the Committee for the 
Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons 
in Thailand (CCSDPT) – which coordinates 
the involvement of 19 NGOs providing 
services in the camps – have acknowledged 
that refugees lack access to formal channels 
through which relevant and credible 
information can be requested and accessed.2
In 2013 I conducted an ethnographic 
study that sought to understand how 
camp residents perceived the role and 
importance of communication in camp 
settings, particularly in light of the prospect 
of repatriation. Many camp residents I spoke 
to explained that a lack of access to trusted 
information about the situation in Burma 
and plans for repatriation heightened their 
concern and uncertainty. For instance, a 
woman with two children said, “I don’t know 
anything, any information, about where 
they will send us and what they will do.”
Camp residents also wanted to know 
about alternative options for those who did 
not wish to return to Burma. Would they 
be permitted to stay in the camps or move 
to a third country? Or would the camps be 
forcibly closed and repatriation forced on 
those who are ineligible for resettlement 
because they arrived after the Thai 
government’s November 2005 moratorium 
on screening new arrivals? Moreover, 
camp residents wanted not simply to be 
the recipients of information but to give 
voice to their concerns and questions about 
the negotiation of conditions for return. 
“We stay here for so long, but no one gives us a 
chance. We can’t meet with the UN or NGOs. We 
can’t say anything; we just close our mouths and 
stay quiet. …No one comes down to speak with us, 
to give us a chance or to give us a human right to 
say what we need to say.” (elderly male resident 
in Mae La camp)
Dialogue about these and other matters 
is necessary if camp residents are to make 
informed decisions about whether, when 
and how they feel safe to return, which is 
surely a prerequisite for ‘voluntary’ 
repatriation. As preparations for 
repatriation progress, camp residents 
will need to know about matters 
such as relocation areas, livelihood 
opportunities, safeguards for human 
rights, clearance of land mines, 
location of troops, and whether 
education and training received in 
camp will be recognised in Burma. 
“If you decide your fate on rumours, it 
is all wrong; that is the point I want you 
to understand,” a man in Nu Po told 
me. Likewise, a young man in Mae La 
explained: “The refugees need to know 
the right information. … If they don’t, 
they will do the wrong thing for their 
future, so their life will never improve.”
Loudspeaker in Umpiem camp.
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Main sources of information
Information flows in the camps follow a 
hierarchical structure of authority in a 
manner that simultaneously facilitates and 
restricts camp residents’ access to information. 
‘Section’ meetings (for different geographic 
sections of each camp), loudspeakers and 
noticeboards – all managed by the camp 
committees – are the primary conduits used 
by humanitarian organisations to disseminate 
information to the camp populations. In 
practice these mechanisms do not function 
consistently nor are they accessible to all 
sections of all camps. Camp residents felt the 
information-sharing mechanisms provided 
information predominantly relating to 
rules and procedures to be followed in 
camp but failed to address in detail the 
matters they deemed most important.
Humanitarian practitioners form the 
upper tier of the hierarchy of control over 
information disseminated in the camps, as 
they are the primary sources of information 
accessible to the camp committees, and 
their decisions about what information 
is provided or is not provided directly 
affect camp residents. Humanitarian 
practitioners described making decisions 
about what information to disseminate on 
an ad hoc basis in accordance with their 
own notions of the relevance of certain 
details to the camp populations. However, 
there is a lack of structures to better ensure 
that these decisions respond to the actual 
information needs of camps residents, 
which will inevitably change over time. 
Additional ‘gatekeeping’ of information 
occurs when the camp committees make 
decisions about what parts of the information 
provided by humanitarian organisations 
should be passed on to section leaders, 
who then pass that information on to camp 
residents. The camp administrations have 
been dominated by Christian Sgaw-speaking 
Karen, who make up only a third of the 
Karen population but who are generally the 
more educated and prosperous Karen. The 
representativeness of the camp committees 
is also undermined by the exclusion of 
unregistered camp residents from the right to 
vote or be nominated in the camp committee 
elections. This is particularly problematic 
in Mae La, Umpiem and Nu Po camps, 
where a substantial number of unregistered 
people are not part of the majority ethnic 
group. Non-Karen camp residents frequently 
expressed a belief that the Karen received 
preferential treatment in camp and that 
other ethnic groups were marginalised 
and voiceless. Accordingly, humanitarian 
organisations should communicate the most 
important issues directly to camp residents.3
Given that only one person per household 
is permitted to attend the section meetings, 
the attending member of a household 
also exercises significant control over the 
information that other household members 
access. A woman in her mid-20s explained 
that her grandfather had withheld from 
other family members information about 
the brief period of registration conducted 
by UNHCR prior to the commencement 
of the resettlement programme in 2005. 
Her grandfather harboured hopes that 
it would one day be safe enough to 
return to Karen State, and he wanted his 
relatives to return with him. By the time 
the rest of the family found out about the 
opportunity for registration, it was too late 
for them to have their cases considered. 
A clear theme to emerge is that camp 
residents at the bottom of the hierarchy of 
camp communication are least likely to 
Loudspeaker in Umpiem camp.
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obtain timely and reliable information. 
Camp residents who cannot attend the 
section meetings, are illiterate, cannot 
speak Karen or live in an area where the 
loudspeaker is broken or inaudible – or 
where there is no loudspeaker – are forced 
to rely heavily on word-of-mouth accounts 
from camp residents who have better access 
to the information-sharing mechanisms. 
Camp residents from the most vulnerable 
households are less likely to attend section 
meetings because they are preoccupied 
with the daily struggle of trying to eke out a 
living. One young woman said she and her 
mother were unable to attend the meetings 
because they were busy struggling to make 
ends meet since her father died some years 
ago. “We go outside and work in a village so 
we do not attend the meetings,” she said. 
The accessibility of printed materials – 
such as on the noticeboards – is limited 
given that illiteracy is common among 
camp residents. An additional problem 
is that each individual announcement is 
typically printed in only one language – 
Karen, Burmese or English (depending on 
the majority ethnic makeup of the camp). 
Some camp residents tried to obtain 
information independently but they have 
very limited access to news media and 
communication technologies. In the absence 
of other sources of information, the sharing 
of rumours was a way for camp residents to 
collectively speculate about, give meaning to 
and thereby make sense of their experiences. 
Since the fieldwork for this study 
was completed, CCSDPT has worked 
with the Karen Refugee Committee to 
develop a model for information sharing. 
Camp Information Teams made up of 
personnel recruited from the camp 
populations now operate in the seven 
‘Karen camps’. The Karen Refugee 
Committee is responsible for training 
the teams in a variety of information 
dissemination activities, including 
community screenings, community 
forums, home visits, in-office DVD 
shows, and leaflet distribution. CCSDPT 
provides technical support and funding. 
Conclusion
The challenges around information sharing 
on the Thai-Burma border are indicative of 
the humanitarian sector’s historical tendency 
to focus aid efforts on physical needs, while 
information and communication are treated 
as secondary concerns. If humanitarian 
organisations fail to provide access to timely 
and accurate information, this can have a 
significant impact on the mental well-being 
of refugees, as well as inhibit their ability to 
make informed decisions. Moreover, there 
is an established link between dialogue – 
that is, ensuring that beneficiaries of aid not 
only have access to information but also that 
humanitarian organisations listen to their 
voices – and improvements to the design 
and delivery of aid, relationship building, 
accountability, transparency and trust.4 
Information provision needs to be 
carefully planned in order to reflect 
the diversity of camp residents, and 
so as not to perpetuate and exacerbate 
social inequalities, and therefore further 
marginalise and disempower. In the 
past decade, a range of humanitarian 
organisations have re-envisioned 
communication as both a fundamental 
need of crisis-affected communities and a 
service that can improve the quality and 
effectiveness of aid efforts across sectors. 
Victoria Jack victoriaalicejack@gmail.com 
Currently working with Internews in Greece 
www.internews.org; recent PhD graduate from 
the School of Design, Communication and IT at 
the University of Newcastle, Australia, where her 
thesis was on ‘Communication as aid: Giving 
voice to refugees on the Thai-Burma border’.
1. The Border Consortium (2015) Programme report: January-June 
2015, p11  
www.theborderconsortium.org/media/62531/2015-6-mth-rpt-Jan-
Jun.pdf
2. See CCSDPT Information sharing terms of reference and 
updates www.ccsdpt.org/information-sharing/
3. See UNHCR (2006) Operational Protection in Camps and 
Settlements, p57-63 www.unhcr.org/448d6c122.html
4. Abud M, Quintanilla J and Ensor D (2011) Dadaab, Kenya. 
Humanitarian communication and information needs 
assessment among refugees in the camps: Findings, analysis and 
recommendations. Internews  
www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/
Dadaab2011-09-14.pdf
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Watch this 
TED talk: Our refugee system is failing. Here’s  
how we can fix it.
In February 2016, Alexander Betts (Professor of Forced 
Migration and International Affairs and Director of the 
RSC) gave a talk on the refugee crisis at the closing 
session of the TED 2016 conference in Vancouver. In 
the talk, Professor Betts calls for a new vision, in which 
refugees are not seen as an inevitable burden but 
are recognised as individuals with skills, talents and 
ambitions, deserving of more than the derisory choices 
currently available to them. 
Podcast at http://tinyurl.com/TED-Betts-Feb2016
Elizabeth Colson Lecture 2016
Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics 
of international intervention  
Séverine Autesserre (Associate Professor of Political 
Science, Columbia University) suggests a new 
explanation for why international peace interventions 
often fail to reach their full potential. Based on several 
years of ethnographic research in conflict zones around 
the world, she demonstrates that everyday elements – 
such as expatriates’ social habits and usual approaches 
to understanding their areas of operation – strongly 
influence peacebuilding effectiveness. Podcast online at 
http://tinyurl.com/RSC-Colson2016-Autesserre
Imposing Aid: 30th Anniversary
Emeritus Professor Barbara Harrell-Bond was the 
founder of the RSC. Her seminal book Imposing Aid, 
published in 1986, was the first independent appraisal 
of an assistance programme mounted by international 
agencies in response to an emergency influx of 
refugees – in this case the Ugandans who spilled over 
the Sudanese border in the early months of 1982. In the 
RSC’s May-June 2016 public seminar series (podcasts to 
be available), speakers reflect on the continuing relevance 
and influence of Imposing Aid. Details at  
http://tinyurl.com/RSC-ImposingAid-seminars 
The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in 
European Law 
Part of the acclaimed Oxford Studies 
in European Law, this new book by Dr 
Cathryn Costello (Associate Professor 
in International Human Rights and 
Refugee Law at the RSC) contributes 
a scholarly analysis of EU and ECHR 
migration and refugee law, including 
key EU legislative measures, the 
Court of Justice’s main rulings, and 
related European Court of Human 
Rights case law.  
For 30% discount (valid until 31.03.2017), order through 
www.oup.com/uk/law adding ALAUTHC4 code. (Limit 10 
copies per transaction; non-trade customers only.) 
Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced  
Migration Studies: Now in paperback + 30% discount* 
The Handbook critically evaluates the birth and 
development of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, 
and analyses the key contemporary and future challenges 
faced by academics and practitioners working with and for 
forcibly displaced populations around the world. Details at  
http://tinyurl.com/RSCRefugeeMigrationHandbook 
*£21.00 / US$35.00 (until 31.12.2016) – order via  
www.oup.com adding ASFLYQ6 code. (Limit 10 copies per 
transaction; non-trade customers only.) 
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We have, I believe, won acceptance for the argument…
Sadruddin Aga Khan (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1967)
From a statement made to the United Nations General Assembly, 20 November 1967.1
I should like to return for a moment to the 
question of Africa, and to the comment 
I made at the beginning of my statement 
when I mentioned the close relationship 
between the High Commissioner’s work and 
development. [...] agricultural resettlement is 
the best solution for the situation prevailing 
in Africa. This brings me to two observations 
which, I believe, are most important.
First, there is the interdependence 
between the refugee problem and the 
problem of development, an interdependence 
which comes to the fore in the consolidation 
phase, which in turn is possible only within 
the context of the total development of the 
regions where the refugees are settled. This 
is a fact that must be taken into account 
from the very outset. This integrated 
approach to the refugee problem and the 
development problem, this union of all 
forms of multilateral aid and, eventually, 
of bilateral aid, alone make it possible to 
achieve maximum economy in the use of 
resources and to avoid duplication and waste. 
The second observation … is the need to 
ensure co-ordination between the assistance 
of the High Commissioner’s Office [UNHCR] 
and the continuation of development 
programmes which the other United Nations 
organs are able to provide. For if there was  no 
co-operation, if there was no continuation, 
some Governments would be confronted 
with a new emergency once the High 
Commissioner’s assistance programmes had 
ended. For the High Commissioner cannot 
take on a task which is not within his realm 
and involve himself in development matter for 
other agencies to handle and involves not only 
refugees, but also the indigenous population 
of the countries where our programmes exist. 
Now, if our programmes were to end 
before other national or international agencies 
were ready to take over, we might well 
find ourselves in a very serious situation 
requiring further intervention by the High 
Commissioner and additional expenses. It 
is therefore imperative that we co-ordinate 
our efforts; the United Nations development 
agencies and the specialized agencies must 
grant top priority to requests from countries 
and for regions in which there are refugees.
With that aim in view, I have expanded 
my contacts and efforts with all the 
United Nations development agencies. 
The understanding and support I have 
encountered are most encouraging. We have, 
I believe, won acceptance for the argument 
that development plans which disregard 
the presence of large numbers of refugees, 
often as many as hundreds of thousands of 
persons amidst the indigenous population, 
would quite simply be doomed to failure. 
1. http://tinyurl.com/SadruddinAgaKhanGA1967   
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